NIVEL BÁSICO 1.A2

Under Tony Blair’s New Labour government, the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS – formerly DNH) published Sporting Future for All: The Government’s Plan for Sport (2000), and Game Plan: A strategy for delivering Government sport and physical activity objectives (2002)⁴. Both policy documents reiterated John Major’s claim that ‘[s]port matters’ (Department for Culture Media and Sport [DCMS], 2000, p.2), and was an under-used, yet powerful political tool (DCMS, 2002a, p.5).

Indeed, Blair (2000) raised the political profile of sport across government departments by proclaiming that Sporting Future for All was ‘not only a sports policy, it is a health policy, an education policy, a crime policy, and an anti-drugs policy.’

As alluded to previously, a notable level of continuity existed between New Labour’s policies for sport and the Conservative’s Raising the Game, especially the dual prioritisation of school sport and elite sport development (DCMS, 2002a, p.11; Green and Houlihan, 2005, 2006). Observable differences between the policy strategies were a renewed focus on sport and physical activity in schools to increase grassroots participation (particularly for health benefits), and a move towards

‘identifying and nurturing sporting talent to facilitate sustainable improvements at an international sporting level’ (DCMS, 2002a, p.7). Arguably though, Game Plan did not change the policies established in Sporting Future for All, but provided a more comprehensive statement of policy objectives and delivery mechanisms, in part due to the Cunningham Report⁵ (2001, p.5; UKS, 2002a), which concluded that ‘radical steps’ were required to ‘create a world class system capable of producing consistent success in the international arena.’

4 Respectively referred to as, Sporting Future for All and Game Plan, throughout this thesis.

5 The Cunningham report laid out a constructive set of proposals aimed at the continued evolution of UKS’s elite funding system, and an increased focus on the ever-changing needs of top athletes and coaches.

16 Government had branded Sporting Future for All as a new way of thinking about sport (DCMS, 2000), although not in terms of what sport could do for government, but rather how this could be achieved through a ‘radical rethink of the way sport [was] funded and organised’ (DCMS, 2000, p.19), and a ‘radical change in the relationship between government and NGBs’ (DCMS, 2000, p.20). More specifically, the government’s intention was to realise its vision for sport through a reform agenda and a ‘modernisation partnership with [NGBs]’ (DCMS, 2000, p.19), which was a key recommendation within Game Plan. The organisation and management of sport was still regarded as ‘fragmented and too often unprofessional’, and criticised for being

‘inefficient, lacking vision, and failing to develop common goals’, especially in high public profile sports (DCMS, 2000, pp.5-7; Deloitte and Touche, 2003; Green, 2009).

A common claim was that British sport was plagued by ‘infighting and turf-wars generated by overlapping organisational responsibilities’ (DCMS, 2000, p.163;

Foster, 2004). Foster (2004, p.11) explicitly cited the existence of ‘backbiting, prejudice, blindness to the facts and a disturbing resistance to change’ in athletics, which could equally apply to other sports (see Dutton, 2006). According to Deloitte and Touche (2003, pp. 1-2), change was clearly necessary within some NGBs, where evidence suggested a ‘lack of basic administrative and professional support which is essential for any organisation’, and that if NGBs were to realise their full potential in meeting the challenges of sport in the 21^st Century, ‘many will need to reform.’

Sporting Future for All asserted that NGBs should develop 'a clear strategy for participation and excellence’ to receive public funds (DCMS, 2000, p.20), whereby greater emphasis was placed on the importance of target-setting, with the caveat that ‘success or failure in achieving milestone targets in performance plans [would]

be an important factor in deciding future levels of funding’ (DCMS, 2000, p.14).

According to Green and Houlihan (2006, p.58), Game Plan set priorities for ‘a wide range of sporting activity including participation rates, elite sport development, the hosting of major events, and, notably, the overly bureaucratic nature of sports administration in the UK.’ A clear example of the impact of Game Plan is the modernisation of SE and its radical transformation from a sports development agency concerned with mass participation, to a strategic-lead agency responsible for community sport and the co-ordination of government policy through other

17 organisations (Keech, 2011). Despite government critique of the inadequacies of NGBs, both UKS and SE had received sustained levels of criticism by major political parties and NGBs, for example, Houlihan and Green (2009, p.678) noted that both agencies were accused of being:

‘unresponsive to the needs of their clients, overly bureaucratic and complex, especially in relation to accessing funds; and incoherent due to overlapping responsibilities, the lack of strategic clarity and the generation of an excess of what are often termed short-term initiatives.’

