NATURALEZA Y ARQUITECTURA EN EL MOVIMIENTO MODERNO

UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES V. NESTLE PHILS.

March 3, 2008

Union of Filipro Employees – Drug Food and Allied Industries Union – Kilusang Mayo Uno was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Nestle belonging to Alabang and Cabuyao plants. Prior the expiration of the CBA, they signified their intent to renegotiate a new CBA. Nestle informed them about its counter proposal and that it implemented rules to govern the conduct of CBA negotiations. Due to a failure to reach an agreement, conciliation proceedings bargaining deadlock ensued.

A notice of strike was filed by the union prediated on Nestle’s alleged ULP (bargaining in bad faith – by setting preconditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the retirement plan in the CBA negotiations. The Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the subject labor dispute.

Nestlé and UFE-DFA-KMU filed their respective position papers. Nestlé addressed several issues concerning economic provisions of the CBA as well as the non-inclusion of the issue of the Retirement Plan in the collective bargaining negotiations. On the other hand, UFE-DFA-KMU limited itself to the issue of whether or not the retirement plan was a mandatory subject in its CBA negotiation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of DOLE can take cognizance of matters beyond the subject of the notice of strike in CBA negotiations?

RULING:

Yes. The Secretary of DOLE may. Based on the Notices of Strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU, the Secretary of the DOLE rightly decided on matters of substance. That the union later on changed its mind is of no moment because to give premium to such would make the legally mandated discretionary power of the Dole Secretary subservient to the whims of the parties.

It was UFE-DFA-KMU which first alleged a bargaining deadlock as the basis for the filing of its Notice of Strike; and at the time of the filing of the first Notice of Strike, several conciliation conferences had already been undertaken where both parties had already exchanged with each other their respective CBA proposals. In fact, during the conciliation meetings before the NCMB, but prior to the filing of the notices of strike, the parties had already delved into matters affecting the meat of the collective bargaining agreement.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION V. CONFESOR

FACTS:

Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank, for brevity) is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (the Union, for brevity).

Before the commencement of the negotiation, the Union, through Divinagracia, suggested to the Banks Human Resource Manager and head of the negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team. The Bank acceded.[11] Meanwhile, Diokno suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel.[12] However, Umali was retained as a member thereof.

On March 12, 1993, the parties met and set the ground rules for the negotiation. Diokno suggested that the negotiation be kept a family affair. The proposed non-economic provisions of the CBA were discussed first.[13] Even during the final reading of the non-economic provisions on May 4, 1993, there were still provisions on which the Union and the Bank could not agree. Temporarily, the notation DEFERRED was placed therein. Towards the end of the meeting, the Union manifested that the same should be changed to DEADLOCKED to indicate that such items remained unresolved. Both parties agreed to place the notation DEFERRED/DEADLOCKED.

The petitioner asserts that the private respondent committed ULP, i.e., interference in the selection of the Unions negotiating panel, when Cielito Diokno, the Banks Human Resource Manager, suggested to the Unions President Eddie L. Divinagracia that Jose P.

Umali, Jr., President of the NUBE, be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel. In support of its claim, Divinagracia executed an affidavit, stating that prior to the commencement of the negotiation, Diokno approached him and suggested the exclusion of Umali from the Unions negotiating panel, and that during the first meeting, Diokno stated that the negotiation be kept a family affair.

ISSUE(1): Whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice against the Bank arising from the latters alleged interference with its choice of negotiator; surface bargaining;

making bad faith non-economic proposals; and refusal to furnish the Union with copies of the relevant data RULING: NO

The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel.

The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of Umali in the Unions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15, 1993.

It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the economic provisions became heated and the parties had become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to involve personalities. As the public respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result, suggestions given under less adversarial situations may be colored with unintended meanings. Such is what appears to have happened in this case.

The Duty to Bargain Collectively

If at all, the suggestion made by Diokno to Divinagracia should be construed as part of the normal relations and innocent communications, which are all part of the friendly relations between the Union and Bank.

The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to bargain; hence, committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface bargaining. It alleged that the Bank just went through the motions of bargaining without any intent of reaching an agreement, as evident in the Banks counter-proposals.

Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to reach an agreement.[50] The resolution of surface bargaining allegations never presents an easy issue. The determination of whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one because it involves, at bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and usually such intent can only be inferred from the totality of the challenged partys conduct both at and away from the bargaining table. It involves the question of whether an employers conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is merely hard bargaining.

