A MODO DE CONCLUSIÓN

As I made clear in the introduction, I believe the role of the philosopher is still to follow the argument where it leads. This does not change whether the philosopher begins the inquiry in the abstract realms of philosophy of mind or ideal political theory, or in the empirical works of cognitive science or social science. The philosopher will still follow the argument where it leads.

I have argued here for an account of non-ideal theory that aims to guide action. That is the central difference between ideal and non-ideal theory. That is why I insisted that this should be a central element of non-ideal theorising. Of course, to guide action is a complex matter. There are various elements to be taken into account for a theory to be thoroughly action guiding. I included in this concept: path-dependence, fact-sensitivity,

feasibility and compliance. It is possible for a non-ideal theory to focus on only a subset of these elements or on all of them at the same time. For instance, we can theorize about how to ensure compliance with a set of principles for principles that would not be feasible in the near future (Stemplowska and Swift 2012), and leave the feasibility question for another moment. The four notions just mentioned are all elements of an action-guiding theory, but perhaps not of a theory that would guide action here and now, for not all non-ideal theories have to be non-idealised to the extent of guiding action here and now. Like ideal theories, non-ideal theories can be non-idealised to a greater or a lesser extent.

I have argued in the previous section that even if we have done enough of ideal theory, the type of guidance it provides is very different in nature that what can be gained from non-ideal theorising. We get from some of the main arguments in Part I of this thesis that bottom-up non-ideal work on individual practices provide us with the most crucial elements to build an action guiding theory notably with regards to: the different demands of agency (taking into account, for instance, past, present and future agents); the sort of collective action problem we face (e.g. prisoners’ dilemma, asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma); the kind of authority required (e.g. a coordinating body or a system of governance). All these elements provide valuable insight about how to choose between two non-ideal institutional proposals and how to move towards more ideal settings.

The reason why we do not need ideal theory in order to do non-ideal theory is that improvements to fight injustices in non-ideal theory need to be addressed directly and individually. In cases of reparative justice, ideal theory is not necessary. In cases of transitional and comparative justice, although elements of ideal theorising can play a role, how to move towards more ideal settings can only be known through non-ideal level theorising. Whether addressing these injustices collaborates with a particular ideal theory is an important question but it is wrong to assume that all that is needed is to formulate abstract principles of justice. The structure of the problems with these injustices is to a great extent particular to each one of them.

This conclusion has obvious consequences for the work of the political philosopher interested in non-ideal theory. The non-ideal theorist can still discuss rights and duties. She or he can still talk about responsibility and distribution. But the framing of such debates under less idealised assumptions require philosophers to draw more careful assumptions about the non-ideal world. I argued that the quality of the recommendations will depend on how closer we get to understanding ‘how’ to do what we ‘ought’ to do in reflective integration, e.g. knowing what options allow us moving to move towards an institutional scheme that combats tax competition informs us on what we ‘ought’ to do in non-ideal circumstances.

Now, we may still ask to what extent the work of philosophers should engage with social scientific work and what results are likely to result from that. Stemplowska and Swift agree that perhaps political philosophers should engage with this kind of work. However, for them, “we should be clear to demand that political philosophers deliver concrete action-guidance is to ask them to do something more than philosophy.” (Stemplowska and Swift 2012: 386). I rejected this. This is precisely the kind of work I advocate. The non-ideal theorist will obviously not substitute for the social scientist. But she or he will provide a theory that guides action. If the philosopher comes to a conclusion about a real world case by seeking to bring about change, it is hard to argue that this is not part of the philosopher’s work (Wilson 2014). On the contrary, the philosopher is perhaps particularly well equipped to be an advocate for real change if ever she or he engages sufficiently with the relevant work of the field.

I think that, in order to determine what could be gained from philosophers engaging in the kind of social science research that could contribute to formulating action-guiding theories, we should look at how philosophers do it. If not enough has been done, this is perhaps a call for philosophers to do it more. I for one believe that there is great potential for philosophical research in engaging in the work of social scientist and policy makers.

Wiens (2015) and Miller (2012) are of this view. They ask for a deeper partnership between the political philosopher and the social scientist in normative political theory (Miller 2012). This collaborative work is also meant to rebut the division according to

which the role of the political philosopher is to formulate principles and the role of the social scientist to implement them. The political philosopher has to better understand the political structures of the realisation of justice, just as the social scientist has a role in the formulation of directive principles.

Moreover, although I have been less concerned with motivation, the political philosopher has to be mindful of the motivational structures that affect social and political life. That is part of the work if one wishes to surmount the status quo. Motivation is an important element, which I have not addressed as such. This thesis is more focussed on the structures that favour compliance and to consider issues such as incentives and sanctions. The work on institutional structures that favour compliance is surely one that can have a positive impact on the motivation of agents. Whether agents are likely to be motivated by the principles is a question that will only be dealt with indirectly in Part II.

4.7 Conclusion

Chapter 4 has provided further exploration on the notion of action guidance and on the ways to conceive the relation between ideal and non-ideal theory. It consolidated the understanding of what makes a non-ideal theory of institutional design action- guiding, notably by exposing ways to understand how to bridge the gap between ideal and non-ideal theory, thereby providing further support to the ‘reflective integration thesis’ and the ‘non-ideal theory thesis’. Once we have ruled out, in the previous chapters, the notions of ideal theory ‘as target’ and ‘as measure’ we have opened the door to examining how short-term or second-best gains impact the path-dependence relation between more ideal and less ideal settings. I concluded that the decisions regarding how to assess ways to move towards more just schemes are decisions for the non-ideal theorist.

As activists in the cause of justice, ideal theory may come to seem to us simply irrelevant. But it is important to remember that even most non-philosophers who are active in the cause of justice do in fact have in mind, however vaguely, an ideal of justice toward which they take their campaigns to be ultimately directed. (Simmons 2010: 35)

This is true, and I argued that this idea becomes especially compelling if understood in an historical perspective. This nuance casts light on the contribution of ideal theorising, once we see it in an historical perspective: institutions can evolve in ways such as to allow ideal principles and values to have greater action-guiding potential. Ideal theory has more action-guiding potential when circumstances become more ideal (through political action and non-ideal institutional design). The extent to which these ideals need to be coupled with (over-)determined ideal principles is less certain.

I argued that we need non-ideal theory to know when second-best institutional schemes bring us closer to more ideal institutional settings and when they take us away from them. An adequate examination of the practice is what allows to understand the nature of the problem we face (about e.g. agency questions, collective action problems) and the nature of solutions needed (e.g. regulation, coordination, or governance). I argued that the non-ideal institutional design is what renders possible to gain knowledge about the feasibility and desirability of any future ideal setting. This is the case for reparative, comparative and transitional justice; and for works that are essentially reparative, notions about ideal settings seemed to play an even less important role. Our moral duties to implement the non-ideal setting are justified based on knowledge acquired at the level of institutional design. Moreover, we saw that just like ideal theories, non-ideal theories are non-ideal to various degrees. When this degree approaches the level of social sciences it becomes clear whether it yields concrete proposals or not, whether it has a grip on the probabilities of the positive outcomes associated with the various feasible alternatives at hand.

The three case studies in Part II of this thesis should cast light on the extent to which ideal values and principles, as well as non-ideal circumstances and empirical factors, play a role in the formulation of action-guiding principles.

PART II

Will there really be a "Morning"? Is there such a thing as "Day"? Could I see it from the mountains If I were as tall as they? … Oh some Scholar! Oh some Sailor! Oh some Wise Man from the skies! Please to tell a little Pilgrim Where the place called "Morning" lies! - Emily Dickinson