The most active driver of reform has been the Government of Pakistan, not the provincial governments, as Wambia notes.672 This is surprising because most
668 Rashid Faruqee: Government’s role in Pakistan agriculture: major reforms are needed; World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper no. 1468; Washington, D.C.: WB, 1995, p. 18 – 20.
669 Ibidem, p. 31.
670 D. J. Bandaragoda: Need for institutional impact assessment in planning irrigation system
modernization; IWMI Research Report, no. 21, 1998, p. 9.
671 Ibidem, p. 12.
672 Joseph Makwata Wambia: The political economy of water resources institutional reform in
Pakistan; in: Ariel Dinar, ed.: The political economy of water pricing reforms; Washington, D.C.: WB, 2000, p. 369. The provinces’ reluctance to water pricing reforms, as suggested by the federal
criticism of the existing water management system has focused on the provincial and sub-provincial levels. The federal government, not being a riparian stakeholder as defined by the standard water law (Canal and Drainage Act), does not have a legally sanctioned responsibility for provincial watercourses, apart from the tasks of WAPDA. It has, however, strengthened its institutional capacity to contribute to policy- making, in the form of the newly established Project Management and Policy Implementation Unit within the Ministry of Water and Power. This unit’s aim is to support capacity development, analytical work and detail feasibility studies in order to ensure effective management and development of the Indus River system.673 On the one hand, these initiatives can be read as a sign of central government interference in the water sector; on the other hand, they can also indicate either a lack of motivation on the part of the provinces or a lack of capability.674
The quality and direction of reform initiatives is a different matter. The federal government, in response to World Bank recommendations, presented the Pakistan Water Sector Strategy as a guideline for institutional reform (2002).675 The Strategy signals an understanding of the merits of integrated water management and the role that stakeholders, i.e. water users, especially farmers, should play. As a collaborative document that adopted a participatory approach to ensure that all stakeholders of water have been consulted and have contributed to this Strategy, however, it exhibits a number of familiar traits of the existing system.676 The role of the private sector is barely acknowledged, but not defined.677 The chapter on agriculture is marked by a generalized, planning-oriented, classic supply management approach, rather than a diversified, potential-oriented approach that would take into account specific plant requirements, varied demands and markets. Regarding participation, it remains unclear which non-state institutions and stakeholders have been involved, and whether their involvement made any impact.
In the same year, the National Water Policy – a product of the National Workshop on Water Policy, again involving water experts, NGOs and farmers – went a little further, specifying the guiding principles, such as
- equitable distribution
- decentralized planning, development and management
- delegation of specific water services to autonomous and accountable public and/or cooperative agencies
- sustainable use within a transparent policy framework
- participatory and consultative water sector activities at each level.678
government (on recommendations by the Bank), has recently been reiterated: Centre, provinces agree to set up water commission; Dawn, 22 April 2011.
673 Ministry of Water and Power: www.pakwater.gov.pk/objective.aspx (May 2010). Major activities
include a seminar on Water conservation, present situation and future strategy (21 May 2009), feasibility and capacity building studies (funded by ADB), and a seminar on Public-private partnerships: Mode of financing and implementation of water sector and hydro power sector projects (5 Jan. 2009).
674 The latter seems unlikely, given the size of staff and the fact that water management since the
colonial era has been a provincial prerogative.
675 Ministry of Water and Power: Pakistan Water Sector Strategy; vol. 4; op. cit. The Strategy was
presented in 5 volumes, including a National Water Sector Profile and a Medium Term Investment Plan.
676 Ministry of Water and Power: Strategy, p. II. 677 Ministry of Water and Power: Strategy, p. 47, 52.
678 Government of Pakistan: National Water Policy; Islamabad: GoP, 2002, p. 18;
The document, which is still a draft and not yet adopted as an official policy, is more analytic as the Strategy, despite being much briefer. It pinpoints institutional deficits like
- overlapping responsibilities and poor coordination between institutions, - a lack of clearly divided authorities,
- ineffective new institutions like PIDA and AWB.679
As such, the document features important elements of progressive reform, by and large in line with recommendations. A critical appraisal of these guidelines finds that a crucial aspect of institutions, accountability, receives little attention. PIDA, with its responsibility for both policy formulation and implementation, effectively sets targets in isolation from water users. Jehangir and Horinkova propose a representative Provincial Water Policy Council for policy, and a regulatory commission to monitor PIDA and AWB.680
The implementation of the Policy eventually depends on whether federal and provincial governments will reach a consensus on institutional reform and improved water management. So far – nine years after presenting the Policy and fourteen years after the start of the National Drainage Programme – the provinces have only agreed to form a commission tasked with formulating a national water policy.681 From a rational choice perspective, the potential gains from collaboration towards improvements in the water sector seem to be insufficient to motivate stronger and swifter action, or the feared losses outweigh the benefits.
