NIVEL BÁSICO 2.A2

The change in government in May 2010 from New Labour to a Conservative-led Coalition brought about a ‘sea change in politics’, and the transformation of the political landscape with heightened levels of scrutiny (d’Ancona, 2010). Indeed, SE (2011, p.2) acknowledged that sport was now ‘under the spotlight as never before’, particularly as the increased levels of scrutiny within the sport policy domain reflected continuing austerity and economic uncertainty (SE, 2010a, 2011). DCMS (2012, p.3) also highlighted the decreasing trend in 16-25 participation rates since 2005 (especially in more traditional sports), and the continued drop-off among school leavers. Thus, the emphasis of government’s policy statement for sport, Creating a Sporting Habit for Life: A new youth sport strategy (2012)⁷, was a renewed focus on youth sport aimed at harnessing ‘the power of the Olympics and Paralympics to create a deep and lasting legacy of sports participation in every community’ (DCMS, 2012, p.1). While the collective focus for sport continued to endorse the objective of mass participation, albeit with a particular focus on 14-25 year olds (SE, 2012a, p.4), the ultimate goal was to achieve a tangible ‘transformation of the UK’s sporting culture’ towards becoming an active nation (DCMS, 2012, p.2). To the extent that, against a backdrop of centralised austerity budgeting, government commitment to sport policy included an investment of £1bn of Exchequer and Lottery funding (SE, 2012d, p.4), and the restoration of the Lottery to the original four pillars, increasing sport’s share to 20% (DCMS, 2012, p.1; SE, 2011) from 16.6% (UKS, 2010, p.6).

The idea that the Home Olympics could provide a unique opportunity to deliver a

‘long-term step change in people playing sport’ (DCMS, 2012, p.3), was plausible, but also decidedly questionable. Previous research suggested that mega-sporting-events had no measurable impact on sports participation rates post-games, and limited effects on sports club membership (Hindson et al., 1994; Hogan and Norton, 2000; Coalter, 2004; Veal et al., 2006; Girginov and Hills, 2008). According to Girginov (2013, p.6), while the Home Olympics had encouraged both cooperation and competition among NGBs, few had undertaken a holistic approach to leveraging the Games as an integral part of their WSP strategy, and most had utilised a more

‘tactical approach by leveraging different programmes, initiatives and areas, thus

7Referred to as, Creating a Sporting Habit for Life, throughout this thesis.

23 narrowing the scope of the impact to a limited number of beneficiaries.’ In addition, Girginov (2013) claimed that NGBs felt that government’s positioning and promotion of the Home Games provided a stimulus for the development of their sport, increased the awareness of their sport, and stimulated resources in the key areas of grassroots development, sport talent systems and international success.

However, Richard Caborn⁸, within his evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Olympic and Paralympic legacy (HLSCOPL) (House of Lords Select Committee on Olympic and Paralympic legacy [HLSCOPL], 2013a, p.206), stated that SE had made ‘a fundamental mistake on legacy, and that was to change (sic) most of the funding to [NGBs].’ To some extent, SE subscribed to that view, as noted by the evidence given by Jennie Price, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of SE:

‘There is not really a clear pathway to follow for this [increase in community sport participation]. We have to experiment; we have to draw from other sectors, because this is effectively a behavioural change challenge … If things do not work, and particularly if [NGB] funding does not work, we have a mechanism to remove that money’ (cited in HLSCOPL, 2013a, p.698).

For SE (2013a, p.7), it was unlikely that any transformation of the nation’s sporting habits would be achievable without a degree of collaboration among their ‘strong network of organisations’, which would also require a ‘significant shift in focus for many NGBs’ (DCMS, 2012, p.9) to increase participation in young people aged under-16. Furthermore, SE (2012f) pointed towards the requirement for a new and sharper focus to achieve a meaningful and lasting community sport legacy, and increased participation at grassroots-level, which would be extremely challenging due to the declining trend in participation and tough economic climate. While government/SE signalled their intention to continue working alongside NGBs, it came with a tougher performance regime within a ‘strict payment-by-results system’, and a greater intent to use punitive action against those NGBs not performing. According to SE (2012f, p.3), NGB investment funding was a ‘privilege, not an entitlement’, awarded on a ‘competitive basis’ to those that provided the strongest plans and demonstrated ‘value for money.’ A clear statement from DCMS (2012, p.9) asserted that for those NGBs ‘fail[ing] to meet contracted objectives’, withheld funding would

8 Richard Caborn served as the Minister for Sport (2001-07).

24 be made ‘accessible to other groups which can offer strong business cases for increasing participation.’ The aim of which was to send ‘a clear message to those NGBs who needed to change’ that it would be they who would lose out not the sport, which would continue to be funded ‘through other bodies, such as local authorities or charities’ (SE, 2014f). A strategy that had been adopted previously in relation to sports such as basketball, tennis, and fencing, wherein SE’s lack of confidence in the ability of those sport/NGBs to increase participation, resulted in the re-distribution of funds to non-affiliated organisations (SE, 2014e). For example, £6m was awarded to StreetGames to deliver Doorstep Sport Clubs, in addition to £3.38m previously invested in recognition of their significant progress in getting more young people from disadvantaged communities into sport (SE, 2014f).