The minutes of meetings from March 12, 1993 to June 15, 1993 do not show that the Bank had any intention of violating its duty to bargain with the Union. Records show that after the Union sent its proposal to the Bank on February 17, 1993, the latter replied with a list of its counter-proposals on February 24, 1993. Thereafter, meetings were set for the settlement of their differences. The minutes of the meetings show that both the Bank and the Union exchanged economic and non-economic proposals and counter-proposals.

The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.[53] Hence, the parties failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.

ISSUE(2): whether or not the petitioner is estopped from filing the instant action.

RULING: NO

In the case, however, the approval of the CBA and the release of signing bonus do not necessarily mean that the Union waived its ULP claim against the Bank during the past negotiations. After all, the conclusion of the CBA was included in the order of the SOLE, while the signing bonus was included in the CBA itself.

Moreover, the Union twice filed a motion for reconsideration respecting its ULP charges against the Bank before the SOLE.

The Union Did Not Engage In Blue-Sky Bargaining

We, likewise, do not agree that the Union is guilty of ULP for engaging in blue-sky bargaining or making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals.[59] The Bank failed to show that the economic demands made by the Union were exaggerated or unreasonable. The minutes of the meeting show that the Union based its economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region.

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS CA FEB 11, 2004

On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days.

However, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.

Issue:

W/N GMC is guilty for ULP for violating the duty to bargain

Ruling:

YES. The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years.The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. It is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers. The withdrawal of some union members from the union will not affect the majority status of the union as the exclusive bargaining agent. GMC should have responded and kept its duty to bargain collectively.

FVC LABOR UNION – PHIL. TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ASSOCIATION VS.

SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO

Facts: On December 22, 1997, the petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO – the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the FVC Philippines, – signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the company. The five-year CBA period was from February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003. At the end of the 3rd year of the five-year term and pursuant to the CBA, FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the CBA and modified, among other provisions, the CBA’s duration.

They extended the original five-year period of the CBA by four (4) months.

On January 21, 2003, nine (9) days before the January 30, 2003 expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term (and four months and nine days away from the expiration of the amended CBA period), the respondent (SANAMA-SIGLO) filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA.

Issue:

W/N the extension of the life of the CBA also extended the exclusive bargaining status as well

Ruling:

NO. By express provision of Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond 5 years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the parties to agree upon. Despite the agreement to extend the life of the CBA beyond the 5-yr period, the exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and hence, it can be challenged within the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years.

RFM CORPORATION V. KAMPI-NAFLU-KMU G.R. No. 162324, February 4, 2009

Carpio-Morales, J.

DOCTRINE:

If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, as in the herein questioned provision, the literal meaning thereof shall prevail.

FACTS:

Petitioner RFM Corporation (RFM) is a domestic corporation engaged in flour-milling and animal feeds manufacturing. Sometime in 2000, its Flour Division and SFI Feeds Division entered into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with their respective labor unions, the Kasapian ng Manggagawang Pinagkaisa-RFM (KAMPI-NAFLU-KMU) for the Flour Division, and Sandigan at Ugnayan ng Manggagawang Pinagkaisa-SFI (SUMAPI-NAFLU-KMU) for the Feeds Division (respondents). The CBAs, which contained similar provisions, were effective for five years, from July 1, 2000 up to June 30, 2005. A section of the CBAs provides that the company should make payment if Black Saturday, November 1, and December 31 were declared as special holidays by the National Government.

During the first year of the effectivity of the CBAs in 2000, December 31 which fell on a Sunday was declared by the national government as a special holiday. Respondents thus claimed payment of their members’ salaries, invoking the above-stated CBA provision. Petitioner refused the claims for payment,

averring that December 31, 2000 was not compensable as it was a rest day. The controversy resulted in a deadlock, drawing the parties to submit the same for voluntary arbitration. The voluntary arbitrator ruled in favor of the respondents and upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the VA’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the employees are entitled to the questioned salary according to the provision of the CBA.

HELD:

Yes. If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, as in the herein questioned provision, the literal meaning thereof shall prevail. That is settled.⁵As such, the daily-paid employees must be paid their regular salaries on the holidays which are so declared by the national government, regardless of whether they fall on rest days. The CBA is the law between the parties, hence, they are obliged to comply with its provisions.⁷Indeed, if petitioner and respondents intended the provision in question to cover payment only during holidays falling on work or weekdays, it should have been so incorporated therein.

Petitioner maintains, however, that the parties failed to foresee a situation where the special holiday would fall on a rest day. The Court is not persuaded. The Labor Code specifically enjoins that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, it should be interpreted in favor of labor.

FULACHE V. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING