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In his scheme Guillemard made no attempt to define the federation he had in mind. He only stated that, if practicable, all Federal Heads other than those of purely technical departments would be advisory officers.
Further, a large measure of original legislative power and financial control would be restored to the Rulers-in-Council. To assist in this, future
members of the Federal Council would be appointed from those of the State
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Councils. But no division of powers and functions between the centre and
the states was made in the scheme. Guillemard intended that the detailed planning of this question be worked out by official committees.
Since both the Rulers and the FMS commercial interests opposed the amalgamation of their States with the Colony, Guillemard*s Malayan federation would only comprise the nine Malay States. To achieve this federation, the Rulers of the UMS would be invited to attend an annual durbar with their
counterparts in the FMS and, whenever possible, Malaya-wide departments would be established. Since the heads of technical and certain other
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departments would retain their executive power, the extension of their
departments into Malayan ones would encroach on the autonomy of the UMS. This seems to indicate that Guillemard realised that, the FMS being a federation, it was not possible to place the Rulers and the State Councils on exactly the same footing as those in the UMS, and that a Malayan
federation would necessitate some tightening of the federal bond on the UMS. There is a studied vagueness in the scheme as to whether Guillemard intended to convert Resident rule in the FMS into Advisory rule. Even when
challenged by Maxwell in February 1926, he refused to declare whether he had such an aim. However, in his scheme, the High Commissioner rejected Maxwell's policy because it would ‘'never give to the Rulers, the Councils, and the
Residents the same measure of power and dignity as are enjoyed by their 129
counterparts in the Unfederated States". This implies that he did wish to convert Resident rule into Advisory rule.
On the other hand since he relied on Anderson's policy to justify his scheme, Guillemard appears to have had in mind a revival of the state
authorities before or during the early days of the Federation. Even if it is conceded that he misunderstood the Resident rule of those days to be Advisory rule (which is highly improbable), other indications show that he apparently had Resident rule in mind. For instance, he regarded the
unpopularity of the federal government, not Resident rule, as the central obstacle to the UMS joining the FMS. Unlike in the UMS where the
administration was, to all intents and purposes, run by the State Councils and the Malay Secretariats, Guillemard looked to the Residents and their Secretariats to remain in control and ensure administrative efficiency. Administratively, his scheme would increase the powers of the Residents and that of certain Federal Heads. On the evidences presented, it may be argued that Guillemard either had no intention to transform Resident rule to Advisory rule or proposed to concentrate on decentralising the federal
administration. Probably for this reason, tthe same Residents who opposed Maxwell's attempt to bring the Rulers and the State Councils into the administration supported Guillemard's policy as did) Sir E. Birch who desired a return to the Residential system during the early days of the Federation. If the above analysis is correct, the Guillemard Scheme stood little hope of getting the UMS to federate with the FMS. The UMS opposed this step not only because of the overcentralised federal administration but also because of Resident rule in the FMS.
It is well to reiterate at this point that the Guillemard-Maxwell split hinged on the question whether the High Commissioner, as intended by
Guillemard, should exercise real control over both the Colony and the FMS or whether the Chief Secretary should be the head of a quasi-independent admin istration in the FMS. As already discussed, Maxwell successfully foiled Guillemard’s policy of exercising real control over the FMS and of developing it in close co-operation with the Colony. In his despatch the High
Commissioner advised the Colonial Office that his scheme would eradicate the existing obstacles to the policy of establishing joint departments
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covering the Colony and the FMS.^ It seems clear from another despatch of
22nd October 1924 that the paramount factor behind the scheme was Guillemard's eagerness to remove Maxwell from the FMS. Under the new order it would be easier for the High Commissioner to exercise real control over the FMS than in the past, when his actions were so effectively checkmated by a powerful Chief Secretary.
In the latter despatch the High Commissioner explained that his scheme 132 could not be carried out so long as Maxwell remained the Chief Secretary. In drafting the scheme he had been aware of Maxwell's view that the Chief Secretary was the head of a quasi-independent administration and was essential to the preservation of the federal administration. To substantiate his
case, Guillemard reiterated the opinions the Colonial Office had already formed of Maxwell. Furthermore, he alleged that Maxwell, being by
temperament a centraliser, could not even implement the decentralisation policy hitherto pursued. He charged that:
^ith a Chief Secretary whose heart is not in decentralisation, and whose actions, even in small matters, run counter to the sympathy with the Rulers he declares, it is impossible for a High Commissioner to make any substantial progress with the
policy of devolution. It is more impossible still for the
Rulers or any officers junior to the Chief Secretary to do anything. ^
untrue. Had the Residents and the Financial Adviser supported Maxwell, a larger degree of decentralisation would have been attained in the FMS.
