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Most researchers are of the opinion that the epistemic logical language, models, and structures are useful for something (outside the field of epistemic logic itself). There are, however, multiple viewpoints possible regarding in what way epistemic logic can be of use. Recall the discussion of the benefits of formalisation in the previous chapter. In section 2.2, the advantages of taking a formal approach were discussed along the lines of clarification, verification and exploration. In this section we will have a more elaborate look at what the interviewed researchers think that epistemic logic could be useful for, in what way and in virtue of what.

Van Benthem points to Popper’s concept of the searchlight theory. If one wants to conduct research on real-world phenomena, one cannot just start by gathering a big amount of data. The data thus gathered would not give us any information about the real-world phenomenon, as we would have no framework to fit it into. Providing this framework is the duty of the searchlight theory. Van Benthem is of the opinion that epistemic logic can play this role, for example in experimental game theory or research on the theory of mind. Romeijn adds that epistemic logic could be useful for the forming of theories in such domains, “because it provides conceptual frameworks for understanding information transfer.” Somewhat along the same lines as Van Benthem and Romeijn, Gierasimsczuk remarks:

“I see philosophy in general, and particularly epistemology as a ‘frontier’, where we are allowed to touch issues that are not yet well-formed empirical questions. In order to conduct empirical research, we need to have a theory that allows us to state hypotheses or design experiments.”

We may conclude that one of the possible ways in which epistemic logic can be useful is by aiding empirical research in the stages of forming research questions, interpreting data and developing

theories.

More in general, epistemic logic is also often looked upon as providing a new way of looking at things in other areas. For example, Ramaswamy Ramanujam suggests that epistemic logic can offer an interesting new way of looking at mathematical structures, and may raise new ques- tions for the mathematical community. (EL5Q, 193) The relevance of epistemic logic is also often mentioned in connection to game theory. Artemov suggests that epistemic logic can offer us inter- esting new concepts for mainstream game theory, and form the foundation for the new discipline of epistemic game theory. (EL5Q, 12-5) Epistemic logic is also said to extend the conceptual apparatus of philosophy (Hintikka 1962, 10), and to work as “a catalyst for broader intellectual development.” (Van Benthem in: EL5Q, 36) Summarising this, we may say that epistemic logic may serve the broader scientific community by providing a new way of looking at things, raising new questions and concepts, and creating interesting new research fields.

Epistemic logic may have a lot to offer for the development of the science of knowledge. For instance, as already discussed in the previous section, Gierasimsczuk indicates that epistemic logic, because of its idealisations, can point clearly to limitations of the human mind, thereby im- proving our understanding of human knowledge. Along the same lines, Hendricks sees a function for epistemic logic in identifying pitfalls in epistemic situations. By formalising certain possible real-life situations, epistemic logic may improve the way we look at or do things.

Now where in our human lives could this have an application? Romeijn attracts attention to situations in which knowledge claims serve as a basis for action. For example, this can be in court where judges do or do not convict the suspects, or in applications for grants by scientists. However, Romeijn is of the opinion that our current work in epistemic logic is often way too far from everyday situations of knowledge claims. The connections to the practice of knowledge claims should be made. Likewise, Hendricks sees a role for epistemic logic in respect to action based on knowledge (claims):

“Knowledge is very good for deliberation, decision and action, individually and collec- tively. And that’s the reason why you need an apparatus like epistemic logic, dynamic epistemic logic and other derivatives, to exactly pin down what sort of basis we are going to deliberately decide to act on individually and collectively, and what sort of pitfall do we find in the way.”

Summarising this, we may say that epistemic logic could be very useful for society, because our actions are often based on knowledge or knowledge claims.14

Compare “I think that the notion of information cannot be usefully analysed without a matching logic,” (Van Benthem in: EL5Q, 41) and “Philosophical discussions about the notions of knowl- edge and beliefs are interesting, but they dont lead often to somewhere if they are not formalised.” (Williamson in: EL5Q, 150) In these two citations, epistemic logic is considered to be a formal tool that can be used to clarify philosophical arguments and enhance conceptual understanding. More generally, epistemic logic is often talked about in terms of being a ‘toolkit’. We will discuss both what this toolkit can be used for and how it functions.

