Mapeo de Procesos

The concept of risk takes on numerous different connotations dependent upon the context in which it is evoked such as financial risk, risk to human health and risk to the environment. The perception of risk is widely acknowledged as a key step for

132 human decision making based on an understanding of the consequences of an event or activity. For example, the consequences to human health of handling dangerous substances may be high; however the mitigation of dangers by working in a controlled environment and wearing suitable protective equipment means that the overall risk may be considered low. The word risk may be applied in numerous contexts, however perhaps the most fitting definition of how risk may be quantified and communicated is offered by Stern and Finebery (1996) “...to describe a potentially hazardous situation in as accurate, thorough, and decision-relevant a manner as possible, addressing the significant concerns of the interested and affected parties, and to make this information understandable and accessible to public officials and to the parties.” This definition is not specific to a particular type of risk, but can be applied to all forms, whether it be financial or physical.

A concise explanation of risk is offered by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) who assert

“risk should be seen as a joint product of knowledge about the future and consent about the most desired prospects”. Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) ideas illustrate that when knowledge is complete and certain, objectives agreed, and alternatives considered it is possible to produce an acceptable solution. If the problem is technical, then the solution is further calculation and simulation. If the problem is lack of information then the solution is research (Fig.5.1). Problems arise either when there is disagreement over the nature of the problem and its definition, or when there are uncertainties over the level of knowledge and options pertaining to a project. In either case uncertainties are likely to prevail.

133 Deciding whether risks are acceptable or not requires human behaviour to be considered; specifically as to how people ignore most of the potential dangers that surround them and interact so as to concentrate only on selected aspects (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Is the acceptance of risk derived from the perception of individual risks but subject to change when presented with a justifying argument?

I.e. the risk of climate change is widely accepted as important but not worrying whereas the risks associated with nuclear power draw from previous examples of nuclear accident and thus are considered more serious and un-acceptable.

However, when the individual is presented with the justification that Nuclear power is carbon neutral and thus help stop climate change, the acceptability of the risk increases even if the perception of the severity does not decrease (Bickerstaff et al., 2008).

To place this in the context of CCS, what may drive people to overlook the dangers of global warming and associated events to focus purely on the limited risk of underground CO2 storage? Is the way in which acceptance is measured by addressing purely the opinion of CCS, and not the opinion of the role opf CCS in decarbonising power generation responsible for perhaps a more negative perception than renewable energy? Or is this driven by the actions of the stakeholders, (mis)information by the media, and distrust in the governing bodies and /or industry; or a combination of all these factors? A key element of understanding and predicting public perception and reaction to the risks to which they are to be exposed, is to effectively and accurately communicate the risks, implications and justifications fairly and openly.

134 The idea of a pure notion of risk that is unpolluted by interests and ideology arising from political bias, morals and emotions has been examined by Douglas (1992). This approach is commonly applied to professions such as law, which are ideally required to be politically and/or morally unbiased. The idealised notion of unpolluted risk is problematic as it fails to account for ways that lay-persons and experts perceive risk. Douglas comments frequently on the baffling behaviour of members of the public who fail to take note of attempts to educate them about risks, such as those inherent in failing to take out insurance against natural hazards or the dangers of driving un-roadworthy vehicles. Ideally people should adopt an unpolluted view of risk similar to that attempted by lawyers and actuaries who seek to follow logical arguments and avoid emotional influences in their assessments of risk. However, most commonly lay-people either exaggerate risk through the lens of fear or anger or underplay its potential often illustrated by unwillingness to invest in insurance schemes.

Because experts and lay-persons do not construct risks in the same way, risk perception varies greatly depending on context and can lead to conflicts of interest.

