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1.3 Aproximación teológica sobre el pecado

1.3.1 El pecado desde la Biblia

Question 1. With respect to this chapter, two or three questions can most especially be asked. First, are Aristotle’s arguments against the ancient philosophers efficacious, particularly those against the Platonists? Second, are those things true which Aristotle says in Chapter 778 about numbers and magnitudes? Third, is form the whole essence (quidditas79) of material things, as Aristotle suggests here in Chapter 7, Text 5.80 However, I think that the first question should be omitted, (1) because those opinions of the ancient philosophers as they are treated by Aristotle are now antiquated and completely rejected by philosophy, and (2) because in his arguments Aristotle (Philosophus) has mentioned nothing which can bring any benefit for knowing other things. Accordingly, I think it useless to spend time in either explaining or defending those arguments. But they may be read in the commentators (expositores), especially [Pedro da] Fonseca whose translation is so elegant and lucid that it can be read by almost anyone without a commentator.81

The second question embraces many things which we treat in the Dis-putations on Quantity, that is, 4082 and 41.83 The third question is treated in Disputation 36, Section 1.84

Metaphysics Book I 33

Notes

1 It may be noted that Suárez knew of fourteen books in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. But, per-haps following the lead of St. Thomas before, he will comment here on only twelve.

He does mention Books 13 and 14 one time in this Index (cf. Book 3, Chapter 1, Question 18). I cannot now recall any references in the Disputationes metaphysicae itself to Books 13 and 14, although I am certain that I have seen a few. In connection with the availability of all fourteen books prior to Suárez, we can say the following: (1) Alexander of Aphrodisias or Pseudo-Alexander (i.e. Michael of Ephesus), In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. Michael Hayduck, in CAG, Berlin: Reimer, 1891, has commented on 13 (M) and 14 (N); (2) Syrianus, In Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. W.

Kroll. Berlin: Reimer, 1902, has commented on M and N; (3) St. Albert the Great, Metaphysica, ed. B. Geyer, Munster in Westphalia, 1960 and 1964, has commented on 13 books, including 13 and 14, but he lacked Book 11, which had not yet been translated by Moerbeke. Bernhard Geyer (Ad Metaphysicam Alberti Magni Prolegomena, in Opera omnia, tomus XVI, pars 1, p. vii) tells us that Albert probably composed his commentary not long after 1262–3; (4) About that time, William of Moerbeke, O.P., edited and translated all 14 books; cf Aristoteles Latinus, ed. G. Verbeke, vol. 25, 3.2, contains Metaphysica lib. I–XIV. Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed.

G. Vuillemim-Diem, Leiden: Brill, 1995; (5) St. Thomas Aquinas (In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, ed. Cathala [Taurini: Marietti, 1950]) commented on books I–XII. A check on authorities cited in the Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles shows what I counted as 458 citations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, all of them from Books I–XII; cf. Leonine edition of the Opera omnia, vol. XVI, pp. 185–7;

(6) Pseudo-Alexander of Hales (Alexander Bonini), In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros dilucidissima expositio (Venetiis, 1572), has commented on books I–XII; (7) Both Duns Scotus (Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis) and Pseudo-Scotus [i.e. Antonio Andreas] (In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio)—in the Wadding edition of Scotus’s Opera omnia (Lugduni, 1639), tome IV—have only Books 1–12; (8) In the 15th century, John Argyropoulos (see in: Aristotelis castigatis-sime recognitum opus metaphysicum [Parisiis: Apud Henricum Stephanum, 1515]) has translated Books 1–12; (9) The 1562 edition of Aristotle with Averroes’ commentary (Averrois Commentaria et Introductiones in omnes libros Aristotelis cum eorum versione latina. Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562; 1573–1574) contains Books 13 and 14 (in Car-dinal Bessarion’s 1450 translation)—but there is no commentary on them; and (10) Pedro Fonseca, S.J., Commentarii in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae. 4 vols., Cologne, 1615–29. [reprint, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964], has the text of all fourteen books, but no commentary on Books 13 and 14.

2 Note that the text of this First Book which Suárez possessed was divided into 7 Chapters, rather than into the 10 as found in modern Post-Bekker editions.

3 That is, Metaphysics 1.1–2.980a20–983a23.

4 Metaphysics 1.3–9.983a24–993a27.

5 “.” Metaphysics 1.1.980a21.

6 Cf. Disputationes metaphysicae (hereafter DM), disp. 1, sect. 6, num. 3, in Francisco Suárez, Opera omnia (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–1866) vol. 25, pp. 53–4.

7 Ibid., nn. 11–12, pp. 55–7.

,.” Plato, Gorgias 448C. For an example of Suárez critically approaching the text of Plato, cf. DM 2, s. 2, n. 3 (vol. 25, p. 207).

