62 mismo, el cual consiste en expresar opiniones; no como medio para la

Though Guillemardfs opinion on the practicability of Advisory rule in the FMS is not clear, he agreed that decentralisation should currently

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concentrate on re-adjusting the official machine. Hence to him and to the MCS the preservation of an efficient federal administration seems to have been more significant than meeting Malay discontent or pursuing a Malayan federation. For unless the Rulers and the State Councils were brought

directly into the administration, or better still Advisory rule established, the last two questions stood no chance of being resolved.

Maxwell's failure to have the Rulers made both the land alienating authority and the signatories of all land grants sheds some light on the attitude of the Residents and Guillemard. Since the reform was in itself insignificant, the Residents directed their opposition mainly at the larger question of transforming Resident rule at least in part into Advisory rule. Maxwell was informed by the Resident of Perak that his Sultan was quite

satisfied with the current practice. On the larger question of administration, the Resident declared:

The present [_ ResidentialJ system has stood the test of time, and His Highness the Sultan has repeatedly told me that he is quite satisfied^wlth it. He re-affirmed his satisfaction only a few days ago.

In the light of the Sultan of Perak1s complaints to the Colonial Office in August 1924 about his lack of power^ (see below, fp.in,-7), this statement was patently untrue. It shows how the Ruler was used as a pawn in the Residents’ dispute with Maxwell.

Unable to carry the Residents with him, Maxwell was forced to modify the draft land bill and make the Rulers only the alienating authority in land matters. As the Residents remained unmoved, the question was referred to the High Commissioner in November 1924. Guillemard ruled against Maxwell, declaring at the same time:

So far as I am aware, no Ruler has suggested that he has insufficient power vis-a-vis his Resident. The problem may arise some day, but decentralisation is quite a stiff enough problem for us to fgge, without complicating it by such considerations now.

It is important to note that this declaration was made a month after

Guillemard had submitted a radical decentralisation scheme to the Colonial Office on the basis of the Sultan of Perak*s complaints to Whitehall. In view of the Sultan*s demand for a larger degree of power, it is difficult to understand Guillemard's negative reaction to Maxwell's proposal except as a result of his personal animosity towards Maxwell. Alternatively, it casts doubts on whether Guillemard was interested in introducing Adivsory rule in the FMS.

In the final analysis, even if Maxwell had been able to implement all his proposals no fundamental change in the administration would have

resulted. Carried to its logical conclusion Maxwell's policy would have left the whole structure of the federal administration intact, though how that would fit into the sort of Advisory rule he envisaged remains obscure. Should a Malayan Federation eventually materialise, Maxwell expected to see the

Chief Secretary continue as the head of the FMS which would remain a distinct 83

entity within it. In other words, like his MCS colleagues, Maxwell was inherently conservative and had the same deep concern for efficiency. Furthermore, He was by temperament a centraliser, an administrator with a

'love for details' and with boundless self-confidence, energy and drive who tended to act without consulting his advisers. ^ The puny measure of

decentralisation effected did not at all inhibit his ability to exercise as centralised a control over the FMS as his predecessor, Sir bdward Brockman. In short, credit was due to Maxwell for being more forward-looking and

innovative than most of his MCS colleague, though it is doubtful whether even he penetrated to the root of the political dilemma facing the Malayan

The Guillemard Response

To understand the next stage of decentralisation, it is necessary first to turn to Guillemard*s relations with the FMS. Guillemard was eager to exercise real control over the FMS, and soon came to the view that his predecessor, Sir Arthur Young, ‘never had the brains to run the show ... and

C > C

that the longer (Young) stayed here the more his power failed1. A week or two after his arrival in Malaya, Guillemard was ’horrified1 by the limits of his power to sanction supplementary expenditure and ‘proposed to get this

rt/

altered at once1. This was followed by his decision to overrule Brockman’s opposition to the FMS financing the construction of the Penang Hill Railway and to order the latter to secure the necessary funds for the project. In fact his determination to wield real authority in the FMS appears to have

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been mainly responsible for Brockman's retirement in mid-1920. When

