For most of the first four decades of the nineteenth century, Britain refused to extend its formal rule to New Zealand. Indeed, the fear of such a commitment was clearly voiced at the time. Even the appointment of a British Resident to New Zealand in 1 833 indicated nothing more than a vague desire to facilitate better relations between settlers and Maori. The decision to appoint a Resident, in New Zealand's case, reflected only the faintest sense of obligation by the Colonial Office to those British subjects that had settled in the colony. Whatever development occurred in the colony at this time was incidental to any official British activities. Maori development - in areas such as the Bay of Islands, where the major European populations were based - was beginning to experience the preconditions for economic take-off. I However, as has been pointed out
in the preceding chapter, this was still an immanent process . of development. There were certainly no British state actions which served to ' . . . actively contain . . . ' disorder or prescribe a path of development.2
The Path to Intervention, 1769 - 1 839
Attitudes among British officials towards official British involvement in New Zealand were at best ambivalent in the early years of the nineteenth century. One writer saw New Zealand's movement towards inclusion in the British Empire as little more than a nuisance: 'The birth of New Zealand as a British Colony was strange and troublesome. Mrs. Mother Country, as represented by the Colonial Office, did not seem glad that a colony was born into the world' .3 Sir lames Stephen, the most senior British Colonial Office official in the late 1 830s, conceded that it was an
2
W. W. Rostow, 'The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth', pp. 25-7.
M. P. Cowen and R. W. Shenton, Doctrines a/Development, p. 6 1 .
unfortunate chain of events that lead to New Zealand's annexation, but that the encroachment of Europeans into New Zealand could not be reversed, and reluctantly suggested that further intervention was inevitable.4 If such intervention were to occur, it would be guided by the principle of British trusteeship over the colony.
In 1 769, Captain Cook declared New Zealand a British colony by right of discovery, but for decades thereafter, successive British Governments failed to exhibit even the slightest degree of interest in the country.s As late as 1 8 1 7, New Zealand was referred to in the British Parliament as being ' . . . not within His Majesty's Dominions' .6 Yet, despite this lack of official interest, British citizens did begin to drift into the country from around the 1 790s.7 The earliest settlers were usually deserting sailors, ex convicts, traders in flax and wood, sailors, whalers, and increasingly from the early nineteenth century, settlers looking to farm in New Zealand. With a growing permanent British popUlation in the country, possibly numbering around 5 00 by 1 830,8 a need developed for the administration of British citizens in New Zealand. The British Government appointed a Resident in 1 833, and with the slight semblance of stability this brought, even more immigration followed. The Colonial Office was, by the late 1 830s, seeking a more secure form of administering New Zealand than was afforded by the position of Resident.9 The domestic economy of the colony was slowly evolving away from the traditional form it had possessed for centuries, in which subsistence agriculture was carried out by kinship-based tribal groupings as the main form of economic activity. 10
4
9 10
1. Stephen to 1. Backhouse, 1 2 December 1 83 8, in GBPP 1840, Vol. 33, p. 3 . G. S . Graham, p . 1 06.
R. A. Huttenback, The British Imperial Experience, New York, 1 966, p. 50. The first permanent European settlement in New Zealand was in Dusky Sound. It was founded by sealers in 1 792.
W. B. Sutch, The Maori Economy: A Survey to the Time of the Coming of the European, Wellington, 1 964, p. 1 4.
G lenelg to G. Gipps, I December \ 83 8, in GBPP 1840, Vol. 33, p. 1 9.
The selection of lames Busby as New Zealand's first Resident had been made by the Colonial Office in 1 832. Busby was a young colonial administrator in the Government of New South Wales in Sydney at the time of his appointment and arrived to take up his role in New Zealand in 1 833. However, his demonstrable lack of power and authority over both Europeans and Maori in New Zealand soon became a matter of concern to British officials. 1 1 The eruption of war between rival hapu (sub tribes) in the Bay of Islands in 1 837 prompted Busby to request direct military intervention from the Governor of New South Wales, Sir Richard Bourke. Up until this time, Bourke had politely rejected Busby's calls for support to give him the 'teeth' he needed to effectively undertake his job. However, the conflict between Northland Maori in 1 837 finally prompted Bourke into action.