12 DM 1, s. 6, nn. 29–30, pp. 62–3.

13 Cf. Metaphysics 1.1.981a16.

14 DM 34 contains only 8 Sections. I have not found a passage which will fit Suárez’s reference here. But, cf. DM 29, 1, n. 35, vol. 26, p. 32, where he explicitly says that actions relate to singular things.

15 Cf. Metaphysics 1.1.981a19.

16 Cf. S. Thomas Aquinatis, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio I, c. 1, lect. 1, ed. M.-R. Cathala, O.P. et R.M. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1950), p. 9, nn. 21–22.

17 Ibid., n. 21.

18 Cf. Alexandri de Ales, O.M. [actually, Alessandro Bonini, aka Alexander of Alexandria (ca. 1270–1314)], In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros dilucidissima expositio, I, t. 5 (Venetiis: Apud Simonem Galignanum de Karera, 1572), fol. 5rv. For Bonini’s influence on Suárez, cf. Ramón Ceñal, S.J., “Alejandro de Alejandria: su influjo en el Doctor Eximio y la dificultad criticista,” Pensamiento, 4, numero extraordinario (1948), 91–122.

19 Subjective parts divide a universal whole. For examples: at the level of a genus, the uni-versal whole, animal, is divided into subjective parts such as man or dog, or, at the level of a species (as in the present text), the universal whole, man, is divided into subjective parts such as Peter and Paul.

34 Cf. DM 1, 5, pp. 37–53, in which Suárez asks the question: “Whether metaphysics is the most perfect speculative science, and whether it is true wisdom?”

35 Cf. DM 1, 4, nn. 6–12, vol. 25, pp. 27–8.

36 Cf. nn. 9–12, p. 28.

37 n. 13, p. 29. The “order of teaching” (ordo doctrinae) is something which Suárez men-tions frequently throughout his works. This paragraph 13 is particularly instructive for its understanding. Briefly, he distinguishes between an order of doctrine for things in themselves, in which metaphysics will be first, and an order of doctrine for us, in which the teaching of metaphysics will come last. Also in this paragraph, he registers a complaint which he has also made in other places: that metaphysics has a particular connection with logic (dialectica) because of which a large number of his contemporary logicians (moderni dialectici) confuse the two disciplines. This last thought might have continued application in our own time.

38 Cf. DM 1, 4, nn. 15–27, vol. 25, pp. 29–34.

39 Cf. nn. 14–19, pp. 29–31.

40 Cf. nn. 28–33, pp. 34–6.

41 Cf. “…,…” Meta-physics 1.2.982b11–13. For the same thought, cf. Plato, Theatetus 155D.

Metaphysics Book I 35

42 Cf. “’ …” Metaphysics 1.2.982b17–

43 Cf. Suárez, Commentaria ac disputationes in tertiam partem D. Thomae, scilicet, opus de 18.

Incarnatione, III, q. 15, a. 8, in Opera, vol. 18, pp. 213–214.

44 Here Suárez is not directly quoting but rather paraphrasing Metaphysics 1.2.982b21–

45 Cf. Metaphysics 1.2.982b30.32.

46 Cf. In 12 libros Metaphys. I, c. 2, lect. 3, Cathala nos. 61–3.

47 On this supposed, but really non-existent, translation by Boethius, cf. Gudrun Vuille-min-Diem, Praefatio Wilhelm von Moerbekes Übersetzung der Aristotelischen Metaphysik, in Metaphysica, Lib. I–XIV: Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, in Aristoteles Latinus, XXV 3.1 (Leiden/New York/Köln, 1995), pp. 2–3. In one place [De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, c. I, n. 33], St. Thomas has referred to Boethius’s translation of the Metaphysics, XII [Book XI for Thomas], 3, 1070a 21–27. But there is no known translation here by Boethius. The earliest Latin versions of the Metaphysics do not go beyond Book IV. L. Minio-Paluello has made an analysis of this text of St. Thomas; cf.

“Note sull’Aristotele Latino Medievale II: La ‘Metaphysica vetustissima’ comprehendava tutta la Metaphysica?,” Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, 43 (1950), 222–226, as cited by Abelardo Lobato, Tommaso d’Aquino: L’ente e l’essenza. L’unità dell’intelletto (Roma:

Città Nuova Editrice, 1989), p. 103, n. 72.

48 Cf. Metaphysics 1.2.982b32–983a2.

49 For this, see Minucius Felix, Octavius 13, 1 (ed. B. Kytzler [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1982]

p. 10) who in the place cites Socrates. Also see Tertullian, Ad nationes libri duo II, 4, 15 (ed. J.G.P. Borleffs [Leiden: E.J. Brill] p. 44; cf. J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina, Tomus I [Parisiis, 1844], col. 591C), who attributes this expression to Epicurus.

