Cognitive science and cognitive linguistics holds that the mind’s conceptual systems
structure perception, understanding and behaviour - including how the person relates to and interacts with the world (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2012). This happens in mostly unconscious processes. Forming part of a conceptual system is a cognitive frame, which is a bundle of strongly linked concepts and associated emotions and values, learnt through experience and stored in memory (Holmes et al 2011). These cognitive structures serve as ‘frames of reference' for interpreting new information and experiences. From this
perspective, because we act according to how we perceive, how we think about nature matters for generating appropriate and proportional responses to ecological crisis (Lakoff 2010). However, people’s conceptual systems are not necessarily internally consistent (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) and it seems we all have a variety of frames available to us that we can move between. Frames are activated in the mind by use of particular words. As this process is largely below the level of conscious awareness, cognitive scientists such as Lakoff suggest that attention should be given to carefully considering which frame is likely to be activated when particular language is used and whether this frame is congruent with pro- environmental values (Lakoff 2010). As critical discourse analysis recognises, metaphor use has political implications. Larson (2011) says “those who control language have the potential to overtly dominate society by naturalising particular ideas” (p95). For a concise history of frames theory see Darnton & Kirk (2011).
By analysing the language that my research participants use about nature I can infer how they perceive and conceptualise the natural world and the relationship between themselves (or humans generally) and nature, and whether these conceptualisations are congruent with pro-environmental behaviour.
There are a number of studies that analyse how the natural world, environmental change, climate change, sustainability and ecological crisis are being talked about and what the implications are for environmental attitudes and behaviour, and some of this work is being used to inform environmental campaigning (e.g. see valuesandframes.org). Some of this literature sits under the banner of ‘ecolinguistics’. Ecolinguistics critiques discourses for the way in which they encourage environmentally beneficial or destructive behaviour (e.g. Stibbe 2015). In some literature (e.g. Larson 2011) there is blurring between cognitive and ecolinguistics approaches, and my research follows this pattern. In psychology and social science research on human responses to ecological crisis, I found language tends to be analysed for themes in discourse but not so much in terms of its cognitive function. Grant et al (2004) observe that cognitive linguistics approaches are relatively undeveloped in
organisational discourse studies (see 3.3.2). Cognitive and ecolinguistics research tends not to be focussed on individuals, and I found no literature specifically examining self-nature relationships and the implications for influencing pro-environmental practices in
organisations (e.g. see Stibbe 2015; Larson 2011). These particular gaps in research notwithstanding, interest seems to be growing in the environmental community in how environmental issues and science are communicated.
I shall discuss the linguistics literature shortly but first I will clarify the relationship between cognitive frames and worldviews, and cognitive frames and metaphors.
Cognitive frames and cultural worldviews
In the subsection on priming of values (see 2.3.1) I mentioned the finding that people can be unwittingly primed to think and respond in particular ways through exposure to certain kinds of language and metaphors (e.g. Thibodeau & Boroditsky 2011). Exposure to language activates cognitive frames, and activation of a frame strengthens its physical neural basis,
making it easier to activate. The dominant discourse in a society, for example in organisations, the media and in educational, economic and political institutions has a priming effect, of which people tend to be unaware. These discourses express and reinforce particular values, beliefs, assumptions and presuppositions, which together constitute a cultural worldview. Griffin (1995 p6) notes that, “the assumptions that belong to a culture are often invisible in their fullest dimensions and consequences”. She advises that to change a culture we must first make visible patterns of abuse. In the next section I discuss cultural worldviews thought to be a cause of current ecological crisis, building upon the theory in this section on cognitive frames about nature.
Cognitive frames and metaphors
Our conceptual systems are regarded as fundamentally metaphorical in nature. The essence of metaphor, say Lakoff & Johnson (1980) is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. More formally, it involves mapping a ‘source domain’ of human experience that is familiar and easily or intuitively understood, onto the ‘target domain’ which is a less well understood or more vague, uncertain or complex domain of experience (Crompton 2010). Knowledge about the source domain is used in reasoning about the target domain, resulting in a possible metaphorical entailment in meaning, which may invite attitudes and behaviours with environmentally beneficial or destructive consequences. Metaphors are a framing device, and in cognitive linguists they are not primarily a linguistic phenomenon but a mental phenomenon - a cognitive operation that activates a frame. Here are three examples involving a mapping between human and nature in different ways to illustrate how it works:
a) With the term ‘foot of the mountain’, the physical structure of the human body is used as a source domain for describing a natural feature. The conceptual metaphor
(also called root analogy) is NATURE IS PERSON9 or LANDSCAPE IS HUMAN BODY. Our
feet make contact with the earth, so the entailment is that the mountain starts at the point where the land can be seen to rise out of the earth. I include this example to show how not everything from the source domain is necessarily carried over to the target domain: whilst mountains may have feet we don’t tend to think that they can walk.
b) The phrase ‘the root of the problem’ projects the source domain of plant onto the target domain of situation. The conceptual metaphor is SITUATION/IDEA IS PLANT, which is mapping nature and human affairs in the opposite direction to the example above. There is also a second mapping to do with height: CAUSE IS LOW. Entailments include problems can grow, and problems originate below the surface. The word ‘root’ may trigger activation of an organic cognitive frame.
c) With the term ‘I am running out of steam’, the conceptual metaphor is HUMAN IS
MACHINE. Machines are human-made artefacts not a naturally evolved entity. The
mapping reduces the complexity and mystery of the human mind to a known mechanistic structure. An entailment is: my purpose is to be productive. The word ‘steam’ may trigger activation of a mechanistic cognitive frame.
We can’t avoid communicating and sharing experience through use of metaphors because almost every word we use is a metaphor, as cognitive linguistics understands it. But metaphors are incomplete representations: they privilege one way of seeing and obscure others, so inevitably there is always some other aspect of the experience that is being downplayed or hidden. When a frame is activated, alternative frames are inhibited. Which frame is reinforced and which is inhibited when certain metaphors are used has significant implications for how we think about and act in response to ecological crisis. This is why I analyse the metaphors that participants use.