Guillemard accepted the Malayan appointment, Milner told him that ’there was

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lots of work to be done and plenty of money to do it w i t h ’. Moreover, it would appear that Brockman and the FMS Treasurer failed to inform him fully

about the F e d e r a t i o n s financial position. Accordingly he launched an

expensive programme of public works in the FMS early in 1920. When the slump deepened and a financial crisis occurred Guillemard was seriously

embarrassed. He then not only accused Brockman and the Treasurer of

inefficiency but blamed the crisis on the financial policy of his predecessor. Regarding himself as a hard-headed and prudent financier out to save the FMS from financial ruin^ Guillemard was now more convinced than ever that

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effective control over the FMS was essential. It would also assist him to develop the Colony and the FMS in close and friendly co-operation.

In this connexion the appointment of Maxwell as Chief Secretary, as already discussed, had two unfortunate results. Firstly, it installed in the FMS an intensely egoistic, energetic and somewhat pugnacious Chief Secretary who was determined to head a quasi-independent administration.

The result was a grim struggle for power between the Chief Secretary and the High Commissioner. Secondly, it led to a period of intense feud between James and Maxwell which exacerbated the Guillemard-Maxwell split.

The Guillemard-Maxwell power struggle came to be centred on the

movement to restore the title of Resident-General. Initiated by the European

unofficial members of the Federal Council, this movement had the support of

the Chinese members and the Association of British Malaya. For years

antagonistic to any Colony control over the FMS administration, the unofficial councillors had their suspicion first aroused by the decision to equalise the status of the Chief Secretary and the Colonial Secretary in 1920. This was

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a piece of face-saving for James for having been passed over, but amounted to a lowering of the de facto status of the Chief Secretary who had hitherto been generally recognised as senior to the Colonial Secretary. To make matter worse, Guillemard ruled that James by virtue of his longer service was senior to Maxwell. Distrust soon turned to fear when Guillemard, having failed to persuade the British Government to accept an FMS loan of £10 million as trustee security, was compelled to get the Colony to raise it on the FMS behalf. The string attached to the loan was the appointment of a joint

Financial Adviser stationed in Singapore to advise Guillemard how to overoome the financial crisis and organise an effective system of Treasury control

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in the FMS. This was regarded by the European commercial interests as a

move by the High Commissioner to secure control over FMS finance and then ’fetter' the Federation to the C o l o n y . ^

In August 1921 the unofficials of the Federal Council petitioned

Whitehall for the restoration of the title of Res ident-General on the ground that the title of Chief Secretary was unconstitutional under the Treaty of

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Federation. The main motive behind the petition, however, was to re-affirm

the chief executive officer in the FMS as the real head of the administration, thereby obviating centralised control from Singapore. Maxwell endorsed the

petition and used it in his power struggle with Guillemard. He contended that,r “the Res ident-General was the real head of the FMS Government; and the fact that the Chief Secretary is still the real head of the Federal

Government has been obscured by the change in his title1* . ^ Hence the position should be clarified by the restoration of the title of Resident- General.

Guillemard advised Whitehall that it was essential for him to maintain a unity of control over the Colony and the FMS in order to continue

Anderson*s policy of developing the two territories on similar lines in friendly co-operation. He contended that the restoration of the title of Resident-General would stultify this policy and lead ultimately to a separate

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FMS under a separate High Commissioner. Alleging that 'finance is Maxwell's weakest point', Guillemard warned the Colonial Office that the FMS would

never fight its way back to solvency if he exercised no real control over the FMS. He then explained the crux of the Matter:

The object aimed at by the Chief Secretary is perfectly clear. He wishes to reduce the responsibility of the High Commissioner for the administration of the Federated Malay States and increase the responsibility of the Chief Secretary. He claims that the Chief Secretary ought to be the Head of the Government and that the High Commissioner ought to occupy much the same position in the Federated Malay States as in the Unfederated States, [_ that is_/ a position outside the Government with,vague and loosely defined authority over its administration.

The Secretary of State rejected the petition, declaring that it was

essential for the High Commissioner to maintain a unity of control over the whole of Malaya.