Evidence from the HLSCOPL Report (2013b, pp.8-11), also highlighted a number of policy concerns relating to community sport participation, including inter alia: the infrastructure at grassroots-level was ‘patchy’; a disconnect existed between grassroots and high performance; there was a ‘lack of a clear legacy plan for capturing the enthusiasm of the Games within all sports’, not helped by the limitations of the APS methodology; and a key driver to broadening NGBs’

participation base should be ‘a change of culture and board composition’ that also reflected participants’ views.

By contrast, government’s continued recognition of and commitment to elite sport policy stability, also received criticism within the HLSCOPL Report (2013b, pp.8-11) on the basis that UKS’s No Compromise approach to elite funding was: ‘principally retrospective’; ‘not a “one size fits all” panacea’; and the ‘heavy focus on the volume of medals [had] an inherent bias against team sports.’ However, it is argued by Houlihan and Zheng (2013, p.338) that ‘the cost of maintaining a country’s relative position in the medals table is considerable and arguably locks countries on to a path from which it is difficult for them to deviate’, which resonates strongly with the UK government’s policy decision-making for elite sport.

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2.6) Sporting Future: ‘sport for sport’s sake’ to ‘sport for social good’

The General Election in May 2015 brought about an unexpected victory for the Conservative party (Parker, 2015). This was followed shortly after by a Parliamentary debate on Sport and the 2012 Olympic legacy, the tone of which was clearly influenced by the HLSCOPL Report (2013b). Parliamentary discussions centred on key issues that were considered attributable to the non-delivery of the Olympic legacy, leading to then Minister for Sport, Tracey Crouch’s, announcement that she had ‘ripped up the old strategy, and … shall publish a consultation on a brand-new sport strategy that will reform how we deliver sport in this country’ (Hansard, 2015a)⁹. This arguably supports Houlihan and White’s (2002, p.223) claim that when politicians are confronted with ineffective policy, they too often 'turn to administrative reform as a highly visible solution when a more effective response might be to improve leadership capacity of management.’

The Parliamentary debate raised a wide range of sport policy issues including inter alia (Hansard, 2015a):

i. The lack of communication and cooperation between government departments, not helped by numerous Ministerial changes within sport during the term of the Coalition government (four Secretaries of State and three Ministers for Sport);

ii. The perceived malaise of ministerial preoccupations other than sport and the laissez-faire, hands-off attitudes towards sport;

iii. A blame culture aimed at NGBs and the fixation on measuring participation figures through the APS, the latter deemed to be a blunt tool;

iv. The use of alternative deliverers of sport who may be better placed than NGBs to tackle harder to reach groups;

v. The need for a cross-government long-term policy and plan for sport that does not change as a result of a bad set of figures or Ministerial changes; and vi. A broader focus and definition for sport that should include the inactive and

outdoor recreation.

9 See Column 1002.

26 In addition to the Parliamentary voices that had debated the Olympic legacy, the first Triennial Review for UKS and SE (DCMS, 2015a, pp.5-6) suggested that both agencies should remain in their current form, but their effectiveness could be improved through inter alia: ‘closer working specifically in the areas of talent, participation and the governance of NGBs’; increasing participation levels by

‘continuing to drive forward current reforms on channels of intervention, and evaluation and appraisal’; and significant efficiencies through NGB shared services and co-location. In addition, too many participation initiatives using different delivery mechanisms measured in different ways had caused difficulties in determining the levels of success, leading to the conclusion that sport was a ‘fragmented sector with several key players and no critical mass (DCMS, 2015a, p.43). The key recommendations of the Triennial Review in connection to UKS, SE and NGBs, are provided in the appendices (Appendix II).

In December 2015, DCMS published Sporting Future, its first strategy for sport in more than a decade. Of particular note, was the inclusion of key headline themes contributed by ten different government departments (DCMS, 2015b), suggesting a genuine cross-Whitehall effort for joined-up government, to achieve the principal aim of harnessing the potential of sport and physical activity to deliver ‘social good’ and

‘change people’s lives for the better’ (DCMS, 2015b, p.10). While the cross-departmental nature of Sporting Future received strong political support, joined-up and co-ordinated delivery of sport had been a constant theme within previous governments’ sport policies. According to DCMS (2015b), the government’s policy intervention through Sporting Future had not resulted from previous government inefficiencies. Neither did SE receive any criticism (Gibson, 2015). The responsibility for the litany of failures was laid firmly at the feet of NGBs, as noted in Sporting Future (DCMS, 2015b, pp.10-20), sports’ inability to increase participation was attributable to ‘complacency’ amongst those who run sport, poor governance and corruption within sport, and the lack of a customer ‘demand-led’ focus, although DCMS (2015b, p.72) did acknowledge that the focus on participation numbers had

‘disincentivised organisations from engaging those who have most to benefit from value of sport.’

