PLAN OPERATIVO

180.

the con v en tio n al v i r t u e o f j u s t i c e w ith regard to the pu b lic i n t e r e s t , but he by no means tak e s i t to be a g en eral f e a tu r e of th e o b jec ts o f our moral ap probation t h a t they promote anything of th e o rd er o f th e g r e a t e s t

happiness of th e g r e a t e s t number*'!^ Although Hume may not have r e f e rr e d to the 'g r e a t e s t happiness p rin c ip le * d i r e c t l y , he placed 'u t i l i t y * in a u n iv e r s a l c o n te x t so o f te n t h a t i t can f a i r l y be said t h a t he a n tic ip a te d the g r e a t e s t happiness p r i n c i p l e .

J u s t as Hume had assumed i t to be superfluous to prove t h a t th e ' b a ie v - o le n t or s o f t e r a f f e c ti o n s a re e stim a b le' , so th e U t i l i t a r i a n s a t f i r s t imagined i t unnecessary to d e fin e happiness. I t was as though ' securing th e g r e a t e s t happiness o f th e g r e a t e s t number* p resen ted the r e a l l y se rio u s problem. I f i t i s in any sense t r u e t h a t Hume* s In tu itio n is m only made sense f i n a l l y a g a in s t a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g io u s background, i t may be more than coincidence t h a t the gradual demise of e a rly U t i li ta r ia n i s m kept pace w ith the d e c lin e o f r e l i g io u s b e l i e f in B r i t a i n .

Even i f we suppose t h a t U t i li ta r ia n i s m had been a b le to supply a

s a t i s f a c t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of h appiness, would t h a t n e c e s s a r ily have secured an easy t r a n s i t i o n to the second ste p - th e secu rin g o f th e 'g r e a t e s t happiness of th e g r e a t e s t number * ? The o b je c tiv e s which i n s p i r e th e i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l i e f b o d ies, such as th e United N ations, OXFAM, and th e Red Cross a re o b je c tiv e s which could be sa id to r e p re s e n t an i n te r n a t io n a l consensus about what c o n tr ib u te s to - 't h e g r e a t e s t happiness of the g r e a t e s t number*. As i d e a l s th e s e o b je c tiv e s may have much to commend them, but f re q u e n tly th ey appear to be v ery d i f f i c u l t to implement in p r a c t ic e . I n te n tio n s a r e o fte n good, but the c a rry in g out o f them often leav es much to be d e s ir e d . 'The g r e a t e s t happiness o f th e g r e a t e s t number* sounds much b e t t e r as a slogan than as a c a l l to a c tio n .

C r i t i c s of e a r l i e r U t i li ta r ia n i s m found i t easy to advance a c a r ic a tu r e of the theory by s t a t i n g t h a t , in i t s most b asic form, i t was preoccupied w ith th e 'low er p l e a s u r e s '. To meet t h i s c r i t ic is m a ' f e l i c i f i c calculous*

2. Hume. by A .J, Ayer. Published by th e Oxford U niversity

l8 i .

w as ad ded t o d e m o n s tr a te t h a t U t i l i t a r i a n i s m a t t a c h e d g r e a t e r im p o r ta n c e t o th e 'h ig h e r p l e a s u r e s ' . E ven s o , w ith o u t t h e d r i v i n g f o r c e o f

r e l i g i o u s c o n v ic t i o n s s t a t e d in c l e a r te r m s , s e c u l a r U t i l i t a r i a n i s m waned in i n f l u e n c e and p r e p a r e d t h e way f o r t h e e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s o f t h e 2 0 t h . c e n t u r y .

S e c u la r I n t u it io n i s m r e v iv e d i n t h e 20t h . c e n t u r y i n a number o f d i f f e r ­ e n t fo r m s . G .J . W arnock lum ps t o g e t h e r G .E . M o o re, H .A , P r ic h a r d and W.D. R o ss a s b e lo n g in g t o t h e e a r ly I n t u i t i o n i s t cam p, d e s p i t e M o o re's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t h e d id n o t b e lo n g t o t h a t g ro u p . Many o f t h e o ld p ro b lem s in e t h i c s had r e tu r n e d

"For P r ic h a r d t h e r e i s no r e a s o n why w hat i s r i g h t i s r i g h t s o , f o r M oore, t h e r e i s no r e a s o n why w hat i s good i s g o o d ." ^

R o ss w as ch a rg e d w it h h a v in g a s s e r t e d t h a t 'g o o d ' and t i g h t ' d epend on o t h e r c h a r a c t e r s , and th e n n o t e x p la in in g "what t h i s p u z z lin g k in d o f d ep en d e n c e o f some c h a r a c t e r s on o t h e r s m ig h t b e . T hough he r e c o g n is e d t h e p o in t he c a s t no l i g h t upon I t . " ^

F or a h o s t o f r e a s o n s t h e b a ld P o s it iv is m o f A y e r 's L a n g u a g e. T ru th and L o g ic so o n l o s t i t s e a r l y i n f l u e n c e , a d e v e lo p m e n t w h ich A yer h im s e lf h a s a c c e p te d a s r i g h t . I t f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y t h e p r i n c i p l a l c o n d i t i o n s w h ich i t had l a i d down so i n f l e x i b l y . I t t o o d id n o t b e lo n g t o t h e 'tw o s p e c i e s o f s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o s i t i o n s ' .

In t h i s way I n t u i t i o n i s m had p r e p a r e d t h e way f o r P o s i t i v i s m , w h ich l e f t an unw elcom e le g a c y f o r m o ra l p h ilo s o p h y . A y er was t o w r i t e : -

" ...m o d e r n l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h e s w as t o make som e p h ilo s o p h e r s d e s p a ir o f m o r a ls a s a r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y . " ^

S c h lic k s u g g e s t e d t h a t " . . . s o - c a l l e d m o ra l ju d g m e n ts r e a l l y

fo r m u la te d r u l e s , and t h a t t h e o n ly r e a l q u e s tio n f o r a ' s c i e n c e o f

e t h i c s ' w as t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l q u e s tio n why c e r t a i n r u l e s c a w ^ e a d o p te d. 9

3. Contemporary Moral Philosophy, by G.J. Warnock. LORdOR,

by MacMillan in 19&7« ^

4. Warnock op. c i t .

5. The Language o f M orals. by R.M. Hare. Published by Oxford Paperbacks, in 1967.

l82

The onerous r e sp o n s ib ility o f moral education was being committed in crea sin g ly to preachers and pedagogues, w h ile th e r e a lly great minds addressed the main questions which were now thought to be bound up w ith a n a ly sis. The new preoccupation was w ith the 'language of m orals' rather than the 'fa ith of m orals'.

Warnock w r ite s :-

"We wish to know what moral goodness i s , or what i t i s fo r an action to be o b lig a to ry , and we are not to ld ; fo r the 'q u a lit ie s ', we are to ld , are in d e fin a b le .

Warnock w r ite s :-

"In becoming aware th at some proposed course o f a ctio n i s , say, ob lig a to ry , I have, on th is theory, added to my inform ation, I have come to know a tru th about the world. But what has th is truth th at I recogn ise to do with my behaviour?

Why should I adopt th at course of a ctio n rather than some other? The fa c t th a t the course o f actio n i s o b lig a to ry i s presumably meant

to be a reason fo r adopting i t ; the fa c t th at i t would, i f adopted sta r t on a Wednesday presumably i s n o t. But why the d ifferen ce? Why is some inform ation about the pnp erties o f th in gs and a ctio n s

irrev ela n t to questions about what i s to be done, w hile some other inform ation i s not? Moral judgments, i t seems, lik e other judgments, convey inform ation: what i s i t about the inform ation they convey which makes i t important fo r , or even relevan t to , our d e c isio n , our c h o ice s, our advice, or our recommendations? We fin d , once again, th at in tu itio n ism has nothing to say here: in th at theory, the relvance o f moral judgment to conduct appears as a bare assumption, about which, as indeed about alm ost everything in the su b ject, there i s nothing to be said ."

8

This outlook had the e f f e c t o f clo sin g o f f every reasonable approach

7* Warnock op. c i t . 13

in the search for answers to moral problems, k cleavage had developed between the older approach to m orality, p u b lic and p r iv a te , in communities where ra tio n a l argument had been used in the defence o f C h ristian stand­ ards; and th is newer approach, which bad a l l the a ttitu d e s necessary to make e x iste n tia lism accep tab le.

I t i s p r e c ise ly in th is tw en tieth century s e ttin g th at the f r u it s of the secu lar in flu en ce in moral philosophy can be seen a t th e ir p la in e s t. Hume's aim had been to p lace moral philosophy on a new b a sis. I t was now on th at b a s is. But the secu lar in flu en ce made i t in crea sin g ly d if f ic u lt to pronounce with c e rta in ty on any moral q u estion . That i s why the presence or absence o f r e lig io u s co n v ictio n s in the study of moral philosophy i s a m atter about which we cannot be in d iffe r e n t.

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In a len gthy Introduction to one ed itio n o f the T rea tise o f Human Nature. T.H. Green led h is readers to draw unfavourable conclu sions from the whole d r ift o f Hume's th in k in g. The conclu sion such as " ...h e so empties m orality o f i t s a ctu a l c o n te n ts ..." was in d ica tiv e o f how

9

many s t i l l reacted to Hume's view o f human nature in the nineteenth century, a conclu sion which threw in to question the leg itim a cy o f h is en q u iries,