Medidas de protección contra incendios

The orthodox IR theoretical traditions of realism and liberalism are generally “rationalist” theories that privilege structural-material variables in the analysis of state behaviour and international outcomes.14 In their contemporary guise, both neo-realism and neo-liberalism foreground systemic over unit-level investigation. The former emphasises the overarching importance of the anarchic international system in defining states interests and actions in terms of relative distribution and balance-of-power within it (Waltz 1979); while the latter

13 _{This debate foregrounds on the so-called definitive “Lakatosian” understanding of what constituted a}

coherent and falsifiable social science research programme. See Lakatos (1970). For a critique on neo-realism, and other variants of the realist research programme as degenerative, see Vasquez (1983; 1997); Legro and Moravcsik (1999), and Wendt (1995).

14_{According to constructivist critics like Steve Smith, the “rational choice” emphasis underpinning both neo-}

conceives state behaviour/preferences in the light of complex interdependence and interstate cooperation (Keohane and Nye 1977). Both share the assumption that unit-level and ideational factors are a priorigivens, “self-evident and non-problematic” (Lapid 1996:6) in the analysis of world politics. According to critics, their fundamentally “statist”, “rationalist- materialist”, as well as Hobbesian-oriented, “ahistorical”, “asocial”, and “acultural” perspectives of international relations, not mentioning, fixation with systemic-level theorising, make these mainstream IR theories analytically inhospitable to problematising non-material factors, like culture, identity, historical memories, and ideology (Inayatullah and Blaney 1996:66-67; Pasic 1996:85; Tooze 1996). In fact, cultural-ideational variables are deemed trivial, and of secondary importance by both neo-realism and neo-liberalism, and are conveniently “relegated to the domestic realm, where they remain irrelevant to the workings of international relations” (Pasic 1996:85; Tooze 1996:xix).

2.2.1. Mainstream IR theories’ “analytical myopia” on nationalism

Understandably, mainstream IR theories have severe limitations in offering a comprehensive understanding of nationalism in international affairs, since the “national” phenomenon is a social construct, domestic and non-material in essence, as well as subjective and inter- subjective in meanings/nature (Tooze 1996:xviii-xix; Farrands 1996:12-13; Lapid 1996:13). This inadvertently leads these theories, or the IR discipline for that matter, to conveniently ignore “the problem of nationalism” (Judt 1994:51; cf. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:105), despite its growing salience, as events of the post-Cold War epoch suggest. According to Lapid and Kratochwil:

It is indeed strange but hardly overstated that, in an age of nationalism, international relations and most other social disciplines seem to have converged on little else but the sustained exclusion of the national problematic from their respective research agendas, relegating it to a fringe phenomenon (1996:105).

For instance, nationalism is often under-appreciated, if not trivialised, or neglected, altogether by neo-realism, due to its rigid theoretical construct and underpinnings that view states as undifferentiated (like-units), unitary actors, whose behaviour are conditioned and governed primarily by structural attributes of international anarchy (Waltz 1979). Also, the

conventional realist thought is dominated by the “primacy of foreign policy” notion, which, according to Zakaria, can be meant; i) international relations being significant in affecting/ influencing the domestic arrangements of states; and ii) interstate politics as a realm separate from domestic politics, where state behaviour is prevalently influenced by systemic, rather than domestic factors/pressures (1992:179-180). By treating nation-state as a given, conventional realists in the Waltzian tradition are, forgone to overlook unit-level and ideational-normative imperatives, i.e. issues concerning character of states and the social construction of state identity, which are related and essential to comprehending nationalism. Indeed, neo-realism’s dismissal of such factors, its excessive indulgence with parsimony (Roth 2006:487), and overdependence on “system-level”, “rationalist-centred” and “structural-material”-driven explanations, among others, are fallacies that render it “problematique” when encountering nationalism from a theoretical viewpoint (cf. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:116; Copeland 2000).

