The necessary modes [i.e. the modes of necessity], which Aristotle treats, are clear enough. For necessity from an end can be twofold, that is, either
simply or for being better—plus a third [necessity] from an agent, which he calls violent.22
Question 1. With regard to this last mode the question could be asked:
whether everything which is necessary from an efficient cause is violent? But because the matter is not difficult, it may be noted briefly that something can be necessary from an efficient cause in two ways—in one way from that cause alone, and in another way not from that cause alone but at the same time [from something] on the side of what undergoes or receives the causality. What is necessary in this latter way is not violent, even if it happens to be caused by an extrinsic agent, as is clear [for example] from the downward motion of a stone. Therefore, only the first way of necessity, which results from an extrinsic thing alone, is violent. But again in that there is need for distinction. For sometimes what receives the causality is not opposed to the effect or the motion, even though it may not desire it, and in this case that necessity also is not violent, as is clear from the motion of the heavens, or (to be sure) the motion of fire in its proper sphere.23
Therefore, only that necessity is violent which comes about when the thing receiving (passum) the causality is opposed [to it], which Aristotle has sufficiently stated here in these words: “Apart from tendency and choice
…” (Praeter propensionem electionemque)24—where he incidentally sug-gested that the violent is generically superior to the forced.25 For the forced taken properly is contrary to choice (by which you should understand all elicited appetition), but the violent is either contrary to this or contrary to a natural tendency or propensity which is founded in a natural, whether active or passive, potency. For Aristotle in no way distinguished between these. Hence, he tacitly explained this also in Ethics, Book 3, Chapter 1, and said that the violent is “what is from outside, with the recipient not contributing any impetus,”26 where “not contributing” must be understood positively, that is, as “opposing,” or, if I may say it, not passively suffering [the causality].
You will object: therefore, another mode of necessity can be added, namely, one which is from an efficient cause without either violence or connaturality.27 The answer is that either there is nothing which is neces-sary in this way or [this mode] is reduced to the fourth mode [of necessity]
which Aristotle has immediately posited—that is, what cannot be otherwise than it is,28 which he has said is what is necessary without qualification and through participation in which all other [modes] are called necessary.
This I explain as follows: for either that effect is from a cause which is acting by a necessity of nature, and in this way such /p. XIX/ necessity belongs to the simply necessary, because it cannot be otherwise than it is,
Metaphysics Book V 83 and it does not have a special kind of necessity. Or that effect is from a free cause, and it is called necessary only by supposition, because when that cause is acting the recipient of the causing cannot resist. And this mode of necessity, with respect to the agent, is reduced to that by which a thing when it exists necessarily exists, which mode seems to be omitted here as indeed most improper and as not inducing more than a conditioned necessity. But with respect to the recipient it belongs to the fourth mode [of necessity], because that recipient cannot be related otherwise to an extrinsic agent which is so acting. Hence, Aristotle immediately seems to add a certain division of that fourth mode of necessity. For one thing has a cause of such necessity, but another thing does not have a cause, but is such by itself.
Question 2. But with regard to this division the question is: whether according to Aristotle and according to truth there are any beings which are necessary by themselves and have no cause of their necessity? For Aristotle here seems to affirm it so, and many think that he did feel it to be so. But this passage does not compel the imputation of this to Aristo-tle. For, first of all, this division can be understood not about beings with respect to their existence, but only with respect to their being of essence (esse essentiae),29 or with respect to the truth of judgments which abstract from time—which judgments are called necessary, because they have eternal truth. And among these certain ones have a cause of their necessity, as for example: mediated propositions which are demonstrated through prior principles. There are others which do not have a cause, such as, self–evident principles (principia per se nota).30 Or if Aristotle is speaking about exist-ing beexist-ings, even though he gives the division in plural, it is not required that both members be verified in plural. Hence, in the end he concludes only conditionally—if there are some beings of this kind, then they are eternal. But what he thought in other places, we will see in what follows.
And we discuss the whole matter in various places in the following work.
For through the whole of Disputation 2031 we treat of the emanation of all beings from One by creation. Moreover, in Disputation 29, Section 1,32 we treat of the necessity of the First Being, and in Section 2,33 about how this is proper to that Being. And in Disputation 30, Section 16,34 [we treat the question]: whether the First Being acts from a necessity of nature—as well as what Aristotle thought about this.35
Question 3. On the other hand, in this place we can also ask: whether there are some beings which can be called necessary, even though they have a cause? This is treated in Disputation 28, Section 1,36 and in Disputation 35, Section 3, near the end.37
Question 4. Finally, it can be asked: whether complex truths which are called necessary have a cause of their necessity, and of what kind their necessity is? We have touched on this in Disputation 1, Section 4,38 and Disputation 8, which is about truth, Sections 139 and 2,40 and [have treated it] extensively in Disputation 31, Section 2,41 and Section 12, toward the end.42