A hypothetical example may be such as where government policy to solve public debt by radical reforms is deemed too risky by voters which results in a compromise. The method by which risk is communicated to the public has a significant role in how risk is perceived in general. It is a commonplace observation that people often treat Health and Safety regulations as unnecessary interference, evidenced by the expression ‘nanny state’ controls. Even though these regulations are often justifiable in reducing danger to life and limb they may be rejected by

135 people who view them as confusing, infantilising or restrictive of their freedom of choice. Douglas (1985) characterises humans as generally over intrepid and difficult to persuade of the reality of dangers. It is likely that people, rather than taking responsibility personally, are often quick to hold others accountable for risk, in particular those who might already be held with suspicion.

Fig.5.1. The four problems of risk defined by Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) showing the perception of risk as a product of knowledge and consent.

Focusing on this statement in more detail, Douglas (1985) explains that public opinion generated from deciding whether or not risks/dangers inflicted on them by a higher power are fair, may in turn lead to rejection of these risks due to anger or indignation, perceived exploitation, lack of choice or confusions rather than fear alone. Thus the tendency to lay blame becomes an important factor in acceptability of any project. Perhaps therefore, the subject of blame has a more significant impact on the perception of risk than the danger presented by the situation itself?

Or does the need to be held to account by law for all incidents make society on a

136 whole more risk averse? Douglas (1992) comments on the language of probability becoming more frequent, where experts communicate risks measured as probabilities and leave the public to come to their own conclusions. She highlights the medical profession as a prime example, suggesting that potential litigation by patients against doctors for mistreatment and misleading advice has led to the latter becoming more formal and distant in their communication. Doctors are nowadays more likely to explain that procedure A has a 60% success rate as opposed to procedure B which has a 80% success rate, while the consequences of failure in procedure B are 70% more severe than procedure A. This kind of language forces the patient to choose the course of treatment based on their interpretation of the medical assessment of risk, thus transferring responsibility from doctors to patients. However Douglas considers the communication of facts in this manner increases the patients’ perception of risk, leaving them confused and bereft of feelings of reassurance that result from close interpersonal communications.

Despite the best efforts of the experts, the assessment of the magnitude of the risk will always differ dependent on whether an organisation or demographic group is more risk adverse than another. Among the scientific community, risk and uncertainty are an accepted part of innovation and progress. Geology is a classic example as new measurements such as dating the age of the earth’s crust comes with a significant uncertainty range comprising of millions of years, which is beyond the breadth of timescales that many members of the public can comprehend. These kind of disjunctions can lead to conflicting assessments of risk that inflate the risk perception amongst the non-experts and leads to the question of how the role of

137 confusion and uncertainty within the theory of risk relates to theories of public engagement.

The UK National Co-ordinating Centre for Public Engagement (PE) draws attention to the link between risk and PE by stating: “Public engagement describes the myriad of ways in which the activity and benefits of higher education and research can be shared with the public. Engagement is by definition a two-way process, involving interaction and listening, with the goal of generating mutual benefit” (NCCPE, 2012). Although encouraging collaboration between university research and its communication to the non-specialist public, this statement is applicable to many aspects of communicating technical policy to non-experts. However, public engagement is not limited solely to transfer between research and the public but can cover a range of bodies and organisations be they governmental or commercial as well as different publics, as illustrated in Fig. 5.2 (Rowe and Frewer, 2005).

The hypothesis that confusion heightens perceptions of the magnitude of risk can be illustrated in Rowe and Frewer (2005) model of public communication (Fig. 5.2).

Their model indicates a one-way flow of information from the experts to the public similar to that featured in the example of a doctor presenting a patient with scientific evidence of risks associated with a choice of procedures. Confusion arises due to the absence of a flow of information from the public back to experts: it is a one-way conversation. Simply being presented with facts and unable to seek clarification results in frightened publics and escalates people’s perceptions of risks.

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Fig.5.2. Differing types or Public Engagement based upon flow of information. After Rowe and Frewer (2005)

The two way flow of information between expert and public as presented by the engagement model allows for the non-experts to seek clarification on specific points that may alleviate confusion and lead to a more balanced risk perception between both parties. It is the idea of two way flow that inspired my investigation into whether a two way dialogue between experts and members of the public significantly alters perception of risk as opposed to the initial perceptions.