The agitation, however, continued. It was intensified by the

arrangements made for the Prince of Wales' visit to Malaya early in 1922. Owing to Guillemard's insistence the Rulers took formal precedence over the

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Chief Secretary during the visit. What infuriated the unofficial

councillors and Maxwell most was that as a result the latter was assigned a relatively obscure position throughout the visit. This event was regarded

b y the unofficial councillors as another attempt to erode the Chief

Secretary’s status and as evidence of the High Commissioner’s aim to assume 98

real control over the FMS administration. In 1923 the unofficials renewed their petition to the Colonial Office and published it in the newspapers, thus carrying their agitation into the open. Maxwell by now had also manoeuvred the Residents and the Malay Rulers behind him in support of the petition. The Residents apparently supported it to prevent further erosion

(

of the status of the Chief Secretary. The Rulers' support was skilfully obtained on the day the Hose Decentralisation Committee held its inaugural session in November 1922. They were given to understand that the restoration of the title would facilitate decentralisation and would expedite official

99 business.

To strengthen the petition Maxwell emphasised that friction between the Chief Secretary and the High Commissioner were likely to occur because of the undefined position of the two officers and of the differing interests of the two regions. To stabilise the relations between the above officers, Maxwell suggested the introduction of an Administrative and Executive General Order. Under this Order, any difference in opinion between the High

Commissioner and the Chief Secretary should, if the latter desired it, be 100

referred to the Secretary of State. Thus, the High Commissioner would only be an equal of the Chief Secretary unable to enforce any order against the latter’s wishes without previous reference to the Colonial Office. Needless to say Guillemard opposec the petition, adding that the agitation had been instigated by Maxwell. ?he Colonial Office renewed its support for Guillemard, and instructed Maxwell., when next on leave in London, to accept the Secretary of State's decision.

Despite this setback, Maxwell succeeded in excluding the High Commissioner from many spheres of the FMS administration. The undefined relations between th e m enabled hilt to limit references t o Guillemard to those

important questions requiring the High Commissioner's sanction and to permit the latter little initiative in other matters. This was facilitated by the fact that Guillemard lost the support of the unofficial councillors and, to some extent, of official opinion in the FMS because of his policy of lowering the status of the Chief Secretary and events such as the FMS Sterling Loan.

Maxwell also managed to foil Guillemard*s attempts to continue Anderson's policy of developing the Colony and the FMS on close lines through the

formation of joint departments with jurisdiction over both territories. He was not opposed to this policy initially and supported the establishment of a joint Survey Department in 1920 and a joint Fisheries Department a year

later. But owing to the power struggle, he desired to free the FMS administration from the High Commissioner's control as far as possible. Hence, he condemned this policy mainly because joint departments based in Singapore tended to increase the High Commissioner's control over the FMS. For the rest of his term of office, Guillemard succeeded only in forming a joint Posts and Telegraphs Departments in 1924.

In this connexion two issues merit discussion. As already mentioned, Guillemard proposed the appointment of a Secretary for Malay Affairs,

Malaya, to advise him on Malay affairs. Collins was keen on the idea, suggesting at the same time that Maxwell should also become the Secretary for Malay Affairs so that the latter would secure a standing in the UMS. It was hoped that this would help Maxwell carry out his Pan-Malayan policy. Maxwell however opposed the proposal partly because the Malay Secretary might get in between the Rulers and their British advisers and mainly because the new officer might enable the High Commissioner to centralise

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control over Malay affairs in*Singapore'. Apparently owing to his opposition, the matter was in the end dropped. The most stormy issue of dispute concerned the proposal to form a Malayan Medical Service under a

only declaring that the Medical Departments could continue to function efficiently under a Principal Medical Officer in the FMS and a Principal Chief Medical Officer in the C o l o n y . B u t the Colonial Office, as though to stir up a fire, desired to see the Director invested with executive powers. This was regarded by the FMS as another attempt by the High

Commissioner to assume direct control of the FMS administration. Hence the Chief Secretary, the Residents and the Unofficial Councillors now turned solidly against the proposal. Reviewing the position, Guillemard comp^ined to the Colonial Office, 'I could have carried (the proposal) through at the

101