27 The objectives of Sporting Future were to harness the power of sport for the good of society, invest in talent and stand up for the integrity of sport, through three key components (DCMS, 2015b, pp.6-7): i) a change in the way sport was funded – to ensure a more meaningful and measurable impact on improving people’s lives, rather than merely focusing on people taking part in sport; ii) NGBs of non-Olympic sports to be prioritised alongside NGBs of Olympic and Paralympic sports; and iii) a new mandatory governance code that would be rigorously enforced. Government’s reaffirmation of its commitment to Olympic and Paralympic success clearly extending policy continuity for elite sport (DCMS, 2015b, p.11). However, Sporting Future also sought to move sport policy away from the narrow focus on participation and medals (DCMS, 2015b, p.8), by way of a broader focus on engagement in regular and meaningful participation not only in sport and physical activity, but also volunteering, and experiencing live sport (DCMS, 2015b, p.19). For SE, Sporting Future demanded the development of innovative sports offerings that were not only

‘accessible, sustainable environments – practically, financially and emotionally’, but also engaging enough to attract a more diverse audience (SE, 2016d, p.4). Central to the aims of Sporting Future has been a focus on five fundamental outcomes linked to: physical wellbeing, mental wellbeing, individual development, social and community development, and economic development, driven through three broad outputs within a new sport strategy framework, as shown in Figure 2.1. The key elements of the three strategic outputs particularly relevant to NGBs are provided Table 2.1.

28 Figure 2.1: Framework for a new Sport Strategy 2016-21

Source: DCMS (2015b, p.18)

Table 2.1: Strategic outputs of Sporting Future relevant to NGBs

Output Key Implications for NGBs

Sporting success Olympic/Paralympic support aligned to achieving key strategic outcomes. UKS’s primary objective to deliver medal success. UKS, NGBs, BOA, and the British Paralympic

Association to acquire a better understanding on how medal success delivers the strategy’s outcomes, and work to increase their impact.

Engagement in sport and physical activity

Broader remit for SE - responsible for sport outside of school from the age of 5 (with a focus on core physical literacy skills at an early age);

NGBs – greater customer-focus and increased partnership-working with charities and local authorities to use their ‘collective power’ to deliver results; strategic and best value

investment of public funds to prioritise those who are least active; continued evidence-based monitoring and assessment against agreed KPIs to measure performance against outputs and outcomes.

A strong and resilient sport sector

A more productive, sustainable and responsible sport sector. Organisational and financial sustainability, ‘excellent governance’, and collaboration considered key concerns for the effective delivery of strategic outcomes;

A more ‘sustainable mixed funding model’ desirable, in particular for those organisations considered to be resource-dependent, and orchestrated by both UKS and SE to: a) reduce the funds received from a single public sector source; b) increase the overall level of non-public investment; and c) increase back office efficiencies, co-locations and shared services among sporting bodies (e.g. NGBs);

A new mandatory governance code to be introduced for those organisations seeking public funding. Organisations unable to meet the requirements of the code will not be eligible for public funding.

Source adapted from: DCMS (2015b)

29 However, Sporting Future was relatively agnostic as to precisely who should receive investment funding. SE advocating greater inward investment of public funding into the sporting sector (SE, 2015b, p.2), while DCMS considered those who could deliver on the outcomes were best placed to receive funding:

‘All new government funding for sport and physical activity will go to organisations which can best demonstrate that they will deliver some or all of the five outcomes in this strategy … [I]t is likely that organisations which show that they can work collaboratively and tailor their work at the local level will be best placed to access funding’ (DCMS, 2015b, p.16).

A clearer indication on how funding would be prioritised was provided within SE’s Towards An Active Nation 2016-2021 Strategy (2016e), which included a radical new approach to investment funding decisions, clearly aligned to government objectives and outcomes. In particular, the distribution of funding would focus on inactivity and under-represented groups, including women and girls and those with disabilities, lower socio-economic groups, and older people (DCMS, 2015b, p.10); and improved community cohesion and standards in school sport (DCMS, 2015b, p.6). In addition, there would be a greater drive towards sustainability in ‘organised’ sport, in recognition of the ‘dependence of many bodies on SE funding’ (SE, 2015b, p.2), and more significantly for NGBs, organisational-neutrality as the method of delivery to achieve agreed policy outcomes (SE, 2016e, p.12 – emphasis mine). Furthermore, the controversial APS monitoring system has been replaced by Active Lives (a system of measurement focused on how people are active overall rather than how often take part in sport) (DCMS, 2015b, p.11). For elite sport, however, while there were no significant changes in terms of sport policy, there were significant affordability challenges (UKS, 2016b) due to declining Lottery income (UKS, 2017, p.1), which by its very nature is ‘inherently volatile’ (UKS, 2017, p.3), to the extent that not every sport with medal potential has received funding for Tokyo 2020 (UKS, 2016c).

30