Similarly, liberal analysts tend to “underestimate the potency of nationalism” (Holsti 1995:44; see also Rosecrance 1986; Mayall 1990).15 Especially to neo-liberalism, the construction of political identity, according to Tooze, is “assumed to be unproblematic”, due to its state-centric position (1996:xviii). Despite viewing it as more of a collective, the state remains the neo-liberal construct’s central unit of analysis, which makes “sub-state” variables, like nationalism and identity beyond its investigation (Tooze 1996:xix).

Critics of mainstream IR theories are also quick to highlight their flaws in theorising, and explaining developments in particular regions like East Asia, where the political climate and intra-regional relations are commonly characterised by rising nationalist impulses, which tend to promote irregular and irrational state behaviour that somewhat defy the conventional IR logic and assumptions (Berger 2000; 2003). Realistically, the politico-security instability occurring in contemporary Northeast Asia is as much, a reflection of confrontational

15 _{Interestingly, there are domestic-liberal works utilising the “democratic peace” thesis like Mansfield and}

Snyder (2005) that explicitly incorporated nationalism in understanding why democracies go to war. However, it has been charged for conflating the state and nation concept, and simplifying the treatment of nationalism, not mentioning over-emphasising its salience in precipitating conflicts. For a critique, see Bloom (2006:339-341).

nationalisms and identity-related predicaments, as with the usual variables identified by mainstream IR theories that affect regional stability, i.e. structural transformation of the regional security architecture; profound shifts in the power balance; emergence of potential non-status quo/revisionist powers; asymmetrical distribution of relative capabilities between regional actors; insufffcient levels of economic interdependence; and underdevelopment of multilateral norms and institutions, to name a few (Christensen 1999:49; Friedberg 1993/4; 2000; Mearsheimer 1990a; 2001; Betts 1993/4; Buzan and Segal 1994; Van Evera 1999; Berger 2000; Ross 2006). In fact, rising nationalism and duelling national identities are increasingly shaping bilateral relations between regional actors like China and Japan, Japan and Korea, and China and Taiwan, which are problematic to standard neo-realist, or neo- liberal explanations (Berger 2003).

To be sure, mainstream IR theories have made efforts to incorporate nationalism and other unit-level, ideational variables to address the glaring anomalies found in their theorisations of interstate relations, especially in specific regions during the post-Cold War epoch. To stem the retrogression of IR realism, which has come under severe attack from constructivists for its theoretical inadequacies, contemporary realists, i.e. Mearsheimer (1990a; 1992),16Posen (1993a/b), Snyder (1991; 1993), Van Evera (1994) have opened up to nationalism’s role under a revised neo-realist construct (cf. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Downs and Saunders 1998/9). Lapid and Kratochwil opine that, through “inclusionary control”, they seek to address major nationalism-related problems in international politics from essentially neo-realist premises, a position that reflects a departure from the typically narrow Waltzian tradition of “exclusionary control” (1996:110-116).

However, critics argue that the treatment of nationalism by these variants of neo- realism appears more of a “retrofitting”, or juxtaposing of the elusive phenomenon to fit into the traditional neo-realist construct without proper theorisation (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:112). In their opinion, nationalism is treated as “merely a reflection of the more “basic”

16

Mearsheimer (1992) introduces the notion “hypernationalism” into the traditional premises of neo-realism, albeit as a secondary factor that exacerbates the insecurities of the anarchic international system, which remains his central analytical variable (cf. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:110-113).

forces – such as the security dilemma17 and power balancing among the preexisting “like units”” (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:112), reducing it to being a ““second order” variable, [or] an epiphenomenon of the international system and its anarchical structure” (Mearsheimer 1990b:32; cf. Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:112). In other words, nationalism is often, invoked as an ancillary factor to supplement the inadequacy of the Waltzian logic,18 exogenously incorporated to explain away anomalies in their non-traditional case-studies.

