MARCAS RELIGIOSAS

According to Kant, the fact that rational beings give themselves the moral law, the fact that they are self-legislators of morality, is the source of their rational natures having a “worth beyond price” (or, alternatively, of their having dignity). Says Kant,

And the dignity of humanity consists just in its capacity to legislate universal law, though with the condition of humanity’s being at the same time itself subject to this very same legislation.41

But why is this? Why is it that the worth/dignity of rational natures lies in their capacity to do this sort of legislation? What is so special about doing this? The answer lies in how Kant believes worth is conferred. According to Kant,

Thereby is he [a rational being] free as regards all laws of nature, and he obeys only those laws which he gives to himself. Accordingly, his maxims can belong to a universal legislation to which he at the same time subjects himself. For nothing can have any worth other than what the law determines. But the legislation itself which determines all worth must for that very reason have dignity, i.e., unconditional and incomparable worth; and the word “respect” alone provides a suitable expression for the esteem which a rational being must have for it. Hence autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.42

Given that worth can only be determined by the law, it seems that whatever gives the law must itself have unconditional worth43. In order to be worth-conferring, the legislation/legislative act itself must have unconditional worth, and since this legislation 41 Ibid, p. 44. 42_Ibid , p. 41 (my italics). 43

This is not the only way to understand Kant’s arguments. In Chapter Five, we will discuss alternative ways to make this argument, but for now, I will give a cursory explanation in order to make the analysis

is something rational agents do, their own worth lies in their ability to do this. In fact, their unconditional worth can come from no other place; a plant or rock, while it may have worth, is not the sort of thing that has a “worth beyond price”, or unconditional worth, since it is not the sort of thing that is the ground of worth. Its worth is conditional on that worth being conferred from outside – by the law. But, it is clear that the legislator of that law must have a worth that is not conditional on anything else (for otherwise it must be conditional on itself, since all conditioned worth is conditioned by the law). So, the law -- and legislation itself -- has unconditional worth, and rational nature must therefore have this worth since it is legislative of that law. Says Kant,

…that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, i.e., a price, but has an intrinsic worth, i.e., a dignity…Hence, morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, alone have dignity.44

Peoples’ humanity – specifically, their capacity to be moral creatures -- and morality itself, are the two things alone that have dignity and a “worth beyond price”, since it is under the condition of being able to be moral (in Kant’s terms, to be legislators of the moral law to which they are at the same time subject) that human beings are ends in themselves. It is the law, and our natures as legislators of it, that alone have

unconditional worth.

Thus, respect for the law segues naturally into respect for those things that

legislate that law, since respect in both cases recognizes the worth inherent in both. Says Kant,

44

…our own will, insofar as it were to act only under the condition of its being able to legislate universal law by means of its maxims – this will, ideally possible for us, is the proper object of respect.45

Thus, rational nature – or, more specifically, a will that can legislate universal law through its maxim-formation -- is the proper object of the sort of respect that Kant

believes must be shown to humanity. This is because it is in this will that the worth of humanity resides – i.e., it is the source of the worth for which respect is a sort of esteem, and so it is the proper object of respect.

Because the proper object of respect must be something of unconditional worth (such as the law itself, or the legislative will), Kant’s view has the peculiar consequence of identifying the object of respect as abstract humanity, or rational nature, or in some cases the representation of the law itself in an individual, rather than taking an individual as its object. Says Kant,

…the will of a rational being, in which the highest and unconditioned good can alone be found. Therefore, the pre-eminent good which is called moral can consist in nothing but the representation of the law in itself, and such a representation can admittedly be found only in a rational being insofar as this representation, and not some expected effect, is the determining ground of the will.46

And in a footnote to this section,

Respect is properly the representation of a worth that thwarts my self-love. Hence respect is something that is regarded as an object of neither

inclination nor fear, although it has at the same time something analogous to both. The object of respect is, therefore, nothing but the law – indeed that very law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognize as necessary in itself…All respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, etc.) of which the person provides an example…All so-called moral interest consists solely in respect for the law.47

45_Ibid

, p. 44 (my italics).

46

According to Kant, the highest good is to be found in the will that legislates universal law, and the only good that is unqualified is such a will insofar as it is always determined by that very law. Thus, the pre-eminent good is the representation of the law in a will that is determined by that very representation; a will that takes a representation of the moral law (and not some effect that it hopes to bring about by performing some action) as the determiner of what it wills (for example, a will that takes a duty of

beneficence as the determiner of its will, rather than a good public image) is a good will, and the representation of the law in that will is pre-eminently good. Thus, respect “for a person” is not so much respect for them, but esteem for a worth in them that renders other things valueless in comparison. Respect for a person is respect for the moral law within them – and this means that it is respect for both (1) the capacity to legislate that is inherent in them, and (2) the representation in them of the moral law itself. Thus, I can have respect for you, fundamentally, as a person that has a rational nature. Or I can respect you as a moral agent in whom we find the moral law – I respect you, but the object of my respect is the moral law itself that you represent. I respect (for example) truth-telling, or beneficence, which are parts of the moral law, and I respect them as represented in you as well. Thus, when I say that I respect you, this is merely shorthand for respecting some feature in you, or fact about you, that has unconditional worth. It is shorthand for respecting the capacity to legislate moral law, or for the representation of the law itself.48

48

Note Darwall’s use of this Kantian idea when he grounds appraisal respect for persons in their representing some feature for which we have recognition respect.

Thus, Kant’s theory has the consequence of identifying the proper object of respect as being a feature or fact about rational creatures (and rational creatures only). This seems peculiar for two reasons: (1) Unconditional worth seems to lie in abstract features of creatures, and it’s not clear how it can then rest in the creatures themselves, and (2) Unconditional worth is to be found only in very specific types of creatures. Are these peculiarities particularly troubling? I believe that they are.