Guillemard himself had endorsed the Hose Scheme in 1923 and had supported the Residents against Maxwell’s efforts to bring the Rulers and the state Councils into the administration. Furthermore, he had hitherto advocated no policy of his own nor pressed for stronger measures of decentralisation. It seems clear that he had either been formulating a scheme which would necessitate Maxw e l l ’s removal from the FMS before the Sultan of Perak pleaded with the
Colonial Office for accentuated decentralisation, or had seized upon Whitehall's sympathy for the Sultan's views to draft such a scheme.
But the Guillemard scheme was conditioned by certain basic policy considerations. It had been clear for some time to high British officials in Malaya that there were two approaches to decentralisation. One was through re-adjusting the parts without unduly disrupting the administrative whole. This was precisely Maxwell’s approach towards the administrative aspect of decentralisation. The other was through drastic reorganisation of the administrative mechanism itself, J The first had been tried and, in the view of the^££, found wanting. The second logically followed. This necessitated radical changes in the position of the Chief Secretary - untying the knot, as it were - without which no re-structuring of the administration was feasible. And guillemard was not the first or the only advocate of this approach. As early as October 1920 Collins arrived at the
conclusion that comprehensive decentralisation necessitated the abolition 135
of the Chief Secretaryship. J Apparently in a bid for the last Chief
Secretaryship, William Peel and Hose advocated the same move to the Colonial Office late in 1924.
The Colonial Office approved the Guillemard scheme, and extended the High Commissioner's term of office by two years to enable him to
Maxwell prematurely. It tried to muzzle him with the post of Malay States Information Agent in London, provided he took it up in November 1925. In March 1925 Guillemard, acting on London1s instruction, secured the general
support of the Rulers, the Residents, and the Malay and European Unofficial Councillors for the new policy. About the same time Maxwell was also
summoned to Government House in Singapore where Guillemard read out three typewritten pages informing him of the gist of the Secretary of State's decision. Maxwell opposed the new policy and rejected the Malay States Information Agency. But his request for a Governorship in a major colony failed to obtain London's approval. For a time the Colonial Office
anxiously hoped that Maxwell would not challenge its decision to remove him from the FMS. As the Malay States were technically sovereign, the Chief
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Secretary could not be recalled at the King's pleasure. This 137
constitutional obstacle was probably known to Maxwell but, knowing the futility of carrying opposition to that extreme, he agreed to leave Malaya by November 1925.
The Gathering Opposition to Decentralisation
In May 1925 Guillemard left for London to discuss his scheme with the Colonial Office. During his absence, the Acting High Commissioner, Hose,
'drifted into the arms of Maxwell* and tried 'to run with the hare and hunt with the h o u n d s . H o s e advised Whitehall that it would be unwise to make Maxwell a martyr for opponents of the new policy. While he had accepted Guillemard's suggestion to stay beyond his retirement age so as to succeed Maxwell and carry out the new policy, he now informed Whitehall that he agreed with 'some of the best official opinion' in Malaya that the government should not be committed to any drastic change in administration
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but should only accelerate decentralisation. In the end Hose decided to retire when he reached retirement age in December 1925. The result of this lengthy correspondence between Hose and London was that Maxwell was permitted
to stay in Malaya till he retired in mid-1926 provided he undertook to co operate with Guillemard. In return Maxwell was given the right to comment officially on the policy, including the abolition of the Chief Secretaryship. Since this provided him with sufficient scope to oppose the Guillemard scheme indirectly, Maxwell agreed to remain in Malaya.
Guillemard1 s departure from Malaya was also followed by the first signs of opposition to his policy. Kindersley, a staunch supporter of Maxwell, protested to the Colonial Office about the embargo imposed on him and other unofficial councillors who were consulted by Guillemard, preventing them from discussing the policy among themselves or with anyone else except the Acting High Commissioner, When the Chinese unofficial councillors learned that they were the only ones not consulted, they protested strongly to London and threatened the government with Chinese public meetings, on Guillemard*s return, to demand a public a p o l o g y . I n London Swettenham
submitted a memorandum to Whitehall opposing Guillemard*s policy. He contended that overcentralisation could be overcome by restoring the title of Resident-General^by instructing the High Commissioners, the Resident- General and the Residents to adhere closely to their respective roles under Federation, and by frequently consulting the Rulers and their chiefs about public m a t t e r s . A c c o r d i n g to him there was nothing wrong with the system of administration he established; the fault lay in his successors’
deviation from previous practice and policy. While recognising Swettenham as the leading authority on Malaya, the Colonial Office rejected his views on decentralisation as out-of-date. ^
On his return to Malaya, Guillemard was confronted with a lengthy
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memorandum by Maxwell attacking the new policy. Partly because of the strong overtones of personal animosity, and partly because it might foment opposition to his scheme, the High Commissioner forbade Maxwell to