2.2.2. Neo-realism’s under-appreciation of nationalism in Japanese-Chinese relations Indeed, most IR-centred studies of Japanese-Chinese relations tend to take nationalism less seriously, providing assumptions and analysis that fall short of appreciating the extent of its influence on their contemporary bilateral affairs. From the conventional realist perspective, nationalism is mostly a sub-factor exacerbating the “strategic conundrums”19 and shifting power distributions between Japan and China, which studies by Green and Self (1996), Zhao (2002), Wang (2002), Self (2002); Pei and Swaine (2005), Roy (2003; 2005), Taniguchi (2005), Calder (2006), and Yahuda (2006), among others, deem as the core determinant affecting the bilateral ties. According to Yahuda, “the key to understanding the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations is the structural change in the international politics of East Asia” (2006:162). Induced by the Cold War’s demise, he believes this change “has led to the repositioning of regional great powers and…an intensification of economic development” among East Asian states, which has helped transform “the regional and international balance of power” (2006:162-163). Compounding the structural change has been the renewed efforts by regional actors “to redefine their domestic, regional, and international identities”, which Yahuda insists, has engendered a revitalisation of assertive nationalisms in China and Japan that are developing divergently, with one cast as the other’s “putative adversary” (2006:163; see also Self 2002).

17 _{Christensen (1999) also acknowledges nationalism’s role in aggravating the “security dilemma” – a self-}

fulfilling realist logic regarding the tendency of states to be involved in unwanted conflicts, resulting from their very act of seeking security and wanting to avoid conflicts. For a seminal work on the “security dilemma” concept, see Jervis (1978).

18

This term is, commonly used with other equivalent expressions like “straightjacket” in IR theoretical works, to describe the rigid underpinnings of conventional/neo-realism (see Brooks 1997; Guzzini 2004:535).

On a similar note, Kokubun (2001; 2003; 2006; 2007) has consistently associated the degeneration in contemporary Japanese-Chinese relations and shift in Japanese strategic thinking with the structural transformation of the post-Cold War international context, which brought an end to what he calls the “1972 System” that held the bilateral ties amiably together since diplomatic normalisation. The ensuing “power shift” that saw China rising, and Japan stagnating, economically and politically/militarily, has invoked negative Japanese images and perception of the Chinese, fostering nationalistic attitudes that are increasingly driving Japan towards a so-called “psychological cold war” with China (Kokubun 2007:146-154). Zhao (2002:39) equates China’s rise to a foreign policy that is “more assertive” and “sensitive” to domestic popular nationalist sentiment, which complicates Tokyo and Washington’s strategic calculations, as the Chinese leadership becomes more vulnerable to nationalist demands, to address sovereignty issues like Taiwan and Senkaku/Diaoyudao, and redress Japanese-inflicted historical legacies.

The opposite is true with Japan’s regression vis-à-vis China, notably in economic terms, which Watanabe (2000), Takagi (2006), and many others insist, has triggered Japanese consternation, fuelling anti-Chinese sentiment that exacerbates their negative perceptions of the changing power balance (Takahara 2004; Pei and Swaine 2005; Roy 2005; Teufel-Dreyer 2006).20 Yang Bojiang notes that “facing China’s rise, Japan’s nationalism prevents the country from perceiving itself as a second-rate power”, compelling it to use the US-Japanese alliance “to balance out Chinese development while defending or promoting Tokyo’s own international status” (2006:133). The “power shift” argument is also emphasised in several other studies, although some identify the shift not in terms of “diverging fortunes”21but from a “strong China, strong Japan” standpoint (Jin 2002:51;22see also Wang 2002; Yang Jian 2007; Yang Bojiang. 2006; Calder 2006). Nonetheless, they generally share the view that Japanese-Chinese enmity and rivalry are the offspring of changing power dynamics, accentuated by rising nationalism in both countries.

20 _{Indeed, as early as 1998, Funabashi Yoichi noted that a rising China would “induce critical, painful, and}

psychologically difficult strategic adjustments in Japanese foreign policy” (1998:32).

