Normas de valoración

on the country. They are a main challenge for the British Government at the moment because of the link between poverty and lone parenthood. It is very much less the case in Finland or even in France, where these families, like all families in these countries, have access to a broad range of services. Lone parents are mainly integrated in the labour market in both countries, and these welfare states also have some specific policies for lone parent families. Lone parent family situations are not on the top of the political agenda neither in Italy nor in Portugal. Thus, the lessons we could learn from this work package on lone parenthood about caring policies depend largely on these national contexts.

This research has taken place at a time of a significant change in the policy context faced by lone parents in the UK. The ‘New Labour’ government, which was elected in May 1997, has deliberately sought to improve the welfare of poorer families with children, to offer incentives that will draw more parents into paid employment, and in doing so, to make a sharp break with the social policies of the past. Over the last two or three years some of these policy initiatives have begun to have practical effect on people’s lives and therefore they can be seen in our sample. This is particularly true of

the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), which is designed to raise the incomes of

lower paid working parents, and of the National Child Care Strategy, which consists of a series of initiatives to increase the supply of formal child care provision.

At the same time as these new policies have been implemented, there has been a continuation of a substantial debate on both the policy and research arenas concerning the most appropriate and effective ways of raising family welfare and changing family behaviour. While for most of the last half a century, the UK has been a laggard in pursuing family-friendly policies (Kamerman and Kahn 1997 described British policies as ‘conservative and hesitant’ compared with those elsewhere in Europe), it has none the less almost always seen a very vigorous debate. A good deal of the political discussion in the UK has been focused around normative issues to do with whether mothers of young children should in general take paid employment and whether parents, particularly lone parents, are representative of a dependency culture and of undesirable ‘underclass’ values and modes of behaviour. There has been a tendency to focus on changing the attitudes and behaviour of lone parents rather than changing in practice the opportunities and constraints they face. Lorraine Harding (1995, p. 177) has pointed out that in the UK, the debate about the role of the family tends to feature a spectrum with two extreme positions: the authoritarian position, which asserts family responsibility, and the libertarian position, in which family life is regarded as an entirely private issue. There is no place in this spectrum for a type of debate more often found in other EU

countries; one which focuses on using the state to assist the family in carrying out its activities.

The context is totally different in all the other four countries, even if some change is going on, concerning family policies or lone parenthood. This is the case for example in Portugal, which is indeed usually described as a country with a strong and explicit ideological commitment to the family, but a low profile as far as family and child policies are concerned. There has not been an explicit government policy in Portugal with regard to lone parents and their situation, but governmental programmes have often referred to lone parent families when stressing the need for protection of vulnerable families and certain population groups (disabled people, low-income groups, working women, older people, and so forth). This is mainly due to the fact that evidence compiled by studies on the poverty levels of different types of families has shown that lone parent families, along with people over the age of 65, are particularly vulnerable to poverty. This has led to the expression of some public concern.

In practice, however, this has had little impact on policy options and only a few legislative or support measures for lone parents have been introduced. In 1998, Decree- law 75/98 of 19 November introduced the payment of child maintenance by the state for very low-income lone parent families (income must be below the national minimum wage). In situations where the non-custodial parent is supposed to pay child maintenance and does not do so, the state steps in. In terms of cash benefits, this is the only measure which applies specifically to lone parents (apart from the “survivor’s pension” which widowed lone parents may claim). Thus, with regard to child benefits, for example, lone parent families are entitled to the same benefits as other families and only receive higher benefits for children if they fall into the lower income brackets. In other situations, such as access to housing or criteria admission for public or publicly- supported crèches and nursery schools, there is no special protection for lone parents either. Apart from the M.L.S. nurseries, which consider lone parenthood as an additional risk factor and usually give working lone parents some priority, most child care facilities simply give priority to the admission of children from low-income families in which the parents work.

