Normativa relacionada al Desempeño Logístico

6.1 The South African Context 6.1.1 Income Inequality and Poverty

South Africa has a medium HDI of 0.702 and is ranked at number 94 in the UNDP’s (2001) listing of 162 countries. Apart from having a mediocre human development rating, South Africa is also one of the most unequal societies in the world (Table 6.1).

In South Africa society is stratified along four major lines of inequality, i.e. class, gender, race and ‘spatially’. Although inter-racial inequality is declining, South Africa still has the first or second highest rate of income inequality in the world, and this is rising (Stats SA, 2000).⁶³ This narrowing of inter-racial inequality is mainly the result of the creation of a new African entrepreneurial and managerial class and the absorption of African people into paid employment by the state (Nattrass &

Seekings, 2000). An emerging African bourgeoisie is now benefiting from white corporate unbundling and the privatisation and commercialisation of state assets (Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert & Moodley, 1997).

A Human Poverty Index (HPI) of 20.2 means that poverty affects at least 20.2% of the population. As a result of the AIDS pandemic, life expectancy at birth is only 47.8 years. Apartheid policies, by engendering a situation of inequitable access to employment, service delivery, infrastructure and resources to the majority black population, have resulted in poverty being characterised by a strong racial dimension.

Further, poverty is geographically concentrated, with the largest share of the poor (72%) residing in rural areas, especially the former ‘homelands’. There is a marked tendency for poverty to be more prevalent among female-headed households and among children (Klasen, 1997; Aliber, 2003; May & Carter, 2001). In the context of high formal unemployment (generally estimated at between 30-40%) and jobless

63 Brazil’s may be higher.

growth, the situation of these households is desperate (Altman, 2003).⁶⁴ Further, Altman (2003) estimates that between 1994 and 2001 the number of underemployed citizens increased from 14% to 21%.

Table 6.1: General social data profile for South Africa (2000 figures) Total population (millions) 42.8

Urban population (% of total population) 55.0 Population growth (annual %) 1.6

GDP (US$ billion) 125.9

GDP growth (annual %) 3.1 Human Development Index (HDI) 0.702 Human Poverty Index (HPI)* 20.2 Share of consumption Life expectancy at birth (years) 47.8 Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and over) 85.3

*The HPI is an attempt to capture a broader measure of poverty, by going beyond just money or income. The HPI was computed on the basis of deprivation in longevity, living standards and knowledge.

**The Gini index measures inequality over the entire distribution of income or consumption.

A value of 0 represents perfect equality and a value of 100 perfect inequality.

Source: World Bank (2001) Development Indicators Database; UNDP (2001)

Based on a per adult equivalent poverty line of R352 per month, in 1995 61% of Africans were poor, 38% of ‘coloureds’, 5% of Indians and 1% of whites (May, Woolard & Klasen, 2000). There is also a strong geographical dimension to the incidence of poverty. Based on the same data set, 72% of those below the poverty line reside in rural areas and 71% of all rural people are poor. Aliber (2003:479-482) identifies a number of groups who are likely to be classified as ‘chronically’ poor⁶⁵, viz.: the rural poor, female-headed households, people with disabilities, the elderly, retrenched farm workers, cross-border migrants, the ‘street homeless’, and AIDS orphans and households with AIDS sufferers. According to Aliber (2003:482), “at least 18-24% of all households nationwide are presently living in chronic poverty or

64 The unemployment data cited by Altman (2003) emerge when the narrow or strict definition of unemployment is used, namely where people are considered unemployed only if they are actively looking for work.

65 Aliber (2003:473) argues that the ‘chronically poor’ are intuitively those who are most likely to remain in poverty in the absence of outside assistance.

are highly susceptible to chronic poverty”. From this brief discussion of income inequality and poverty, it should be clear that after 10 years of democracy, social cohesion remains extremely fragile.

There is evidence that countries with significant inequality experience lower growth rates than others because lack of access to physical, financial and human assets constrains poor people from participating effectively and efficiently in the economy (May, 1998). In an influential study Whiteford and Van Seventer (1999) explored in detail the income disparities within South Africa. The researchers found that the rich continue to become richer, while the poorest members of the community, found mainly in the black community, become even poorer. The income of the poorest 40%

of black households was 20% lower in 1996 than in 1991. Whiteford and Van Seventer (1999) show that the only blacks to benefit significantly from the transition to democracy in South Africa are the elite top 10%. The economic condition of most of the remaining black community worsened during the same period.

