Segundo momento

In The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant begins his discussion of morality by analyzing the idea of a good will; according to Kant, there is nothing in the world that is good without qualification except for a good will. What this means is that a good will is the only thing that is good in every situation, no matter what other conditions hold. All other good things in the world – including things that are non-instrumentally

good, are not good in each and every situation, regardless of context. Rather, all other good things are only good given that other sorts of conditions are met. A good will, however, is the only thing that is good without this qualification – it is the only thing that in all situations, under all conditions, is good. What does this mean for all other good things? To take an example that Kant himself uses, intelligence may indeed be very good – and may indeed be good in itself (for example, it may be good apart from any use that may be made of it) – but it can only be seen as good given that other conditions are met. For example, one does not consider intelligence to be a good thing in a person whose will is not good – that such a person is intelligent can in fact seem somewhat unfortunate, since that person does not will to use that intelligence in pursuit of good ends. That such a person wills bad ends casts a shadow on the goodness of having the intelligence to direct such actions in a clever fashion; we do not consider intelligence to be good

independent of the condition that it be used in pursuit of good ends; in this case, then, the goodness of one’s will is a condition on our judging that one’s intelligence is a good thing.

The obvious question, then, is “What is a good will”? According to Kant, a good will is most clearly shown in cases when someone has absolutely no inclination to perform a certain action (helping the poor, for example), but performs it anyway because that action is one’s duty. A good will, then, is most clearly displayed when one performs actions that are required because they are required, and for no other reason (even if it may turn out that one has other reasons). Thus, someone with a good will does what the moral law requires, and does so because the moral law requires it, even if there are other reasons one might have to want to do what is required. And it is this regard for the moral

law, and the will to do what the law requires based on this regard (i.e., practical determination of the will given esteem for the moral law), that constitutes a will that is good. Thus, someone with a good will is attentive to the laws of morality that are delivered to him by his reason, and he has respect for this law as binding on him. Says Kant,

…respect is a feeling, it is not one received through any outside influence but is, rather, one that is self-produced by means of a rational

concept…what I recognize immediately as a law for me, I recognize with respect…The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness thereof, is called respect…33

Thus, one who has a good will and does what is required of him does so because he has respect for the moral law; this involves having an esteem for the moral law, as well as being disposed to choose one’s course of action (i.e., to set, or determine, one’s willing) based on what the law requires of him. Thus, a man might desire to keep all of his money and ignore the suffering of others; however, if his will is good, he will

recognize a duty of beneficence to others, and recognition of this as a duty (given to him by the moral law), coupled with the setting (or determination) of his will to go ahead and help those in need, constitutes having, and acting out of, respect for the moral law. And it is having this respect for the moral law (and acting according to it) that truly marks out a good will.

Thus, one way in which respect figures prominently in Kant’s ethical thought is: a good will is possessed by one who (1) has proper respect for the moral law, and (2) subsequently commits oneself fully to following that moral law. In other words, having a good will involves having a robust esteem for the moral law, as well as a commitment to

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act according to that law which is esteemed. Thus, having the correct orientation to the moral law (i.e., regarding it as a law for you that determines your will unconditionally) is having a very important kind of respect. Says Kant,

…respect is an estimation of a worth that far outweighs any worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty…34

Thus, very formally and abstractly, respect is important for Kant because having respect (or, as the quotes given suggest, a proper “feeling”, or estimation, or “regard”) for the moral law (where this respect involves having a strong commitment to act according to the moral law, to choose according to its dictates) is what having a good will is all about; doing what morality requires for the right reason (i.e., that it is required) is having, and acting out of, respect for the moral law. Thus, having (and acting out of) respect for the moral law – having the correct orientation to the moral law, and being committed to behaving according to this orientation – is an important way of looking at how morality works for rational beings.35 Respect, for Kant, is a fundamentally important idea for explaining what truly following the laws of morality is about.36

Respect is also important in Kant’s thought for another reason – it figures prominently in what the moral law requires. According to Kant, the moral law requires us to act only on those maxims that we can will to be universal law37, and what this

34

Ibid, p. 15 (my italics).

35

This also shows that Kantian “respect” is both (1) a feeling, or regard and (2) a practical, active determination. Respect is both a way of “looking” at the moral law, and a way of organizing one’s behavior in light of it.

36

Further analysis of this will come later – for example, a more complete discussion of the moral law as an object of respect.

37

This is the First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative. For brevity’s sake, I am assuming familiarity with these aspects of Kant’s ethical theory.

involves when other human beings are involved is important for understanding respect. According to the second formulation of the categorical imperative38, one is required to act in those ways that treat rational nature never as a mere means, but also always as an end in itself. The reason for this, on Kant’s view, is that things that are ends in themselves in the way that rational natures are have a dignity that is above price; they have a worth that is beyond measure, they have dignity insofar as they are not valuable merely for some use that they serve. As such, they should not be treated as if their worth were somehow only valuable as a means – they should be treated as ends in themselves, as valuable as ends- in-themselves. Says Kant,

…rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as something which is not to be used merely as a means and hence there is imposed thereby a limit on all arbitrary use of such beings, which are thus objects of respect.39

The fact that rational beings are ends in themselves marks them out as things which cannot be used in just any way one desires; there is a limit on the use/treatment of such beings, and we discover this limit (marked out by the moral law) through reason. What’s more, acting in accordance with one’s respect for the moral law is, in effect, paying attention to this limit. Thus, the way in which respect figures in the content of the moral law (i.e., by marking out certain limits on how we can treat rational beings) is much the way it figures in the elucidation of the concept of duty – acting with respect, essentially, involves a determination of the will to act/not act in certain ways. Says Kant, “This principle of humanity and of every rational nature generally as an end in itself is

38

See Note 37.

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the supreme limiting condition of every man’s freedom of action.”40 When one recognizes rational nature as something that cannot be used in just any way, one is respecting the humanity in that person by seeing it as something that determines/limits one’s will. Respect, then, involves both a determination of the will and a certain sort of feeling; it is esteem for unconditional worth – both the worth of the moral law (as discussed above) and the worth of rational nature itself. And in both cases, respect involves one’s will being determined/limited by the esteem it feels for that worth. Having respect for the moral law, and for rational nature, involves one’s will being determined to “behave appropriately” towards the unconditional worth that is recognized.

That respect is owed both to the moral law and to beings with rational natures is not an accidental similarity, however; respect is owed to beings with rational natures because of their connection with the moral law. Specifically, beings with rational natures have the sort of worth that Kant describes because they are legislators of the moral law – they give the law to themselves. According to Kant, it is imperative that rational beings give themselves the moral law, because if there were external imposition of this law (rather than self-imposition), obedience to it would not have the correct character. In order for the law to be binding on agents in the right way, they must see themselves as free to follow it or not, as a dictate of their own reason. When this is the case, following the law will have a truly moral character, for only then will the law be followed for itself. In order to have the good will that Kant describes, agents must see the law as rationally, but not prudentially, necessary; only then will they follow it for its own sake (i.e., because they see it as rationally necessary -- they see it as a constraint on their will only because they see that they have good and sufficient reasons to follow it, no matter what

40_Ibid

else they may have reason to do) and not for any other motive (i.e., fear of an external legislator, etc.).