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2. Planteamiento Operacional

4.2 Metodología de procesamiento de datos

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up in a p h ilo s o p h ic a l t r a d i t i o n which found i t d i f f i c u l t to address stra ig h tfo rw a rd q u e s tio n s . The mundane, th e simple and obvious, was somehow too o rd in a ry to m e rit exam ination. Great theology and g rea t philosophy had to be on a plane which was f a r higher than anything which the average person could tak e i n . That was why i t could only be w r itte n in a s t y l e f o r th e i n i t i a t e d . Kant was capable of developing arguments a t g rea t le n g th , w ith th e g r e a t e s t eloquence, which were n e v e rth e le ss q u ite unsound.

At i t s b e s t; K a n t's development of the Moral argument occupies a unique p lace in moral philosophy, alm ost making us f o rg e t t h a t what r e l i g i o n he professed was c lo s e r to Deism thku Theism. K a n t's work on the Moral argument w i l l stand f o r a l l tim e as a f re s h , modern i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the moral law. Comparing h is e t h i c a l system w ith Hume's, i t i s ‘a l l too

evident t h a t Hume's I n tu itio n is m was a poor s u b s ti tu t e fo r K an t's e x p o sitio n of th e m oral law. K an t's Groundwork has a note o f moral a u th o r ity which i s q u ite la c k in g in Hume's w r itin g s .

For Hume, q u estio n s r a is e d by th e Moral argument extended in to some of th e o th e r T h e is tic proofs as w e ll. When d isc u s s in g the Cosmological argument he did not co n fin e h im self to the q uestion o f th e c o r r e c t theory of c a u sa tio n , but went on to i n s i s t t h a t we must not only fin d out about the f i r s t , uncaused cause, to whose i n i t i a t i v e th e chain o f c a u se -a n d -e ffe c t p ro cesses can be a t t r i b u t e d ; b u t, we must go on to ask - 'what i s the m oral c h a ra c te r o f th e C r e a to r '? He knew t h a t h is own theory of p e rc e p t­

ion could not d e a l f u l l y w ith th e q u estio n o f how God's workings r e l a t e to c a u s e - a n d -e ff e c t p r o c e s s e s, but t h a t did n o t p revent him from p o in tin g out t h a t th e Cosm ological argum ent, by i t s e l f , t e l l s us l i t t l e about what th e C re a to r i s l i k e ; -

" . . . a s s e r t , t h a t a b ein g , whose v o l i t i o n i s connected w ith every e f f e c t ; . . . g i v e s us no i n s ig h t in to the n a tu re o f h is power or co n n ectio n .

152.

This can be in terp reted as a two-pronged a tta ck , f ir s t l y on the Cosm ological argument, and then on the T e le o lo g ica l argument. In both cases the main claim o f the argument i s undermined f ir s t ; in the case o f the Cosm ological argument - the need for an uncaused f i r s t cause; and, in the case o f the T e le o lo g ic a l argument - the need fo r an in te llig e n t Creator to account for the p r in c ip le of te le o lo g y . Secondly, Hume went on to ch allen ge the con clu sion th at, from the Cosm ological argument and the T e le o lo g ic a l argument combined, we can prove th at the w ise, omnipot­ ent Creator i s m orally good. In th is connection, there are two s e ts o f passages which can be quoted from Hume's w r itin g s. The f i r s t puts forward the n ega tiv e c a se. The second an o p tim istic view , moving clo se r to the L eib n izian view - th at th is i s the best of a l l p o ssib le w orlds. The con trast between th ese passages is at tim es f a ir ly marked, forcin g us to conclude th at Hume stressed one view at one stage in h is career and the op p osite one a t another. As both s e ts o f arguments are developed at con sid erab le len g th , i t is wrong to be dogmatic that he held only to one view . I t has already been argued th at ha favoured a 'ch eerfu l

d is p o s it io n ', or the o p tim istic view , when developing h is anthropological model; so th at there is good ground for saying th at h is most co n sisten t view o f l i f e was o p tim istic .

The T h e istic view th at the Creator is m orally good does not n e c e ssa r ily e n ta il the con clu sion th at human l i f e is p a in less or the Creation fla w le s s . I t does hold th at the C reation i s in h eren tly good, so that the good

t e le o lo g ic a l ends which dem onstrate that goodness w ill even tu ally be f u l f i l l e d . According to th is view , the good Creation of which Leibniz speaks is - 'th e b est o f a l l p o ssib le w orld s'. This claim turns back the question on those who would condemn the Creation as the work o f an a ll-g o o d , a ll-p o w erfu l d e ity by asking - ' i s any other ex isten ce p o ssib le'?

But, the fa c t th at the Creation i s the b est o f a l l p o ssib le worlds reminds us o f a b asic moral d is tin c tio n , which h ig h lig h ts the ex isten ce o f an e v il power in the cosmos. 'E v il' is the other sid e o f the co in .

I t i s th e dark tones in th e p a in tin g a g a in s t which th e b r ig h te r colours and h ig h lig h ts stan d o u t. To a s s e r t t h a t something i s good i s to argue f o r th e e x iste n c e of e v i l . That, f o r th e T h e ist i s not th e problem. The problem a r i s e s out o f t h a t s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s . I t i s summed up in E p ic u ru s's p r e s e n ta tio n o f th e antinom y:-

" Is he w i l li n g to p revent e v i l , but not ab le? then he is im potent. I s he a b le , but not w illin g ? then he i s m alev o len t. I s he both a b le and w illin g ? whence then i s e v il? "^ ^

That i s a l o g i c a l s t r a i g h t j a c k e t from which th e T h e ist cannot escape. I t i s a t r u e fo rm u latio n o f th e problem on t h e i s t i c te rm s , and th e only answer which th e T h e ist can give i s to say t h a t i n some ways God's power i s lim it e d . There a re some th in g s which He cannot and o th ers which He w i l l not do. I t has to be remembered t h a t Omnipotence i s a concept which has been c o n trib u te d to theo lo g y from th e philosophy o f r e l i g io n d eb ate, and in an extreme form does not belong to b i b l i c a l theology. Theism must be d efin ed from w ith in th e C h r is tia n t r a d i t i o n , r a t h e r than from a p h ilo s o p h ic a l t r a d i t i o n . Two b i b l i c a l passages have helped t o d e fin e C h r is tia n t r a d i t i o n on t h i s q u e s tio n :-

"How c l e a r l y th e sky re v e a ls God's gloryI How p l a i n l y i t shows what he has doneI Bach day pronounces i t to th e follow ing day;

each n ig h t re p e a ts i t to th e n e x t. No speech or words a re used,

no sound i s heard;

Yet t h e i r v o ice goes out to a l l th e world and i s heard to th e ends of th e e a rth ."

"Ever sin ce God c re a te d th e w orld, h is i n v i s i b l e q u a l i t i e s , both his e te r n a l power and h is d iv in e n a tu r e , have been c l e a r l y seen; they are perceived in th e th in g s t h a t God has made . . . So th ese people have no excuse a t a l l . .

97. D ialogues Concerning N a tu ra l R elig io n . P a rt X.(Ei.M ecIntyre)

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