In the near future, however, some additional policy measures related to lone parents are likely to be debated about or to come into effect. In the tax reform proposed by the government for 2001, lone parents are entitled to extra deductions. This policy option has already created some debate: the Association for Large Families (created in 1999) has strongly criticised this measure because it will benefit “non-traditional families” rather than “traditional” families based on marriage. A specific legislative project34 on lone parents has also been submitted to Parliament by the “Bloco de Esquerda” (a left wing coalition of two small parties). Among other measures, it proposes more financial support for lone parents (namely by increasing the main child benefit), changes tax deductions, gives priority to lone parents in access to social housing and suggests increasing the parental leave to care for sick children.

Finally, in the field of bottom-up initiatives, interest groups advocating for lone parent families have only surfaced very recently and have not yet had time to emerge as strong interest group organisations. Nevertheless, in a context where the family has not yet emerged as a main focus for interest group advocacy, it is important to underline the emergence of new organisations which focus on lone parents. Celib (the Portuguese

Association for Support to Lone Parents) was created in the mid-nineties around the interests of lone parents but it has not been very active. Parents forever began its activities as a social NGO in 1998 and advocates the interests of separated/divorced parents whose legal rights to caring for or being with the child are being curtailed (especially the rights of absent fathers). It is setting up legal and counselling services for lone parents in these situations. Thus both organisations are still in an initial stage of activity, both at the level of service provision and at the level of creating more public awareness with regard to the situation of lone parenthood.

In Italy as well, there was almost no debate on the conditions of lone parents, compared to the discussions in other European countries. Neither was there much discussion in the various political bodies of their place in the welfare system. The reason for the absence of a debate is that the Italian system of social welfare is simply immature and therefore fails to “see” the conditions of lone parent families — especially the ones headed by women — as conditions of accumulated disadvantages that cry out for a broad range of remedial measures. If anything, it is true that in Italy, given the present state of social welfare, until the recently approved social welfare outline law (L. 8-11-2000, n. 328) comes into effect, no one can live “on welfare”. Up to now, social welfare in Italy remains in the hands of local authorities, not only for its implementation, but with enormous autonomy regarding amounts to be spent, continuity of the payments, and locally acknowledged entitlements that can hardly be conceived of as leading to dependency.

However, stopping at this level of explanation would continue to put in parentheses the fact that in Italy too — like everywhere else, as recent studies have emphasised (Hobson 1994, Lewis 1997, Trifiletti 1999) — the conditions of lone mothers are an important indication of the general spirit of the welfare system, a litmus paper of its treatment of women. Except that, in our case, this is so because it helps to explain the structural reasons for an absence and for an invisibility (Bimbi 2000).

The context in France has also its own specificity. Contrary to what happened in the mid-eighties, lone parents are not now generally considered as a main social problem and no specific reform has been scheduled in the past decade. They do, however, represent one of the most fragile groups in the population and formed an important percentage of the poor households at the end of the century. In 1986, a proposal was formulated by the right-wing government to abolish the lone parent allowance (Allocation de Parent Isolé), which is one of the main elements of family policy towards lone parents. Even at that time, the proposal was not enacted. API is not anymore a main policy reform issue, except in the prospect of harmonisation of the French minimum incomes35. Three recent official reports have suggested harmonising API and RMI (Fragonard, 1993; Join-Lambert, 1998; Belorgey, 2000).

Nevertheless, such a harmonisation will have some symbolic and practical effects. First, API gives access to almost 60 per cent of the minimum salary (SMIC), compared to 46 per cent of SMIC for the RMI and for a lone person. The proposition is therefore to increase RMI up to the level of API. However, the difference is not just monetary, it is also symbolic. API is conceived as a replacement income or as a 'maternal salary ', without any obligation to enter or immediately to return to the labour market. It is mainly received by younger lone mothers (61 per cent of recipients are under 30 years

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The cost of API at the national level has been relatively stable from 1988 on: between 4.6 and 4.9 billion francs (Thélot and Villac, 1998).

old) and the main objective of the benefit is to give the recipient the opportunity to take care of her/his child. By contrast, RMI is a general minimum income benefit, available to all who are over 25 and without other adequate means. So, to go from API to RMI is very negatively perceived, like a failure. Nevertheless, about 45 per cent of the ex- beneficiaries of API are receiving RMI. This type of trajectory is very frequent, mostly for those who received API up to the end of the legal period of entitlement 36 (about six out of ten of all terminations). Where the end of API happened before the legal period ended, it was due to the resumption of a couple way of life in almost 25 per cent of the cases. These trajectories of re-partnering mainly involve young people with few children. The suspension of API was due to an increase of the incomes in only 11 per cent of the cases of termination before the end of the legal period of receipt.