A Suggestionfor Intentional Development
In 1 837, Bourke dispatched H.M.S. Rattlesnake to New Zealand, under the command of Captain William Hobson, with two purposes in mind. The first was to provide assistance to Busby - preferably in the form of mediation with Maori, although direct military intervention was not ruled out - and the second was to get Hobson to report on the options for an increased formal British presence in New Zealand. 12 For the first task, the conflict eventually ceased without the need for involvement by Hobson or
the Rattlesnake, although the presence of the Rattlesnake was a sign of the
seriousness with which the British administration, in New South Wales at least, was viewing New Zealand. As for Hobson's report, it contained a rationale for intervention with which Bourke was sufficiently satisfied to recommend to the Colonial Office that it be implemented. 13 It is significant that the initial impetus for pursuing a policy of intentional 1 1
1 2
1 3
J. Busby to Colonial Secretary of New South Wales, 16 June 1 837, in GBPP 1840, Vo\. 40, pp. 6- 1 2 ; J. Stephen to J. Backhouse, 1 2 December 1 838, in GBPP 1 840, Vo\. 33, p. 3 .
P . Moon, Hobson: Governor ojNew Zealand, 1840 - 1842, p . 1 9 .
E . Ramsden, Busby oj Wailangi, H. M. 's Resident at New Zealand 1833-1 840,
development in New Zealand came from an official in the region rather than in London. The probable reason for this was that Bourke saw a need for a more active British presence in New Zealand, and was concerned about the disorder into which the Residency seemed to be descending. Without Bourke's plea in favour of Hobson's report, the Colonial Office most likely would not have been aware of the need for a firmer position on New Zealand. However, although Bourke endorsed Hobson's report, it was still the prerogative of the Colonial Office to determine the next course of action on New Zealand.
Hobson's report contained ideas based on the factory system operated by the Hudson Bay and East India Companies. 14 These factories would be established in New Zealand in the form of timber and flax extraction and processing plants, which would initially be set up in the Bay of Islands, Hokianga, and Cloudy Bay, and then in other locations as the number of British settlers arriving in New Zealand to work in these factories increased.1 5
Among the advantages of such a scheme, according to Hobson, were that British immigration could be increased, and the British presence in New Zealand better regulated, without causing resentment among Maori or any other power.16 In addition, all sections of land purchased for the factories would be placed within the influence of British jurisdiction as dependencies of New South Wales. The heads of factories would become Magistrates, and the chief factory would also function as a political agent and consul, through which all communications with the British
Government would take place. 17
1 4
1 5
1 6 I 7
P. Moon, Hobson: Governor of New Zealand, 1840 - 1842, pp. 28-9.
Report from W. Hobson to R. Bourke, 8 August 1 837, GBPP 183 7-8, Vot. 40, pp. 3·5.
Op. cit.
Under Hobson's proposed scheme, all British subjects would be required to register themselves and their landed property at the factories; prisons would be constructed within the factories and legally proclaimed within the colony. Finally, Hobson envisaged that a treaty would be concluded with the New Zealand chiefs for the recognition of the factories and the protection of British subjects and property18 - something that conformed with Bentham's preparedness to apply different standards of utilitarianism to differing communities to suit the parochial interests of one groUp.19 Hobson's scheme relied on different types of land tenure for settlers than those used by Maori.20 It also provided for a different justice system to apply to settlers from the one Maori operated.21 To meet the expenses which the establishment of this system of factories would incur, Hobson suggested that funds could be obtained from a small fee on the registration of the purchase of land from Maori, and from customs duties. The issue of cost was vital. The requirement to have colonies being as economically self-supporting as possible was a theme strongly promulgated by Bentham. Hobson's proposed scheme would effectively limit the extent of British involvement in New Zealand to the point where the involvement would not incur additional costs to Britain.22
The benefits that Hobson believed would flow from the factory system included the, ' . . .introducing amongst the natives a system of civil Government which may hereafter be adopted and enlarged upon',23 the emphasis on Free Trade, the establishment of centralised forms of authority, and the introduction of new types of social structures - imported directly from Britain.24 Such a scheme would shortly lead to the
1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 23 24 Op. cit.
D. Lyons, In the Interest o{the Governed: A Study of Bentham 's Philosophy of Utility and Law, Oxford, 1 973, p. 26.
Report from W. H obson to R. Bourke, 8 August 1 837, GBPP 183 7-8, Vol. 40, pp. 3-5.
Op. cit. Op. cit.
Op. cit. Op. cit.
fragmentation of Maori land holdings,25 and re-orient at least some Maori labour from its traditional to quasi-industrial forms. This was the extent to which Hobson envisaged Maori would be involved in the factory system. Over those parts of the country that Hobson conceived would come under British rule, the 'savage', in Mill's words, would have to submit to the government of the colonial power.26 This type of apparently despotic approach was necessary because it was believed that native populations
any e
without external (European) intervention?? The general thrust of
Hobson's proposals was economic in basis, and displayed an assertive will
to develop the perceived economic potential of the economy, rather than a
broader attempt to develop the society of the colony as well. Certainly, the idea of fragmented 'mini-states', presided over by magistrates, and
based around a single industry, was a scheme which would greatly hinder,
if not make impossible, the execution of a doctrine of intentional
development over the whole colony. If carried out, Hobson's scheme would promote intentional development in the factory settlements, while leaving the Maori communities to continue with their immanent
development. The two strands of development would literally exist side- by-side. This principle of dual paths of development within one colony -
based mainly on ethnic divisions - was to be a recurrent one in Hobson' s
management of the colony after his appointment as Governor in 1 840.
