Manual 1 (usuario)

While these cognitive frameworks are useful for describing an individual’s ethical reasoning, they are insufficient for representing the definitive picture of ethical decision- making, as scholars increasingly call for a consideration of biases, intuition, and emotion in ethical decision-making (Haidt, 2001; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Reynolds, 2006; Zhong, 2011). This section will discuss the reasons behind this argument, followed by a review of ethical decision-making models that integrate both cognitive and non-cognitive factors.

The cognitive models or rationalist approach ignore the role of the affective domain, such as feelings and emotions that affect decision-making processes (Jackson, 1975; McShane, Olekalns, & Travaglione, 2013). These approaches also ignore individual differences in personal values, personal motivations and world views (Stewart, 1994). In fact, Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, Dyer, and Boothby (2012) suggest that the concept of automaticity is emerging in the area of decision-making, and that it has permeated nearly all domains of

21 psychological research over the last several years. Automaticity enables humans to perform certain tasks with little attention due to their capacity for unconscious thought ("Automaticity," 2013). Nordgren, Bos, and Dijksterhuis (2011) clarify this concept clearly. They suggest that the best decisions occur when conscious deliberation is followed by unconscious thought; as unconscious thought is superior in weighting the various alternatives leading to a decision. As such, various scholars corroborate the superiority of unconscious over conscious deliberation in three judgment domains: guilt, utilitarian morality (approving of harmful actions that nonetheless produced the best consequences), and, fairness (in complex job application procedures) (Ham & van den Bos, 2010a, 2010b; Ham, van den Bos, & Van Doorn, 2009).

2.3.2.1. Reasons to extend beyond cognitive processes

A strong critique of the rationalist perspective comes from social intuitionists, who propose that moral judgments do not typically arise from rules and beliefs; rather, they are most often the result of intuition, which includes emotion or a set of emotions (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001, 2004). For instance, Haidt (2001) propose the following: (1) moral judgments come about quickly and automatically through intuition; (2) an effortful moral reasoning process takes place after the occurrence of the moral judgment in order to justify the judgment; and (3) the resulting moral reasoning can be used to influence others’ moral judgments, which triggers their intuitions rather than engaging their rational minds (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001). In addition, Haidt (2001) suggests that group norms such as those held among friends, allies, and acquaintances have the capacity to exert a direct influence of their moral judgment on individuals, even in the absence of any reasoned persuasion. The importance of emotion is acknowledged by many empirical research studies, especially in the process of individuals dealing with ethical issues. One such set of studies examines the effects of emotion on moral reasoning and moral

22 behaviour by longitudinally examining the deviant behaviours of individuals with various brain abnormalities that impair their emotional capacity (Damasio, 1994; Greene & Haidt, 2002). Similarly, in a longitudinal study conducted by Greene and Haidt (2002), individuals who have neurological damage to parts of the brain that handle emotions were found to suffer from diminished capacities for moral reasoning. This evidence indicates that emotion is not only relevant to moral judgment, but is also more broadly relevant to ethical decision-making. Tenbrunsel and Smith‐Crowe (2008) conclude that, while moral decision making may involve deliberate processing in some situations, other situations may produce automatic moral decision making.

Gaudine and Thorne (2001) observe that the prevalence of emotion in individuals' ethical decision processes has been identified by researchers from various theoretical and philosophical perspectives (for example, Etzioni, 1988; Gibbard, 1990; Solomon, 1993). Therefore, Gaudine and Thorne (2001) propose a cognitive-affective model that considers how the two dimensions of emotion (i.e. feeling state and arousal) influence each of the four components of Rest's (1994) model. The scholars propose that certain emotional states play an important part in: (i) influencing an individual's propensity to identify ethical dilemmas; (ii) facilitating the formation of the individual's prescriptive judgments at the relevant levels of moral development; (iii) leading to ethical decision choices that are consistent with the individual's prescriptive judgements; and (iv) promoting the individual's compliance with his or her ethical decision choices.

Damasio (1994) presents a neurological perspective, where he suggests that emotions and feelings are enmeshed in the network of reasoning processes, both as mechanisms in biological regulation to guide reasoning strategies, and to ensure effective deployment of

23 the reasoning made. Although at times, emotions and feelings complicate decision- making processes, Damasio suggests that certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality. Damasio (1994) reports the historical case of Phineas Gage. The nineteenth-century construction foreman had an accident that damaged a particular part of his brain associated with emotional functioning, in a way that ultimately changed his character. The story hinted at the fact that, besides “high- level” thinking, there are systems in the human brain that are dedicated to the personal and social dimensions of reasoning. Damasio (1994) presents his investigation with neurological patients who suffer brain lesions that impaired their experience of feelings. One particular case involved a patient who had damage to a specific sector of his brain. While his rational behaviour was still intact (i.e. knowledge, attention, language, memory, calculations), his inability to experience feelings had led to decision-making failure. Therefore, Damasio (1994) argues that, in the case of moral reasoning, emotions functions in tandem with reason; and that the absence of emotion results in the individuals being unable to operate with conscience.