Scheumann reminds us that reforms are not politically neutral if they involve loss of power and status or simply uncertain outcomes, i.e. the mere risk of such losses.682 A closer look at the attempt by the World Bank and the federal government to shift some irrigation management responsibilities to the private sector reveals that the vested interests of politically affiliated landowners led to a coalition against privatization.683
The negotiations between the World Bank (as the major lender) and the Government of Pakistan (as the primary recipient of funds for the NDP), viewed from a rational choice perspective, present an interesting game: The Bank, using prospective funds as a leverage or incentive, exerted pressure on the GoP to push forward comprehensive NDP legislation by a given deadline. The GoP, in turn, presented a revised NDP that was expected to raise less opposition from the big farmers. The incentive to the farmers: the prospect of retaining some, if not most of their influence. The possible loss of essential funding for this project and even future projects as well, the GoP finally received the consent from the provincial
679 Ibidem, p. 35.
680 Waqar Jehangir & V. Horinkova: Institutional constraints, op. cit., p. 21.
681 Centre, provinces agree to set up water commission; Dawn, 22 April 2011. No reference is made to
the existing draft of 2002. The federal government initiative towards a national water policy will be discussed in more detail in the water sharing section.
682 Waltina Scheumann: Institutional Reform in the Irrigation Sector: the case of Turkey and Pakistan;
in: Susanne Neubert, W. Scheumann, A. Edig, eds.: Reforming Institutions for Sustainable Water Management; Bonn: German Development Institute, Reports and Working Papers 6, 2002, p. 5 – 6.
683 Ibidem, p. 8. Misinformation and manipulation of small farmers proved crucial in getting their
support for a campaign that would preserve the status of big farmers. Cf. van der Velde & Tirmizi: Irrigation policy, op. cit., p. 213.
governments.684 To please the big farmers, several loopholes were planted in the legal foundations of the reform, hindering the proper implementation of the reform, particularly the establishment of autonomous mid-level water institutions.685
The relevance of the underlying legal foundation, the Canal and Drainage Act, was identified as a central obstacle by the donors, but the GoP and the provinces opted to keep it unchanged. Explicitly referred to in the PIDA Acts, it remained what it had ever been, a particularly powerful piece of colonial legislation, which vested virtually all meaningful control of the irrigation and drainage system in government institutions, specifically the provincial irrigation departments, as van der Velde and Tirmizi note.686
Rinaudo and Tahir point out that the full implementation of the Bank proposal would significantly affect the existing economic interests and power relationships in the irrigation sector, in particular threaten the status of the rural elite fearing the loss of privileged upstream water supplies, and of the irrigation bureaucrats.687 The outcome, by a purely political assessment, on the surface resembles a win-win situation: The landlords and bureaucrats retained their positions of influence; the GoP remained in control of the process, without the threat of continued opposition from the provinces and the landed elite. From a water management perspective, the result is a zero-sum situation: A small group of politically established farmers secured economic gains at the expense of the majority of farmers which are very likely to receive as little or less water than before.
The small and medium farmers, representing the greatest combined land area, would have been the beneficiaries of the reform. Had the reform been implemented, more water could have been made available more evenly. It is at this point that the deficits of the public water administration become the critical factor in reform failure.
The narrow self-interest orientation of the bureaucracy strengthens the landholders and at the same time weakens the smaller farmers because it exacerbates the existing asymmetry in water supplies. As future water shortages will affect downstream farmers more severely than upstream farmers, the failure to initiate partial privatization is likely to have a significant impact on the overall water situation of Pakistan.
The PIDA process exposes two types of deficits:
- institutional (inconsistency of legal framework, lack of transparency, accountability, coordination and communication) and
- behavioural (misinformation, personal and group self-interest over administrative responsibility).
684 Van der Velde & Tirmizi: Irrigation policy, op. cit., p. 214 – 215. 685 Ibidem, p. 215.
686 Van der Velde & Tirmizi: Irrigation policy, op. cit., p. 223.
687 Jean-Daniel Rinaudo & Zubair Tahir: The political economy of institutional reforms in Pakistan’s
irrigation sector; in: Phoebe Koundouri, P. Pashardes, T. Swanson & A. Xepapadeas, eds.: The economics of water management in developing countries. Problems, principles and policies; Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2003, p. 43 - 44.