One of the merits of epistemic logic is that it is very precise about the assumptions that it makes, so that, for instance, tacit conditions may be identified so that one is clear about which method of

14_{However, Fitting still sees a gap in epistemic logical research here: “Generally our interest in the place of a}

person comes from our understanding of what those beliefs will cause a person to do. This seems to be missing from the standard model that is based on possible worlds.” He suggests that we might be able to substitute possible worlds semantics by action-based epistemic semantics, to fill this gap. (EL5Q, 87)

reasoning is used in some model. In general, using a formal tool makes one aware of the modelling choices, which Timothy Williamson sees as a vital illustration of the usefulness of epistemic logic: “The role of epistemic logic, and that of logic, or formalisation in general, is that it helps us to be- come aware of what specific choices in the modelling of the concept lead us to.” More specifically, Fitting (EL5Q, 89) discusses that in the process of modelling, “formal epistemic methods help us clarify what is basic to fields, or rather to our knowledge of and interaction with a field. In par- ticular, which are the fundamental concepts, and which are the derivative ones.” A good example of this would be the interesting new insight at the birth of the field of epistemic logic of taking the concept of ignorance as fundamental in researching knowledge. Since then knowledge of some proposition is traditionally defined as having excluded all the possible worlds contradicting that proposition. Some other examples of where the precise assumptions of epistemic logicians may be helpful are: testing coherence of different philosophical approaches (Williamson), disentangling puzzles (Arl´o-Costa) and identifying necessary conditions for coordinated actions (Shoham). Van Benthem remarks that “the models used are extremely simple, but that is precisely why they allow us to see essential structures, and develop major themes in a perspicuous manner.” (EL5Q, 37) Van Benthem is one of many that see merit in the simplicity of epistemic logical models. When asked when his interest for epistemic logic came about, Stalnaker answered that it “provided a precise representation, at the right level of abstraction.” (EL5Q, 245, emphasis added) By eliminating some complexity of epistemic issues, epistemic logic can be very helpful for several purposes. It has been mentioned that the simplicity and systematicity of epistemic logic could help reveal deeper relations between different epistemic concepts (Arl´o-Costa), and bring to light subtle points (Bonanno). Horacio Arl´o-Costa also contends that “some deeper problems in the theory of knowledge and belief, concerning the relations of knowledge with truth and self-reference and belief with degrees of belief are only evident when one has the proper logical tools at one’s disposal.” (EL5Q, 4) Both the simplicity and the systematicity or rigour of epis- temic logic are often praised for their illuminating properties. Artemov puts it like this: “Formal methods do not usually resolve fundamental philosophical issues but they provide the necessary reliable framework for more advanced reasoning about these issues.” (EL5Q, 17) Summarising, we might say that epistemic logic could aid in our understanding of certain concepts and problems by being both very simple as well as systematic. Besides this, we might add relative ‘objectivity’ as an attractive feature of epistemic logic for formalising philosophical disputes. (Point raised by Williamson, (EL5Q, 252))

Hendricks explains how epistemic logic can aid in conceptual understanding, because of its local approach:

“Instead of pursuing a global conceptual understanding of knowledge, formal epis- temologies proceed in a more piecemeal fashion. A certain amount of conceptual understanding is presupposed, or a certain set of conceptual parameters are fixed. ... Although the results of the piecemeal conceptual analyses in a formal framework may not add up to a global concept of knowledge,15they may all the same reveal something about the structure of the ingredients making up such a concept.” (Hendricks 2005, 15-6)

Besides a useful ‘toolkit’, epistemic logic has also been looked upon as a ‘common language’ in which discussions of epistemic issues can be phrased. Ramanujam spoke about epistemic logic in terms of “a very attractive way of discussing things.” (EL5Q, 191) Melvin Fitting and Giacomo Bonanno agree that epistemic logic may enable talking and reasoning about epistemic concepts like knowledge and belief. (EL5Q, 51, 89) Along the same lines, Aviad Heifetz remarked that

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However, he also argues that these local approaches may contribute to global understanding of the subject matter. (Hendricks 2005, 162)

“as a language, epistemic logic provides a vocabulary to communicate and express ideas about interaction and mutual knowledge and belief between individuals.” (EL5Q, 139) More outspo- ken, Bonanno takes epistemic logic to be “the common language that made it possible to bring together different professional communities.” (EL5Q, 48) Not everybody agrees. Gierasimsczuk criticises the view of epistemic logic as the common language: “The idea that logicians will be able to sell the language that they designed as the common multi-disciplinary language is a bit colonial, I would say.” Summarising this, we may say that epistemic logic is sometimes viewed upon as a helpful language that may simplify discussions of epistemic issues, but regarding it as ‘the common language’ of multidisciplinary knowledge-related research may for some be a bit too strong.