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CAPÍTULO II MARCO TEÓRICO

2. INTELIGENCIA EMOCIONAL

2.2. ORIGEN Y DESARROLLO HISTORICO DE LA INTELIGENCIA EMOCIONAL

2.5.4. MODELO DE GOLEMAN

The Charter of Rights is another source of primary law in the EU legal order. In contrast to the TEU and TFEU, it is directly relevant for refugees and asylum seekers. The Charter is a document that codifies fundamental rights applicable to all people in the territory of the EU, subject to qualification under Article 51. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 6(1) TEU recognizes the legally binding character of the Charter and states that it shall have the same legal standing as the founding Treaties. The Charter reaffirms the status of fundamental rights, derived from national constitutions of the EU member countries and other legal sources, such as customary norms or peremptory norms

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jus cogens, as general principles of the EU law by bringing them together in a single document (Rossi, 2008). The instrument certainly plays an important role in the EU legal order because of the changes to the EU architecture introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty not only elevates human rights norms to the level of primary law, but also makes CJEU the guardian of the Charter (De Burca, 2013). One of the tasks of CJEU under the Lisbon Treaty is to ensure compliance by the EU with fundamental rights stated in the Charter when performing its functions. As Weiler (2009) notes, after legalization of human rights in the EU legal order, the EU has formally acquired constitutional traits.

Even though the Charter is often likened to a European constitution because it codifies fundamental rights of people residing in Europe, which in turn can be enforced by CJEU, it has a limited scope of application. Article 51(1) states that the Charter provisions “are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law”. Thus, the document does not seek to challenge the constitutional traditions of EU member states by elevating human rights protection to the level of EU competence. Article 6(1) TEU and Article 51(2) of the Charter explicitly prohibit the Charter from altering the institutional balance in the EU or allocating any new powers to the Union. Rather, its purpose is to ensure validity and legality of measures adopted by the Union and its member states while discharging their respective duties under EU law (Gil-Bazo, 2008). As regards EU bodies, the Charter applies to measures that the supranational institutions adopt pursuant to the realization of the Treaty objectives in areas of their competence. As regards EU member countries, the Charter applies whenever they fulfil their obligations under EU law (Lenaerts, 2012).

1.2.1 The Charter and Refugee Protection

The Charter is relevant for refugee protection because it ensures that fundamental rights are taken into account when EU member countries implement secondary legislation on asylum. Indeed, Article 67(1) TFEU explicitly ties the creation and operation of AFSJ to respect for fundamental rights. The scope of the Charter application is not restricted to reviewing national laws implementing European asylum rules, but also encompasses administrative or discretionary measures put in place to achieve the objectives outlined in the secondary legislation. For example, in NS8, CJEU has ruled that domestic

measures adopted by the UK under Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation (the so-called “sovereign clause”) must comply with the Charter because they are part and parcel of the CEAS and as such can be described as giving effect to Union law (Lenaerts, 2012). In addition to that, there are linkages between the TEU and TFEU on one hand, and the Charter on the other hand, which can strengthen the system of refugee protection in the EU. Lenaerts (2012) argues that the principle of loyal cooperation

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(Article 4(3) TEU) has a potential to amplify the effects of the Charter in the EU legal order. To begin with, the principle obliges EU countries to respect fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter when they derogate from the provisions of the EU law on grounds of ordre public. Indeed, CJEU has established such a precedent in ERT9, when the Court argued that any derogation from the EU law

must be compatible with the fundamental rights under ECHR. Furthermore, Article 4(3) TEU reinforces the principle of effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. In DEB10, CJEU has

relied on the latter principle to set aside national procedural measures that inhibit access to justice and, thus, hinder the effectiveness of the EU law.

There are a number of Charter provisions that are particularly relevant for refugee protection. First and foremost, Article 18 of the Charter guarantees the right to asylum in the EU. There is a debate among scholars as to what this provision entails. Article 18 does not specify the holder of the right; therefore, it is addressed to refugees and states alike. Furthermore, it does not specify the exact guarantees attached to the right, i.e. whether a person can “seek”, “enjoy” or “be granted” asylum (Gil-Bazo, 2008). These uncertainties are exacerbated by including a reference to the Refugee Convention in Article 18. As discussed in Chapter 1, the approach to asylum put forward by the Geneva Convention is couched in terms of state obligations rather than individual rights. Furthermore, the benefits of refugee status are only applicable to persons who satisfy criteria listed in Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention. In other words, persons falling outside the scope of the Convention application are not entitled to refugee status. Gil-Bazo (2008) rejects such a narrow reading of Article 18 of the Charter. She argues that in the EU legal order, the right to asylum is an enforceable individual right, codified as a general principle of EU law and further elaborated in the secondary legislation. She states that this right applies to refugees who qualify for Convention status and subsidiary protection alike because the scope of refugee protection is broader in the EU law than in the Refugee Convention. Indeed, a combined reading of Article 18 of the Charter and the relevant provisions of the Qualification Directive guarantee a status to all refugees, regardless of whether they qualify as such under Geneva Convention or international human rights instruments. That is, refugees in the EU have the right to “international protection”.

Further provisions of the Charter that are relevant for refugee protection include the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 4); protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition (Article 19(2)); and the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47). Article 19(2) can serve as grounds for judicial review by CJEU of the treatment of refugees

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by the EU countries to examine compliance of national measures with non-refoulement obligations, while Article 4 can be invoked to examine national detention measures. Finally, Article 47 limits the discretion of states with respect to designing national rules that impede access to legal help for refugees.

Having discussed the two sources of primary law in the EU legal order and their relevance for refugee protection, the following section briefly addresses the role of the Refugee Convention in the EU legal order.