21_{This term, which will be used occasionally in this thesis, derives from Pei and Swaine (2005).} 22_{This phrase is, specifically quoted in Rose (2005:6).}

Nationalism as a “factor” aggravating the confrontational forces spawned by the fluid international order is also a theme shared by Christensen (1999), Self (2002), Calder (2006:130), Tsunekawa (2006), and Hagstrom and Lagerkvist (2006), in their observations of how the unravelling Japan-China power equation, coupled with resurgent nationalisms fed by historical legacies, ethnocentrism and xenophobia in both countries, are magnifying mutual security concerns, and fuelling a potential security dilemma. In his analysis, Christensen pessimistically suggests that even though nationalist emotion has yet to severely affect “the practical, day-to-day management of Sino-Japanese relations”, it does influence one another’s longer-term threat assessment, which “may be more important in fuelling the security dilemma than particular diplomatic policies in the present” (1999:54-55). Meanwhile, Tsunekawa sees Japan’s “dependent nationalism” as a product of, and a source “that has precipitated the security dilemma through action-reaction cycles aggravating perception gaps among major powers in the region” (2006:14), including China.

Another related, key external-structural variable in the realist observation is the role of the US, and the US-Japan alliance, which is, in Zhao Quansheng’s opinion, “the most significant external actor/factor” shaping the direction of Japanese-Chinese relations (2002:32). Echoing this is Takahara, who sees the US-Japan alliance as “the largest issue in Sino-Japanese ties in the 1990s” (2004:161-162). Its salience is likewise, noted in Johnstone (1998; 2000), Liu (2000), Green (2001), Vogel (2003), Drifte (2003), Wan (2003), and Christensen (2006), as with most of the works cited earlier, although opinions do diverge regarding the implications of its interaction with nationalism, or the appreciation of nationalism’s role in these works, for that matter. Optimists view the US-Japan alliance as a countervailing force suppressing chauvinistic nationalism in Japan and China. For instance, Green suggests that the reason for MOFA’s insistence for “an iron-clad defense commitment” from the US on Senkaku/Diaoyudao during the 1996 dispute, was to curtail Japanese nationalist pressure for “a unilateral military capability” to deal with the issue, which could trigger a Japanese-Chinese confrontation (2001:87). Meanwhile, despite its fierce rhetoric, Beijing has always been, quietly confident of the US-Japan alliance in

containing a resurgence of Japanese militarism, although such confidence has somewhat eroded in recent years (Green 2001:89; Wu 2000; 2005/6). Conversely, pessimists tend to see Washington’s “lopsided” policy as facilitating Japanese nationalist aspirations, i.e. reinstating military force as a foreign policy instrument, and emboldening other “revisionist” agendas (history revisionism, Taiwan policy, etc.), that are bound to trigger reactive anti- Japanese nationalism in China (Liu 2000; Tamamoto 2004).23

Apart from limited theorisation, another standard realist misgiving of nationalism is the tendency to accentuate its malignancy (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996:114), of which the majority of the abovementioned studies have exaggerated in explaining Japanese-Chinese competition, rivalry, and conflict. Such extreme interpretation of nationalism is to be expected, due to realism’s preoccupation with the assumption regarding state behaviour as being conditioned by the “possibility of conflict”, where states are pressured into making calculations based on a zero-sum, worst-case scenario (Brooks 1997).

Likewise, it is common for realists to over-emphasise nationalism’s instrumentality as a political tool utilised by both governments for diplomatic and domestic expedience. Tsang (1999) sees realist calculations as leading the PRC to foster a kind of narrow-minded nationalism that targets Japan, as a means to undercut Tokyo’s credibility and intention to seek a larger political role in the region, which could hinder its own long-term external goals of irredentism and leadership in the Asia-Pacific. Conversely, the Japanese government, increasingly dominated by hawks, and shaped by realpolitik, is, according to Miller (2000), Tamamoto (2004), and Taniguchi (2005), seeking to rejuvenate nationalism to mobilise popular support for a broader Japanese security role that has China well within its radar.

