Secuencia Crear hoja

“Something’s having intuitive content ... is very heavy evidence in favor of anything.”

- Saul Kripke (1980, 42)

Epistemic logic is based on and connected to our everyday conception of knowledge. But what role should and do our intuitions about the everyday conception of knowledge really play in epistemic logic? Just like there is some variety in opinions regarding whether and how to use empirical data in epistemic logical research, there is quite some variety in what role intuitions may and should

12

play. Although many researchers agree that intuitions can be very useful in guiding our research, conceptions diverge as to where the role of intuitions end.

Where some say: ‘I have enough of an intuitive understanding of the concept of knowledge to do my research’, others point to possible limitations to the use of intuitions. Gierasimsczuk raises the issue that intuitions are often very vague, and may have “little value for science.” B´ılkov´a shares her worries: “intuitive understanding of how knowledge works ... can be very inspiring, but on the other hand there is this danger that intuitions are really subjective, and also may be not quite fit- ting.” Therefore, she contends that we should always check our intuitions against (empirical) data. Furthermore, multiple interviewed researchers note that intuitions (about the concept of knowl- edge) diverge, and that there is not just one notion of ‘knowledge’. Different social groups may have a different conception of knowledge. Moreover, the feeling that I know something is not necessarily the same as knowing it. So how could the knowledge of one researcher (or the feeling that they know) be a trustworthy guide?

Because of reasons like these, many of the questioned epistemic logicians see only a limited role for intuitions. Gierasimsczuk, for instance, suggest that intuitions can only be used for questioning and discussing, not for judging science to be either good or bad. Also Hintikka sees a limited role for the use of intuitions. In his book ‘Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery’, Hintikka discusses the problem of generalising intuitions, as well as the limited access we have to them. This makes the extent of their applicability unclear, and it causes Hintikka to conclude that they may not serve as premises for (philosophical) arguments. Van Benthem claims that intuitions can be useful for “mapping out an area and putting constraints for an analysis,” but can always be revised and refined. To him this is like music: we start with some musical sense, but by studying music our musical sense may change and be refined. Similarly, intuitions can only have the first word, not the last. Leitgeb agrees: for him intuitions can be prima face reasons to go for one formalisation (rational reconstruction) rather than for another, but we can always go back and revise these intuitions.

Hendricks argues that in epistemic logic intuitions canonlybe used as an illustration of outcomes of some formal framework. It cannot be used as more than this, in particular, we cannot base our formal framework on these intuitions unless it is reflected explicitly in the definitions, lem- mata and assumptions of our framework. This can be contrasted to the practice of (mainstream) epistemologists, who “often remain quite vague about the tacit assumptions and presuppositions of their conclusions, which are based on intuitions and folksy examples.” (Hendricks 2005, 16) Another critique of the philosophical practice of this kind comes with Dennett and Hofstadter, who discuss the limited applicability of intuitions, especially when philophers’ imaginations take flight:

“When philosophical fantasies become too outlandish – involving time machines, say, or duplicate universes or infinitely powerful deceiving demons – we may wisely de- cline to conclude anything from them. Our conviction that we understand the issues involved may be unreliable, an illusion produced by the vividness of the fantasy.” (Dennett and Hofstadter 1982, 230, cited by Hendricks 2005, 154)

Also Yoav Shoham (EL5Q, 228) underscribes a limited role for the use of intuitions, but then as necessary but insufficient conditions for a theory. He is, in fact, quite positive about their use: “One should be explicit about the intended use of the theory, and within the scope of this intended use one should require that every day intuition about the natural concepts be a useful

guide in thinking about their formal counterparts.”

Although intuitions can be very instructive in guiding our research, intuitions about the concep- tion of knowledge are often prescribed a limited role. Of course we should not fail to distinguish two different objects of our intuitions here: our intuitions about how a proof might go versus our intuitions about the meaning of the word ‘knowledge’. Using the first kind of intuitions is usually uncontroversially accepted, whereas using the second kind of intuitions is more debated and restricted. We have seen that the objections raised may imply that intuitions cannot be the judge of science or have the last word, should not serve as premises for arguments or as sufficient conditions for a theory, and that intuitions are not allowed to play more of a role than just for illustration of the formal framework outcomes. In the formal and computer science agenda of epistemic logic one makes use mainly of the intuitions of the first kind, and consequently there is not so much of a danger of using intuitions in the wrong way: using misguided intuitions in guiding you in proving a certain theory or building a certain system may merely cause you to take longer for the proof construction. This is in contrast with using the second kind of intuitions as, for example, a reason for dismissing or accepting a framework. The latter can be expected to happen mostly in the philosophical or societal agenda, as they tend to focus more on the human conception of knowledge. Therefore, as suggested by the researchers, in the philosophical and societal agenda of epistemic logic, the use of intuitions of the second kind should be restricted. At the same time the possibility of an outside check to our intuitions safeguards us from the sub- jectivity of these intuitions. This outside check is rather to be expected in the societal agenda, in which data about the real-world phenomenon of knowledge play are more vital role than in the philosophical agenda.13