In 1994 the ANC-led government inherited an economy marked by deep economic inequality, high levels of poverty and low living standards characteristic of much poorer economies. Assuming power in 1994, the ANC initially adopted a leftist, basic needs-oriented Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994) as the popular foundation of its economic policy. The RDP White Paper, however, differed from the RDP Base Document in placing greater emphasis on “financial and monetary discipline”, the “establishment of an economic environment conducive to economic growth” and “trade and industry policies designed to foster a greater outward orientation” (Government of the RSA, 1994:21). Hence, within a short period of time the ANC shifted from its long commitment to structural transformation through democratic developmental means towards structural adjustment using neo-liberal economic means.⁶⁶ That said, the tripartite alliance partners (i.e. COSATU and the SACP) are attempting to constrain the rightward drift of the ANC and to keep it accountable to its left wing allies.

66 In neo-liberalism the main restriction on an inherent tendency for free capitalist economies to grow is market failure resulting from perverse governmental policies (Wade & Veneroso, 1998).

Within two years of assuming power the ANC had switched to a neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (DoF, 1996) macroeconomic policy stressing privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalisation. The ANC’s alignment with the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ (Habib & Padayachee, 2000), or what Wade and Veneroso (1998) call the ‘Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex’, has drastically reoriented its policy from growth through redistribution to redistribution through growth. Questions have been raised about whether an orthodox neo-liberal policy is appropriate or legitimate, given South Africa’s long history of inequality, poverty and dispossession (Padayachee, Smith & Valodia, 2000; Gibson, 2001;

Carmody, 2002). The problem in South Africa, as elsewhere in the Third World, is the lack of a viable development programme that achieves economic growth through redistributing incomes and satisfying basic needs. Therefore in the years since the 1994 elections South Africa has, with some minor exceptions (labour policy, for example), followed a fairly orthodox, neo-liberal economic programme (Habib &

Padayachee, 2000). This despite the fact that President Mbeki once argued that:

“globalisation, deregulation and the information society…all originate from the developed countries of the North [and as such] reflect the imperatives of the economies and levels of development of these countries and therefore…serve the purposes of our rich global neighbours” (cited in Van Audenhove, 1999:5).

It would appear that the South African government is attempting a compromise between globalisation and social democracy (Koeble, 1998; Padayachee, Smith &

Valodia, 2000). However, this is being undermined as the state is increasingly characterised by embedded or institutionalised dependence on global forces. As the state globalises, the success of government’s development strategy depends on private sector actions and investment (Carmody, 2002). Habib and Padayachee argue that:

“the ANC’s implementation of neoliberal economic policies has meant disaster for the vast majority of South Africa’s poor. Increasing unemployment and economic inequalities associated with the neoliberal economic policies have also pushed even more of South Africa’s population into the poverty trap” (Habib & Padayachee, 2000:259).

Government’s GEAR macroeconomic strategy has thus far failed to create the 833,000 formal sector jobs that it claimed it would between 2000-2005, thus putting more pressure on government to address poverty directly. In a context of sluggish growth, net job losses and escalating poverty, state expenditure programmes have so

far failed to provide an adequate social security net for South Africa’s poorest and most vulnerable groups, especially the unemployed, women, children and the elderly (May, 2000).

The central thesis of Daniel, Habib and Southall’s book entitled State of the Nation:

South Africa 2003-2004 (2003) is that South African society is still characterised by a

‘two-nations’ dichotomy, although the apex of the class structure (i.e. the first nation) is undergoing a limited degree of deracialisation. The second nation continues to be poor, marginalised and overwhelmingly black. The control of the post-apartheid state by narrow class interests imposes limitations on the transformation potential of the state. This state of affairs will persist as long as the ANC government remains committed to its existing set of economic policy prescriptions.

Sampie Terreblanche in his insightful book A History of Inequality in South Africa:

1652-2002 (2003), argues that post-apartheid South African society is as unequal, if not more so, than before 1994. His trenchant critique converges with the central thesis propounded by Daniel, Habib and Southall (2003), namely that present-day South African society is increasingly multiracial and rich at the upper echelons and is still overwhelmingly black and poor, disempowered and marginalised at the bottom.

Terreblanche (2003) refers to the current system as ‘neo-liberal democratic capitalism’. He calls for a policy shift towards social democracy in which the state should play a more active role in alleviating poverty, redistributing wealth and attending to social welfare.

6.1.2 South African ICT Policy Landscape

A notable feature of the South African ICT policy landscape is the sheer number of major projects and in particular the fact that they are all at relatively early stages of development (see Chapter 5). One reason for this is that South Africa is responding rapidly, like many other developing countries, to the recent unprecedented focus on the role of ICTs as a vehicle for gaining a competitive advantage in the global economy and for social upliftment and poverty alleviation. Another reason is the focus on ICTs as an enabling technology in the country’s macroeconomic strategy and development trajectory, and the subsequent visible support at the highest levels of government (see Appendix 2).