50 Ecclesiasticus 3, v. 22.

51 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, I, 2, ed. M.

Hayduck, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, I (Berolini: Typis et Impensis Georgii Reimeri, 1891), p. 17, l. 14–p. 18, l. 13. that being insofar as it is real being is the adequate object of this science of metaphys-ics. In this, he will include God as part of the subject matter of metaphysics and he will follow the path of Avicenna and Duns Scotus in preference to that of Averroes (even though this last is mentioned in paragraph 26 as teaching this same doctrine).

On Suárez’s choice in this, cf. my articles: (1) “Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphys-ics,” The Modern Schoolman, 49 (1972): pp. 201–220; and (2) “The Suarezian Proof for God’s Existence,” in History of Philosophy in the Making: A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on his 65th Birthday, ed. Linus J. Thro, Washington:

University Press of America, 1982, pp. 105–17. On the earlier question here, see Al-bert Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, Leiden-Köln: E.J. Brill, 1965.

57 Disputation 30 (vol. 26, pp. 60–224), which is the longest of all the Metaphysical Disputations, comprises seventeen Sections dealing with the essence and attributes of God inasmuch as they can be known by human reason.

58 Disputation 31 (vol. 26, pp. 224–312) treats of essence and existence in creatures. It contains the famous Suarezian denial of a “real distinction” between the essence and the

existence of a creature. For an English translation, see: Francis Suarez, On the Essence of Finite Being as such, On the Existence of that Essence and their Distinction, translated from the Latin with an Introduction, by Norman J. Wells, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983.

59 Disputation 12 (vol. 25, pp. 372–395) deals in general with causes.

60 In Disputations 13 through 25 (vol. 25, pp. 395–916) Suárez deals with material, for-mal, efficient, final, and exemplar causes. In Disputation 26 (vol. 25, pp. 916–949) he treats the relations of causes to their effects. And Disputation 27 (vol. 25, pp. 949–961) considers the relations which exist among causes themselves.

61 Cf. vol. 25, pp. 399–409. In these sections Suárez deals mainly with the pre-Socratics, whom he divides into those who posited several material principle and those who said there was only one such principle; cf. DM 13, 2, 1, p. 399. His sources include Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius, Plato, Plotinus, Theophrastus, Plutarch, Sts. Augustine, Irenaeus, Clement of Rome, Clement of Alexandria, Ambrose, plus Epiphanius and Eusebius; ibid.

62 Cf. DM 18, 4, vol. 25, pp. 624–27.

63 Cf. “’.”

Metaphysics 1.3.984a21–22.

64. Here I am following Rábade et al., who say that other Latin editions have “intentio” in place of the Vivès edition’s “actio.” “Intention” better fits Suárez’s sense.

65 Possibly: DM 30, 2, nn. 15–17, vol. 26, pp. 69–70; but much more probably: DM 29, s. 2, pp. 34–47, where it is asked: “Can it be demonstrated a posteriori that God alone is this [uncreated] being by itself?”

66 Cf. esp. DM 23, 1, n. 5, vol. 25, p. 844. This Section has special interest inasmuch as it presents Suárez’s doctrine of the metaphorical nature of final causality; on this cf.

Vernon J. Bourke, Will in Western Thought: An Historico-Critical Survey (New York:

Sheed and Ward, 1964), p. 178.

69 A figure of speech in which a name appropriate to different things is applied to one of them for which it is especially suited.

70 Cf. Alberti Magni, O.P., Metaphysica, I, Tr. 3, c. 3, ed. B. Geyer, in Opera omnia, tomus XVI, pars 1(Monasterium Westfalorum: Typis Aschendorff, 1960), pp. 32–3.

71 Cf. “’ reason about the power to act and the efficacy of the Intelligences.” The Intelligences here would be either Aristotelian Separate Substances or, for later theologians, Angels.

76 See Opera, vol. 25, pp. 899–916. Here, especially see Section 2 (pp. 910–916), which asks the question: “Whether an exemplar has the proper nature of a cause or is it to be reduced to one of the other causes?”

77 Cf. DM 12, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 388–95, where Suárez asks: “How many kinds of cause are there?”

78 Cf. Metaphysics 1.8.989b29–990a32.

Metaphysics Book I 37

79 Literally: the “whatness” of something.

80 Cf. Metaphysics 1.7.983b4–5.

81 This must be noted. Suárez has a very high regard for the work of his fellow Jesuit.

82 DM 40, vol. 26, pp. 529–587: “About Continuous Quantity.”

83 DM 41, pp. 587–604: “About Discrete Quantity.”

84 Cf. DM 36, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 477–82, where Suárez asks: “What is the essential nature of material substance and whether it is entirely the same as the nature of corporeal substance?”; but even more, see s. 2, pp. 482–6, where the question is: “Whether the essence of material substance consists in substantial form alone or also in matter?”