When we consider the beneficiaries of RMI, the end of the benefit is only in half of the cases due to resumption of work. The other cases are mainly due to a modification in the family situation. Those who return to the labour market find usually a part-time job with less than 30 hours a week. To avoid the negative work incentives of minimum incomes, it has been possible since 1988 to receive API or RMI together with an earned income (known as the 'mécanisme d’intéressement'). This provides an incentive to return to the labour market without an immediate cancellation of the benefit. The whole earned income can be drawn concurrently with the benefit during the first three months. Then, for the following nine months, 50 per cent of the earned income is taken into consideration in the assessment of the benefit37.

However, there remain other disincentives to work for RMI recipients. Up to 2000, when a lone parent received the RMI, she/he could also claim for the 'Allocation

logement' at the maximum rate. If she/he got a job, she/he would lose a part of this

means-tested benefit. The ‘Allocation logement’ has recently been revised to decrease this disincentive. Until 2003, all incomes below RMI will be identically regarded. Another disadvantage will still be the reactivation of debts, which are suspended during the RMI. In summary, the incentive for lone parents receiving RMI to get a job is weak, even if many beneficiaries prefer to have one.

The current reform proposals concern all the French minimum incomes, particularly API and RMI. The objective is to maintain a minimum income and to sustain all the initiatives of the beneficiaries to go back to the labour market. Like the two previous reports, the recent Belorgey (2000) report suggest merging the API and RMI, with an increased rate for people taking care of a child. It also suggests revising the scale of the RMI benefit to give a better bonus for children in the household and to extend the period of the 'intéressement ', without taking into account the 'allocation logement '. It is proposed that it would be possible to receive RMI and an earned income over six months, without loss of benefit (instead of three months as now).

These projects are still on the agenda. In addition, France has just adopted a new fiscal mechanism called 'prime pour l'emploi' (bonus for work). It is actually a tax credit to working people whose earnings are less than 1.4 of the minimum wage but who have

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For twelve months or until the third birthday of the youngest child. 37

This mechanism works only when the earned income is under 670 € (4,400 FF) (which is less than the full-time SMIC). Thus, it concerns only poorly paid or part-time jobs. In 1999, 132,000 people who were receiving the RMI (12 per cent of the beneficiaries) were using the mechanism of 'intéressement '. It was the case for 13 per cent of the lone parent families receiving RMI. In August 1998, almost 30 per cent of the 220,000 lone parent families on RMI were also receiving an earned income. This amounts

had a minimum period of employment activity during the year. The tax credit is given to individuals but takes into account the family's resources. Beneficiaries with children get a bonus, the first child of lone parent families counting twice, which is quite consistent with the fiscal law that counts children of lone parent families as a higher financial burden than other children.

Except the issue of minimum income beneficiaries and working poor, lone parenthood is not a significant policy issue in France at the moment. For example, the recent report of the 'Observatoire national de la pauvreté et de l’exclusion sociale ' (2000) does not give much attention to lone parent families. And it is also noticeable that very little research has been devoted in the past decade to lone parenthood, compared to its precedents. The problem of the lonely and homeless men is giving more cause for concern. Nevertheless, one could notice the comeback of the 'old evil spirit ', with a growing interest in the issue of parental responsibility or, as it is more often expressed, parental irresponsibility. Lone parent families are in the middle of this recurrent rhetoric that underlines their incompetence, their lack of authority and the behavioural problems of children of divorced parents, etc. It could be suggested that France is in a transition period on these issues

II. Contribution of SOCCARE Work Package 2 to the understanding of