While SE acknowledged some of the criticism and the need for reform and modernisation, the momentum for change was largely government-driven, resulting from government’s acceptance of the salience of sport and physical activity programmes as solutions to various policy issues, such as health and education (Houlihan and Green, 2009, p.687).

As noted in Game Plan (DCMS, 2002a, p.18), SE’s new, rationalised role recognised the governmental agency as ‘investors in sport rather than deliverers.’ The alternations of which prompted a greater focus on customer-based funding and revised Lottery criteria for mass participation/community sport funding, within a performance regime of ‘constant measuring, monitoring and evaluation’, to ensure valued delivery from limited resources (SE, 2003, p.2). The latter included the introduction of two major surveys, SE’s Active People Survey (APS) conducted on an annual basis, and DCMS’s Taking Part, both contributing to the evidence base in sport (Robinson, 2004). According to Houlihan and Green (2009, p.689), the increasing use of contractual arrangements from DCMS to SE/UKS, down through the ‘spine of accountability’, not only captured the ‘new expectations from government’ of its agencies and those in receipt of public funding (e.g. NGBs) further down the ‘sporting-food-chain’, but ensured compliance with government policy.

The above critique of SE also prompted the publishing of the new ‘Framework for Sport in England’ (SE, 2004b), which identified seven generic key performance indicators (KPIs) for NGBs to work towards, as part of an effective policy monitoring process. The KPIs related to mass participation, club accreditation, membership numbers, coaching qualifications, volunteer loyalty, international success, and British representation (SE, 2004b, p.7). Furthermore, NGBs were required to develop a

18 thorough and robust Whole Sport Plan (WSP) in order to receive funding, which articulated long-term goals, agreed outcomes and delivery plans for individual sports, while also outlining the level of investment required (over the four-year funding cycle), and how funding was to be spent, monitored and evaluated (SE, 2004b, p.17). It is clear that the level of reform had daunting implications for many of the more traditional NGBs within British sport, which had not previously considered adopting the principles and practices of strategic management. For example, Robinson (2004) highlighted four main challenges experienced by sport organisations in relation to the modernisation agenda: i) the limited understanding or appreciation of performance management processes; ii) the use of poorly specified KPIs; iii) the inadequacy of existing organisational structures; and iv) the defensive attitudes of sport organisation management who were threatened by the prospect of change. It is this final challenge that has arguably been the most restrictive in the application of performance management systems within sport. According to Melville (2012), the increasing dependency of NGBs on public funding for their survival and/or expansion, and the criteria for receiving public funding, slowly forced attitudes to modernise and incorporate more professional managerial approaches, through a

‘process of continuing development … towards greater effectiveness, efficiency and independence’ (Deloitte and Touche, 2003, p.2).

While DCMS (2002a, p.18) claimed that the modernisation of UKS mirrored many of the hallmarks of SE’s experience, Houlihan and Green (2009, p.692) argued that ‘the level of disdain shown by government to [SE was] not as evident’, the most important manifestation of reform for UKS being the appointment of Sue Campbell as Reform Chair that ‘signalled the start of something very different.’ A significant change was the sharpening of UKS’s wider strategic goals and the implementation of its No Compromise approach, in a bid to increase Treasury funding for 2012. The No Compromise principle prioritised Olympic success, fundamental pre-requisites of which were modern, fit-for-purpose and professional NGBs, and the targeting of elite resources ‘solely at those athletes capable of delivering medal-winning performances’ (UKS, 2006a, p.1). UKS’s remit was to ensure that investment of public funds was not wasted, to challenge NGBs to spend funds to maximum effect, and to exert influence and intervene in NGB affairs to ensure that they were in good shape. The rationale behind such intervention reflected UKS’s modernising agenda,

19 also aimed at reducing NGBs’ dependency on UKS and the encouragement of greater self-sufficiency. However, as argued by Houlihan and Green (2009, p.693), this also led to incidents of ‘enforced self-sufficiency.’

Green (2009. p.131) provided a particular critique of government’s modernisation agenda, by questioning whether ‘such radical restructuring of the major national sports bodies would have been effected … with such expediency, had the IOC votes for the 2012 Olympic games not favoured London.’ Interestingly, UKS (2005, p.1, cited in Green, 2009, p.131) noted that following the award of the Home Olympics in 2005, ‘NGBs of Olympic sports argued that a single agency should have responsibility for performance pathway … from talent identification through to podium.’ For Green (2009, p.131), this hinted towards restructuring favouring Olympic success, rather than ‘organisational repair’ to achieve the ‘primary policy objectives for elite success and youth participation in sport’, as argued by Houlihan and Green (2009, p.682). Indeed, Jefferys (2012) suggested that Game Plan’s policies had been distorted following London's successful Olympic bid, leading to the safeguarding of elite funding in the medium term, particularly as the Conservative-led Coalition government believed the Home Olympics would secure a range of benefits over and above the impact on sport. The skewed focus towards elite sport was a prominent feature of government’s sport policy document, Playing to Win: A New era for Sport (2008)⁶, which undoubtedly reflected the pressures and expectations associated with London 2012. As noted by DCMS (2008, foreword), Playing to Win was a plan ‘to expand the pool of talented English sportsmen and women [in all sports]; and to break records, win medals and win tournaments for this country’, where such endeavour would be achieved through ‘shared goals, clear responsibilities, and everyone playing their part.’