Simply put, a conventional neo-realist perspective of Japanese-Chinese relations draws explanatory power mainly from structural-material imperatives, namely shifts in relative capabilities and the balance of power, and the role of other external factors/actors,

23

In general, “defensive realists” are known to be more optimistic and positive-sum in perspective, while “offensive realists” are more inclined to view international politics from a pessimistic zero-sum lens, although both groups are not mutually exclusive (see Brooks 1997; Taliaferro 2000/1).

i.e. the US in explaining Japanese/Chinese behaviour vis-à-vis the bilateral ties. Meanwhile, nationalism and identity issues are generally, treated as a given, and incorporated “atheoretically” as an auxiliary variable exacerbating the salience of the realist central variables (Tooze 1996).

2.2.3. Neo-liberalism’s treatment of nationalism: a “mirror-image” of neo-realism? Similar to neo-realism, nationalism’s treatment by neo-liberalism is, at best, marginal and lacking in proper theorisation. The marginalisation is due to neo-liberalism’s fixation with its own set of analytical tools, which are state-centric and structural-material in essence. Although there are liberal theories that draw on domestic-level explanations, their preference for structural-material variables makes them less appreciative of nationalism or any ideational factors.

Most research in the liberal vein tend to under-estimate nationalism’s forces, with Taylor (1996), Sutter (2002), Heazle (2007), and Xia (2007), among others, implying that deepening socio-economic interdependence, and incremental political reforms in China’s case would help mitigate virulent nationalist sentiments, and eventually foster a progressive/matured bilateral relationship. Likewise, a higher degree of institutionalisation of diplomatic norms and functions, and participation in multilateral institutions serve to suppress excessive nationalism, while promoting greater cooperation between the two countries. For example, Sutter (2002) agrees that rising nationalist impulses in China and Japan are fuelling potential Japanese-Chinese rivalry even in the economic realm, as reflected by increased frictions in bilateral trade and Official Development Assistance (ODA) arrangements, and competition to establish regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). However, there are in his opinion, “countervailing factors” limiting the rivalry, “the most important” of which “is that both Japanese and Chinese governments are domestically focused on the economic development of their countries”, and thus understand the importance of fostering peaceful, stable and cooperative relationship with each other, and with their regional neighbours, to realise this priority goal (2002:39). This is echoed by Pei and Swaine, who cited two critical factors mitigating the risk of a Japanese-Chinese “cold

war”, namely “the top policy agenda of domestic economic reform”, and steadfast interest in “maintaining their mutually beneficial commercial ties” (2005:4-6).

Similarly, Whiting believes that against the prevailing negative factors (i.e. fragile domestic politics fuelled by rising nationalism and mutual negative images), pragmatic considerations of mutual benefits with economics playing the key role, are “likely to tip the balance in a positive direction” (2000:30). Meanwhile, Chung notes that assertive nationalism in China and Japan “is held at bay by expectations of mutual economic gains through increased trade and investment, and fear of accidental military provocation” (2004:53), in his “two-level-game” study of the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute. Heazle also concludes his analysis by suggesting the salience of the “hot” economic relationship, which would, at least for the foreseeable future, provide both governments “with enough motivation to contain their [mutual] political animosity…and resist any temptation to cause the relationship to deteriorate any further” (2007:200), despite the nationalism conundrum in current Japanese-Chinese diplomacy.

Indeed, from the liberal perspective, economic relations have always provided stable foundation for Japanese-Chinese politico-diplomatic ties, as with their effectiveness in channelling discord in the said arena, and are thus, expected to remain so, as Burns (2000) and Rose (2002:243) argue in their studies. Nonetheless, the logic of economic interdependence is critically questioned by Yahuda (2006), who concedes that deepening