Loewenstein (1996) also examines the disconnection between thought and action, and concludes that it is perpetuated by transient factors (such as hunger, sleep, and moods) that prompt visceral responses that discount long-term self-interest. Similarly, Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni (1998) articulate that individuals often face internal conflict (or intrapersonal conflict) when faced with decisions. The scholars propose the ‘want/should’ framework to describe this conflict. The ‘want’ self is described as emotional, affective, impulsive, and ‘hot headed’; with the contrast of the ‘should’ self that is characterised as rational, cognitive, thoughtful, and ‘cool headed’ (Bazerman et al., 1998). Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, and Bazerman (2010) maintain that,

24 as opposed to the ‘should’ self that encompasses ethical intentions, the ‘want’ self reflects behaviour that is characterised more by self-interest and disregards ethical considerations. This internal clash results in behaviour that is inconsistent with individuals’ intentions. O’Connor et al. (2002) predict that overwhelming details (such as the ethical features) of the situation reduce an individual’s awareness of ethical implications, as the ‘want’ self emerges and dominates at the time the decision is made.

The extension of ethical decision-making process beyond cognitive processes is also illustrated by the effect of priming. Bargh and Chartrand (2000) refer to priming as an increased sensitivity to a certain stimulus due to prior experience, and which may occur either consciously or subconsciously. Priming can affect a wide array of psychological systems, such as perception, motivation, and behaviour (Bargh, 2006). Based on studies in psychology since the early 1980s, Bargh (2006) notes that nearly all forms of social representation can be primed to influence what comes next without the person’s awareness of this influence. For instance, conscious or explicit primes, such as recalling the Ten Commandments may increase attention to moral standards to reduce unethical behaviour (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). On the other hand, subconscious or implicit priming operates through automatic, intuitive processes rather than conscious, deliberative processes. Welsh and Ordóñez (2014) tested subconscious ethical and unethical priming in investigating the connection between subconscious priming, goal setting, and monitoring. They found that subconscious priming influences ethical decision-making through the activation of moral standards. Subconscious priming can be conducted through techniques such as images, symbols, stories and slogans (Hatch, 1993; Latham, Stajkovic, & Locke, 2010; Shantz & Latham, 2009). Welsh and Ordóñez (2014) observe that these subtle moral reminders may not deter corporate criminals who do not

25 possess widely accepted ethical schemas. However, these moral reminders may implicitly influence typical employees in making decisions in the workplace; for example in unmonitored situations such as self-reporting the number of hours worked.

Ethical behaviour is also associated with mindfulness. Mindfulness refers to being present in the current moment, emotionally and intellectually. According to Kalafatoğlu and Turgut (2017), mindfulness has a significant relationship with ethical behaviour. Mindfulness can prevent automatic behaviour, and, associated with self-control, it may, directly and indirectly, prevent ego depletion. The scholars recommend that mindfulness is cultivated through training programmes in organisations to encourage ethical behaviour.

2.3.2.2. Integrative models in ethical decision-making

There are several models that extend the cognitive models in ethical decision-making to include the elements that were discussed in the previous section. One approach, the neurocognitive approach, is proposed by Reynolds (2006). Neurocognitive research focuses on identifying how the brain literally receives, processes, interprets, and acts upon stimuli. This is unlike a cognitive approach that focuses on identifying what the ethical agent thinks. Neurocognitive research identifies different parts of the brain that are responsible for different functions and for tasks that require several parts of the brain to act jointly (Nolte, 2002). Reynolds (2006) suggests a neurocognitive model of ethical decision-making that specifies how the ethical agent thinks. The model suggests that ethical decision-making involves two interrelated yet functionally distinct cycles: a reflexive pattern matching cycle, and a higher order conscious reasoning cycle. Hence,

26 ethical decision-making operates as a combination of reasoned analysis and intuitive reflex.

The reflexive part is represented by the X-system. This system represents those parts of the brain that are most closely associated with non-conscious environmental analysis. Some scholars have described this as automatic processing, implicit learning, and even intuition (Haidt, 2001; Lieberman, 2000; Louis & Sutton, 1991; O’Brien-Malone & Maybery, 1998; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). The processes of this system are referred to as “automatic” because they operate unconsciously by the mere presence of stimuli without deliberate thought. When faced with a situation that resembles a prototypical bribe, the individual not only automatically recognises that the situation is one of bribery, but also reflexively judges that action as immoral, even though he or she may not be able to explain why (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The second system is the higher order conscious reasoning: C-system. As a complex analytical and rule-based tool, the C-system is able to take the facts of a situation and apply an abstract decision rule to determine an outcome. Derivation of decision rules range from utilitarian (e.g. “Determine the greatest good for the greatest number”), to formalistic (e.g., “Do unto others as I would have them do unto me,”), or some other principle of conduct, where the individual can apply to determine a course of action. The C-system also provides and refines prototypes for the analysis of incoming stimuli upon which the X-system is dependent on. Therefore, under similar conditions in the future, consciousness would no longer need to be as actively engaged in identifying the object (Reynolds, 2006).