Notwithstanding the above, the London Olympic bid in 2005 was also premised on the utility of the 2012 Olympic Games to promote a sporting legacy of increased sports participation. The DCMS (2008), within its legacy plans, outlined government aims to make the UK a world-leading sporting nation by inspiring people to get involved in sport to increase participation levels, and advance elite-level achievements. However, according to Girginov (2013, p.4), this ‘could not be

6 Referred to as, Playing to Win, throughout this thesis.

20 achieved without developing the organisational capacities of NGBs who form the backbone of the UK national sporting system’, which was certainly reflective of DCMS’s (2008, p.14) statement that:

‘It was essential to review and refocus community sport and [SE] to give greater clarity of purpose; reduce inefficiency and bureaucracy; and make it easier for NGBs and sports to access funding to improve sport and ensure that under-represented groups get equal treatment.’

According to Keech (2011, p.220), NGBs had also aggressively lobbied government for ‘increased funding and a redefined role for national sports’, as the belief was that SE responsibilities were too broad. The result was agreement from government to shift governmental objectives away from sport’s role in broader social outcomes, returning to a narrower focus on developing ‘sports for sport’s sake’. Thus, signalling a ‘substantial shift from a “bottom-up” mass participation strategy to a nationally- defined strategy for each sport’ (Keech, 2011, p.221), and government’s intention to put ‘experts and enthusiasts in charge, offering sports more freedom and control …, [as this] goes with the grain of what people in sport want’ (DCMS, 2008, p.21). As Parnell (2007, cited in Keech, 2011, p.220) argued, ‘we will never build a world class community sports infrastructure unless we are clear that sport is a good thing and competition is a good thing’, and that for sport development and participation to have a clearly defined focus, ‘NGBs (and clubs, coaches and volunteers within their domain) need to excel.’

According to SE, NGBs were ‘placed at the heart’ of SE’s 2008-11 strategy, the assumption being that the networks of NGB community clubs would ‘drive delivery’

(SE, 2008, p.10; Green, 2009) on SE’s Grow, Sustain, Excel outcomes. The NGB-centric approach undertaken by government/SE challenged NGBs to (SE, 2008): i) increase adult sports participation by one million by 2012-2013; ii) ensure more people were satisfied with important aspects of sport to sustain participation and avoid drop-off; and iii) develop talent support systems and pathways for each sport to improve and maintain talent identification. However, Keech (2011, p.226) noted an open acknowledgement from SE that half the projected increases in participation were based on the targets of eight key popular, well-managed and resourced sports, and argued that such a narrow focus could lead to failure if a ‘culture of greater

21 participation’ amongst all sport was not achieved. Keech (2011, p.226) also argued that WSPs empowered NGBs with ‘greater autonomy and control over the investment of public funds’ to meet targets set-down by SE, although additional assistance and support would inevitably be required for NGBs with fewer resources, weaker governance and smaller memberships. More importantly, NGBs were in the spotlight having wanted and achieved greater responsibility, but such autonomy equated to achieving participation targets to secure future investment of public funds into community sport (Keech, 2011, p.229).

According to Green (2009, p.131), modernisation and reform within the sport policy environment required NGBs to ‘embrace funding decisions and new governance arrangements characterised by New Labour’s bias for “strong tools of government”’, with far less discretion within their own operational environment. A clear indication of which, was the requirement for NGBs to radically modernise to earn the right (emphasis mine) to partner with government (DCMS, 2002a, pp.145-147; DCMS, 2008, p.15). The drive for modernisation reinforced by the threat financial sanctions, whereby ‘any sport not wishing to accept this challenge – funding [would] be switched to those that do’ (DCMS, 2008, p.2). For Houlihan and Green (2009, p.690), SE had become a ‘mechanism to control and not to actually delegate’, the increasing complexity of performance regimes posing a challenge for some NGBs still wedded to the notion ‘that they know what is best for their sports’ (Houlihan and White, 2002, p.165), and those resistant to self-regulation (Fahlén et al., 2015).

22