Bandaragoda, reviewing institutional change in large irrigation systems, summarizes the crucial institutional characteristics:
- legally secured and politically supported water rights,
- access to financial resources for operation and maintenance, - measurable benefits that exceed costs,
- clearly defined areas of responsibility and institutional autonomy.688
Focussing on property rights, he finds that concepts which turn water into an either fully private or state property have both failed in Pakistan, but a system of shared, clearly defined responsibilities based on water as a common property, combines equitable allocation, adequate maintenance and cost recovery.689
Mellor stresses the need for a judicial body to oversee and sanction democratic procedures in water user groups and the separation of public finance from the daily operations in order to counter corruption and misuse of office. Transparency and accountability as well as adequate information for all user groups plus clear and precise tasks are indispensable features of reformed institution.690
The implementation of such reforms, according to Rinaudo and Tahir, could follow a four-phase schedule:
- agenda-setting involving all potential actors,
- public debate, consensus-building and legal foundations,
- implementation according to pre-established guidelines and rules, - enforcement.691
The behavioural dimension may even be more important. Rinaudo and Tahir agree with Mellor, van der Velde and Tirmizi that information and communication have been a major factor in the successful campaign of the landlords. In effect, the government’s failure to counter their propaganda effort – which in fact led many small farmers to oppose the reform in the beginning – helped their cause.692 The reform programme that intended to improve water availability, allocation and productivity ironically appeared as threatening the very opposite. Had the GoP used information and communication to at least passively involve the small farmers, it might have had a lasting effect on the public’s trust in the government and the proposed reform.
688 D.J. Bandaragoda: Institutional design principles for accountability in large irrigation systems; IWMI
Research Report no. 8, 1996, p. 4.
689 D.J. Bandaragoda: Institutional change and shared management of water resources in large canal
systems: results of an action research program in Pakistan; IWMI Research Report no. 36, 1999, p. 6 – 7, 16 – 19.
690 John W. Mellor: Accelerating agricultural growth – is irrigation institutional reform necessary?
Pakistan Development Review, vol. 35, no. 4, 1996, p. 411.
691 Rinaudo & Tahir: Political economy, op. cit., p. 45 – 46. Dinar et al. stress that the most important
step in order to reduce the risk of reform failure is to regain the confidence of small and medium farmers through publicizing the positive results of successful Farmer Organizations; cf. Ariel Dinar, T. Balakrishnan & J. Wambia: Political economy and political risks of institutional reforms in the water sector; World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 1987; Washington, D.C.: WB, 1998, p. 21.
692 Rinaudo & Tahir: Political economy, op. cit., p. 53. Idrees Rajput, former Secretary of Irrigation and
Power, Government of Sindh, points out that the NDP showed the limits of decentralization, as farmers tend to concentrate on their own lands and lack the capacity to perceive their plot as part of a wider, ore complex system. According to Rajput, the provincial governments held strong reservations against the reform, only the federal government was for it; personal discussion, Karachi, 18 December 2002.
The fact that the GoP failed to advertise the reform as a step towards empowerment of the people appears to either reflect a degree of aloofness regarding the value of democratic processes or simply well-known official neglect. By failing to discuss compensation schemes for farmers which would lose subsidies as a result of the reform and pay raises for PIDA officials who are exposed to corruption attempts, the GoP wasted another opportunity to further the reform.693
The PIDA process also showed two types of water-related rationality:
- the performance-oriented argument with a view to increase productivity and - the status quo-oriented argument of officials fearing the loss of employment
and opportunities of illegitimate enrichment.
Under the existing circumstances, bridging this antagonism appears unlikely because the status quo offers more benefits to irrigation officials than the reform. As the large landowners would also face losses rather than gains, the unholy alliance of reform-opponents becomes the biggest obstacle to reform. Following the rational choice logic, these losses would have to be balanced in one form or another. For the irrigation officials this would mean finding other jobs. The problem of corruption is a different matter though intrinsically linked to the civil service.
Asymmetry has turned out to be of an ambivalent quality in the water management procedure as well as in the NDP process. It is at once a great obstacle to some stakeholders, and at the same time it serves as a decisive factor in the economic and political status of other stakeholders.