11. Configuración del dispositivo 36
11.22. Menú Configuración - Servidor FTP>Ejemplo
In the case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Benjamin Romualdez, Ferdinand Marcos, and Imelda Marcos, herein petitioner Francisco Tantuico was impleaded as defendant, the theory that he acted in unlawful concert with Romualdez, et al. in the misappropriation and theft of public funds, among others. After Tantuico’s motion for production and inspection of documents was denied by the Sandiganbayan, he filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging that the complaint filed against him was couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal bases thereof. The Sandiganbayan thereafter denied Tantuico’s motion on the ground that the particulars sought by the latter are evidentiary in nature, thus not necessary in the filing of the complaint. From such order of the Sandiganbayan, Tantuico moved for reconsideration, which motion was also denied by the aforesaid court. This prompted Tantuico to file a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition against the Sandiganbayn, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, when such court denied his motion for a bill of particulars, even though the complaint of the Republic of the Philippines failed to properly provide a concise statement of the facts necessary for him to prepare his defense.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint properly provided a statement of the facts.
HELD:
A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complaint shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. Its office, purpose or function is to inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. The complaint should inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action which forms the bases of the plaintiff's claim of liability. Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three essential elements of a cause of action, the complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of action. However, where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in
the form of conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of
particulars. Anent the contention of the Solicitor General that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars because the ultimate facts constituting the three essential elements of a cause of action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth have been sufficiently alleged in the complaint, it would suffice to state that in a motion for a bill of particulars, the only question to be resolved is whether or not the allegations of the complaint are averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable the movant properly to prepare his responsive pleading and to prepare for trial. As already discussed, the allegations of the complaint pertaining to the herein petitioner are deficient because the averments therein are mere conclusions of law or presumptions, unsupported by factual premises.
73 | P a g e SOLEDAD DY
v.
COURT OF APPEALS and ODEL BERNARDO LAUSA FACTS:
Task Force Kalikasan of Butuan City confiscated two trucks carrying various sized lumber products, owned by Soledad Dy. Task Force Kalikasan was created pursuant to an Executive Order issued by the Mayor of Butuan City, which had the end purpose of combatting illegal logging, and the transportation of illegally procured lumber. Upon seizure, Odel Lausa, head of the Task Force applied for, and was granted a temporary seizure order with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Upon submission of a proper memorandum-report regarding the trucks and the lumber, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Butuan City issued a notice confiscation which was duly posted for three days. More than two months after the lumber had been forfeited, Dy filed a suit for replevin in the RTC, wherein the same court issued a temporary order of
replevin. Lausa, for his part, filed a motion for the approval of a counterbond, as well as for a motion to
dismiss the writ of execution, on the ground that Dy should have gone before the DENR, since according to the Revised Forrestry Code, resort should first be made to it. CA reversed the decision of the trial court, on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to act on the case, since the administrative remedies provided for by law have not yet been exhausted by Dy, thus, the petition for replevin lacks a valid cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is tantamount to lack of cause of action upon the filing of a suit in court
HELD:
A party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned even opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before a court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper cause of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents' rights of action is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court. As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioner's application for a replevin writ and denying private respondent's motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency.
74 | P a g e
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 8