Warren and Smith-Crowe (2008) suggest an approach that incorporates both rationalist and intuitionist models by arguing for a model of moral judgment that is prompted by an

27 emotion. This creates an opportunity via reflection (that involves a process of reasoning) to influence either moral rules or beliefs (particularly the latter) and, ultimately, moral judgments. In Warren and Smith-Crowe’s (2008) study, the emotion component is embarrassment, and the rational component is sanctioning. Sanctions in the workplace, whether social and economic, produce embarrassment, which in turn enacts the internalisation of external values and rules, and therefore influences subsequent behaviour. Examples of economic sanctions include pay cuts, fines, garnished wages, and other financial penalties (Gomez-Mejia, Welbourne, & Wiseman, 2000; Greenberg, 1990; Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Wageman, 1995; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Examples of social sanction at the workplace may include expressions of disapproval, exclusion, and suspension of group membership.

Like Reynolds (2006), Bazerman and Gino (2012) assert that behavioural decision research makes a distinction between System 1 and System 2 thinking that can be useful in understanding inconsistencies in individuals’ moral preferences (Stanovich & West, 2000). System 1 thinking refers to intuitive decision-making, which is fast, automatic, effortless, implicit, and emotional, and is appropriate for the vast majority of decisions that individuals make on a daily basis. System 2 thinking, which is slower, conscious, effortful, explicit, and logical, is performed when individuals think in systematic and in organised ways to make more important decisions. This dual-process theory is suggested by a number of theorists and is summarised in Table 2-1.

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Table 2-1. The terms for the two systems used by theorists and the properties of dual-process theories of reasoning (Source: Stanovich and West, 2000, p. 659)

System 1 System 2

Sloman (1996) Evans (1984, 1989) Evans and Over (1996) Reber (1993) Levinson (1995) Epstein (1994) Pollock (1991) Hammond (1996) Klein (1998) Johnson-Laird (1983) Shiffrin and Schneider (1977)

Posner and Snyder (1975)

Associative system Heuristic processing Tacit thought processes Implicit cognition Interactional intelligence Experiential system

Quick and inflexible modules Intuitive cognition Recognition-primed decisions Implicit inferences Automatic processing Automatic activation Ruled-based system Analytic processing Explicit thought process Explicit learning

Analytic intelligence Rational system Intellection

Analytical cognition Rational choice strategy

Explicit inferences Controlled processing Conscious processing system Properties: Associative Holistic Automatic Relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity Relatively fast Acquisition by biology, exposure and personal experience Rule-based Analytic Controlled Demanding of cognitive capacity Relatively slow Acquisition by cultural and formal tuition

Dedeke (2015) proposes an integrative cognitive–intuitive model of moral decision- making based on models from neurocognitive research and social-intuitionist research. The cognitive-intuitive model suggests that moral decision-making includes five interdependent, yet functionally distinct steps: issue framing, pre-processing, moral

29 judgment, moral reflection, and moral intent. The model proposes a cognitive–intuitive view of moral judgment and it describes how emotion regulation, perceived moral intensity, and perceived ethical climate constructs impact on the formation of moral intent. This model incorporates automaticity in both cognitive and emotional processes. Distinct features of the model include the moral reflection process that involves the review of facts. When faced with a difficult situation at work, instead of acting upon reflexive judgment, a wiser path is to take time to reflect on the issue. Moral reflection is a deliberative means of achieving a moral decision.

Emotions play a significant role in moral judgment. Emotions always accompany a worker’s cognitive moral decisions. These emotions could make it more or less likely for employees to comply with moral rules. It is crucial to encourage employees to differentiate between automatic judgments per se and automatic judgments that have been reviewed by moral reflection. It is likely that workers have developed decision-making habits over the years, some of which rely on emotional heuristics and on emotional hunches.

Schwartz (2016) proposes a model called integrated ethical decision making to capture the current theories and also consolidates intuitionist (Haidt, 2001), rationalist (Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1986), person-situation interactionist (Treviño, 1986), and issue-contingent (Jones, 1991) approaches in ethical decision-making. According to Young (2017), Schwartz’s (2016) model of ethical decision-making theory provides the most comprehensive model of how one arrives at ethical decisions, with the inclusion of System 1 and System 2 thinking (i.e. deliberative versus intuitive).

30 In summary, similar to the discussion of different perspectives of decision-making that acknowledge humans’ incapacity to be fully rational, the study of ethical decision-making is also moving away from the notion that morality is based solely on deliberative processes, towards a process that involves both cognitive and emotional systems.