o Article 1146
1. Ferrer v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-41767, August 23, 1978
Facts: A complaint for damages dated December 27, 1974 but actually filed on January 6, 1975 was filed against Mr. and Mrs. Francis as owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car. It was alleged that at about 5:00 pm of December 31, 1970, their son, Dennis Pfleider, who was then only 16, without proper official authority, drove the above-described vehicle, without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution and as a consequence the pickup car was overturned, causing physical injuries to Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger therein, which injuries paralyzed her and required medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more than 2 years.
The Spouses filed their answer, putting up the affirmative defense that Dennis Pfleider exercised due care and utmost diligence in driving the vehicle; alleging that Ferrer and the other persons aboard said vehicle were not passengers in the strict sense of the term, but were merely joy riders and that, consequently, Sps Francis had no obligation whatsoever to Ferrer.
At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only Ferrer and counsel were present. Spouses were declared in default and Ferrer was allowed to present their evidence ex parte. On June 26, 1975, Spouses filed a motion to ―set aside the order of default and subsequent pleadings‖ on the ground that their failure to appear for pre-trial was due to accident or excusable neglect. This was opposed by petitioners. The motion of the Spouses was denied. On the same date, Judge Ericta rendered judgment against Spouses, finding that the minor, Dennis Pfleider, was allowed by his parents to operate a Ford pick-up car and because of his reckless negligence caused the accident on July 21, 1975.
On September 1,1975, Spouses filed an MR of the decision and of the order denying the motion to set aside order of default contending that the complaint shows on its face ―that it was filed only on January 6, 1975, or after the lapse of MORE THAN FOUR YEARS from the date of the accident on December 31, 1970‖, likewise appearing from the complaint and, therefore, the action has already prescribed.
In opposition, the Ferrer maintained, among others, that the defense of prescription had been waived because it was not alleged in the Answer.
Judge Ericta issued an order absolving the Spouses from any liability on the ground of prescription since the complaint was filed more than 4 years after the date of the accident, and the action to recover damages based on quasi- delict prescribes in 4 years. Hence, this petition for mandamus.
Issue; Whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by the Spouses‘ failure to allege the same in their answer.
Held: NOT WAIVED. ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED. As early as Chua Lamko v. Dioso, this Court sustained the dismissal of a counterclaim on the ground of prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer of the plaintiff. Where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved in the defendant‘s claim of prescription, his failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription, it was explained that the defense of prescription, even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived UNLESS such defense raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading. In a case, it was said that while it is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because the defendants had been declared in default, but such rule does not obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which plaintiff‘s complaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations.
In another case, it was patent from the stamp appearing on the first page of the complaint that the complaint was actually filed on May 31, 1963, this Court sustained the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer. Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court that ―defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.‖
The fact that the plaintiff‘s own allegation in the complaint or the evidence it presented shows clearly that the action had prescribed removes this case from the rule regarding waiver of the detense by failure to plead the same.
There is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription. The complaint alleged that the accident occurred on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for damages was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed within 4 years. The 4-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of the accident.
2. Kramer v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 518 (1989)
Facts: In the early morning of April 8, 1976, a fishing boat (owned by Kramer) figured in a collision (en route from Marinduque to Manila) with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans- Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
The F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard.
The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended.
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent.
Issue: Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by Kramer against TransAsia arising from a marine collision barred by statute of limitation.
Held: BARRED. The TransAsia filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi- delict like a maritime collision is 4 years. He maintained that the Kramer should have filed their Complaint within 4
years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period.
For their part, the Kramer contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The Kramer argued that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the 4-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. The petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was filed on May 30, 1985, the same was seasonably filed.
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.
The prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. In this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels, the 4 year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.
Thus, the court correctly found that the action of Kramer has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.
3. Santos v. Pizardo, G.R. No. 151452, July 29, 2005
Facts: In an Information dated 25 April 1994, Sibayan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries. The Viron Transit Bus driven by Sibayan collided with a Lite Ace, killing the driver and 3 passengers thereof. 5 passengers were injured. He was convicted and sentenced to 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. However, a separate civil action was reserved; no civil liability was pronounced. On October 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit, and its President/Chairman pursuant to their reservation. Viron moved to dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons, prescription, laches, and defective certification of non-forum-shopping.
Petitioners opposed as the right to file a separate action prescribes in 10 years. The RTC dismissed, as actions based on quasi-delict prescribes in 4 years, notwithstanding the reservation. The CA dismissed their petition for Certiorari for being the wrong mode of appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed.
Held: NO. Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to 3 notable exceptions: FIRST, when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused; SECOND, when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and THIRD, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the institution of the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the MTC, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latter‘s civil liability. Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private respondents‘ civil liability arising
from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners‘ cause of action was based on quasi delict and should have been brought within 4 years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners‘ claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 RPC; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners‘ allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.
The case is REMANDED.
4. De Guzman v. Toyota Cubao, Inc., G.R. No. 141480, November 29, 2006
Facts: On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux. The vehicle was delivered to petitioner 2 days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. Petitioner asserted that Toyota should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty.
On April 20, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent with the RTC. Respondent moved to dismiss as petitioner‘s cause of action had prescribed as the case was filed more than 6 months from the date the vehicle was sold and/or delivered. Since no warranty card or agreement was attached to the complaint, the contract of sale of the subject pick-up carried an implied warranty that it was free from any hidden faults or defects, or any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer. The prescriptive period thereof is 6 months under the Civil Code (Art. 1571). RTC granted respondent‘s motion and dismissed. RTC denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that under RA No. 7394 (Consumer Act of the Philippines), the prescriptive period is 2 years. Issue: Whether or not the action has prescribed.
Held: YES. Petitioner specifies that in his complaint, he neither asked for a rescission of the contract of sale nor did he pray for a proportionate reduction of the purchase price. What petitioner claims is the enforcement of the contract, that is, that respondent should replace either the vehicle or its engine with a new one. Petitioner cites Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394 as the applicable provision, so as to make his suit come within the purview of the 2-year prescriptive period. Tangentially, petitioner also justifies that his cause of action has not yet prescribed because this present suit, which was an action based on quasi-delict, prescribes in four years.
Petitioner‘s argument is erroneous. Article 1495 of the Civil Code states that in a contract of sale, the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale. The Civil Code set forth the available remedies of a buyer against the seller on the basis of a warranty against hidden defects.
Under Article 1599, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner‘s complaint for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective. By filing this case, petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a