Modelos de Bloques y Límites de Pits

Mixed-methods research can be justified with “pragmatism, as opposed to orthodox alignments of theory and method” (Kettley, 2010, p. 82). Whilst Kettley disparagingly calls this a tactic, Plowright (2011) argues that pragmatism in an integrated mixed-methods methodology still aligns theory and method but does so in an unorthodox way: the method determines the nature of theorising. Since the method has come from the research question, this is entirely appropriate in taking an open and critical approach. The challenge is therefore to understand the assumptions at work behind the methods I have chosen so that my analysis would work coherently with the data and the types of claims required to answer the research question.

The starting point for this was deciding what counted as evidence. Pring (2004) argues that there is a false dualism in the evidence valued by either quantitative or qualitative approaches. At one extreme is an interpretivist response where the benchmark for knowledge is lower because reports of perception are considered valid due to there being no direct way to access reality. In contrast, radical positivism reasons that there is a single

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objective reality to be found and so requires a higher benchmark for knowledge which rejects alternative interpretations. Pring’s (2004) argument is that it is not necessary to adopt either extreme. Instead, objective reality is increasingly knowable and verifiable. This shares the approach that there are multiple versions of reality which are constructed and negotiated, but also argues that these constructions and negotiations must be based – at least to some degree – on commonly agreed realities, in which the essence of a thing does not change.

Pring does not associate this explanation of reality and perception with any particular philosophical tradition, but it seems to link with the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment and the ideas of direct realism – that often we really do see what is there, but can obscure this with our various lenses. This philosophical stance is most strongly associated with the work of Thomas Reid, who has only started to become a major name in research philosophy (Wolterstorff & Pippin, 2001), but is acknowledged more widely in philosophy as one of Hume’s most effective critics and a leading thinker in the Pragmatism movement.

Reid’s thoughts on perception and objective truth include some complex arguments drawn from his work on optics, but a useful summary is given by D. N. Robinson (2004). Starting with objective truths “which we are under an obligation to accept in all of the ordinary affairs of life” (Robinson, 2004, p. 127), it is argued that even if the mind brings its own interpretations to what is sensed, this does not change the fact that – on some level – we are still able to reliably sense what is really there. In turn, this leads to his argument that the signals the mind receives are not fallible copies, but rather “natural signs” (ibid), which the mind can decode so as to “move from the sign to the thing signified. There is a fit between our biology and the external world such that we are able to live in it” (ibid).

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mean that it is a way of sidestepping discussion of philosophical underpinnings or accepting information naively in the common definition of the term. Michell (2003) summarises this by explaining the nuances between direct realism and radical positivism:

Realists, in fact, believe that much that is said is false: indeed, that much that is said is socially constructed. In this, also, realists and constructivists are united. However, only realists can believe that their claims about social constructions may sometimes be objectively true.

(Michell, 2003, p. 21, emphasis added)

The philosophical home of my mixed methods study can therefore best be understood by what it accepts as reliable knowledge. Using the term direct realist rather than positivist helps to remove some of the stigma of the quantitative/qualitative debate, so that socially constructed knowledge can be taken as valid but needs to be rigorously explored (just as any evidence should be) before it can be considered as increasingly approaching objective truth.

3.4

Summary

This chapter has outlined the main philosophical tradition which aligns with my aims for this study, justifying the use of mixed-methods based on:

 Increasing the variety of methods used in the feedback literature

 Balancing respecting student voice against rigorously challenging all interpretations, including my own, as objectively as possible

 The need to explore generalisability or transferability through larger scale data collection.

The philosophical position I have outlined here flows from how I understand my particular research question, so is to some extent unique. Nevertheless, much of the effort to understand philosophical debates has resulted in arguing my way to pragmatism anyway, so there are strong similarities to the philosophical assumptions which are made explicit in

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Plowright’s version of mixed-methods methodology. Plowright summarises this as an approach “drawing on a relativist social epistemology” in which “ontologically, the nature and characteristics of this world are restrained and constrained by the spatio-temporal world of objects and processes that characterise an ontologically prior intransitive reality” (Plowright, 2011, p. 185). Ethically, then, both student voice and professional judgement need to be respected, but also critiqued – as do my own inferences - in order to reach warrantable claims.

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4

Methods

4.1

Introduction

The methodology chapter described the mixed methods approach of this thesis and stated a philosophical approach which matched with the research questions. The closest fit was direct realism: getting closer to truth or the essence of an experience, or at least further away from falsehood. In this chapter, the tools of data collection are described in more detail to explain how the data was analysed. This included adapting some techniques from studies discussed in the literature review, in particular the seven studies which were described in greater detail in section 2.5. I also introduce the choice of statistical tests and my reasons for adapting an interview method which has not been used in feedback research before: the Biographical Narrative Interview Method.

The structure of this thesis fits with a “quan → QUAL” design (Biesta, 2012, p. 149), in which the numerical data is collected first but then more emphasis is placed on the subsequent narrative data. Whilst there was some shifting between data during the analysis, this timing generally held as survey findings were used to inform the interview stage and analysis. During write-up, this was much more of an iterative process, particularly as I was prompted to return to the data following feedback on journal articles which treated each data type separately. I also became aware that I was starting to prefer the narrative data and was drawn to the interesting stories. To balance against this, I frequently returned to the numerical data, heeding the warning from Gorard and Taylor (2004) that it should be the research problem and not researcher preferences which determine the balance of methods used. Whilst analysis is presented mostly in chronological order, it is important to remember that a regular mixture of methods was actually used since this is a fundamental strength of mixed methods

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