The principle behind Hobson's plans for New Zealand rested with the need to offer the protection of British law to Europeans living in the colony, and to establish small, extraction-based industries, such as timber felling and milling, as a way of improving the colony economically. This plan was not, however, intended to divide up New Zealand into two systems of economic and social organisation. Rather than creating a dual
25
26 27
see B. F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, Chicago, 1 962, p. 1 1 5 .
1. S. Mill, Civilisation, p. 1 1 9. Ibid., p. 1 2 1 .
economy, Hobson believed that the establishment of capitalist enterprises would draw the dwindling Maori population into the new economic structure he was recommending be developed in the colony.28 However, Hobson' s scheme contained no provision for a specific goal of long-term Maori development. Bentham's goal of utilitarian societies ideologically superseded Hobson' s recommendation in as far as Bentham saw countries being unable to progress - economically and socially - unless they were first ' civilised' .29 This was the position of the Colonial Office by mid-
1 839,30 and would require major modifications to Hobson's scheme to accommodate this ideological stance. By a vague process of assimilation into the economic and then social structures of the colonising power, Hobson's proposed scheme would only partially act as the sort of civilising force that was a prerequisite for progress and improvement in 'uncivilised countries' .31
Realising that there were a number of interests that had to be satisfied by his report, Hobson had been careful to lend his support to the Church of England - the Church of the establishment in Britain and at the time at official levels a cautious proponent of an expanded Empire. Hobson carefully broached the issue of the Church of England, and its missionary arm, the CMS, by setting out to diminish the importance or value of the work of other missionary groups operating in New Zealand:32
28 29 30
3 1 32
The Church Missionary Society have purchased and cultivated large tracts of land, and each individual member has property of his own. In fact, they form the nucleus of a large colony, and as they support the general character of parsons and parsons' wives by a full share of fruitfulness, there is little fear of their numbers diminishing. The one hundred and fourth child was born whilst I was at the Bay of Islands, all the issue of eighteen couple. Nothing so much excites the astonishment
Op. cit.
J. Bentham, UCLMC, 1 8 1 8, Box, 1 27, p. 1 89
Normanby to W. Hobson, 1 4, 1 5 August 1 839, in GBPP 1840, Vol. 33, pp. 37-45. J. Bentham, UCLMC, 1 8 1 8, Box, 1 64, p. 39.
of the New Zealanders. Their women seldom bear more than two or three during their whole life.33
Hobson displayed a shrewd sense of judgement and anticipation. The influence of the Church of England in London, and the increased emphasis the Church placed on the protection of natives, had to be taken into account, especially as the Church was about to mount one final challenge to what it saw as the confused pattern of British involvement in New Zealand.34
There were also reasons other than the issue of development which influenced the report. It is probable that Hobson sensed an opportunity for furthering his own career, and accordingly developed a proposal which would help in achieving this ambition by meeting the expectations of officials in London. The suggested factory system was nothing novel. It was a tested method which avoided costly military intervention while also securing British sovereignty. Although popular among some Colonial Office officials, the suggestion of a factory system operating in New Zealand caused alarm in the mind of Dandeson Coates, the outspoken secretary of the CMS. Coates feared that this type of involvement would be ' ... an Infringement upon the national Rights of the Natives', although precisely how this infringement would manifest itself was not specified.35 Coates' objection highlighted a different view as to how the British ought to deal with Maori. Coates seemed to have favoured an approach which emphasised protecting Maori from the ' . . . infringement . . . ' of the adverse effects of 'civilisation' .36 British Government policy, however, was clearly tilting towards the view that indigenous peoples in colonies would
33
34
35
36
Letter from W. Hobson to E. Hobson, 25 August 1 837, in G. H . Scholefield, pp. 65-
6.
P. Moon, Hobson: Governor of New Zealand. 1840 - 1 842, p. 34.
D. Coates, in A. H. McLintock, Crown Colony Government in New Zealand,
Wellington, 1 958, p. 26.
D. Coates, Documents Exhibiting the Views of the Committee of the Church Missionary Society on the New Zealand Question. and Explanatory of the Present State of that Country, London, 1 83 9.