This chapter will survey some o f the broad themes relating to Britain's colonial activity during the first half of the nineteenth century, focussing mainly on Britain's approach to the colonisation of New Zealand in the context of its wider imperial activity. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the numerous and often disparate forces which contributed to the overall character of British colonisation in this period in New Zealand
specifically, and the British Empire generally. The application of
contemporary development philosophies to official British involvement in New Zealand between 1 840 and 1 842 needs to be viewed through the lens of the motives and processes of British imperial activity in the preceding decades. This chapter therefore concentrates primarily on the nature of British colonialism during the early nineteenth century, and where applicable, draws on the concepts and ideas of development that have been reviewed which either influenced or reflected aspects of British colonial expansion. What is clear from this analysis is that, generally speaking, British colonial activity from roughly 1 800 to the 1 850s was
driven less by any single motive than by a whole range of factors. I
One of the discernible features of British colonialism in this period, amid the din of conflicting clusters of different interest groups influencing Britain's colonial policy, was that there was a trend towards intentional development in certain colonies, including New Zealand. This is a theme which recurs throughout this chapter, and is evidence that for British colonial policy-makers there was a definite emerging ideology of development that extended well beyond the subsequent, and more
Graham describes this period as ' The Age of the Evangelicals', see G. S. Graham, p. 1 2 1 , while Egerton cites ideological concerns, such as the welfare of indigenous
peoples, as a major basis for British colonial activity after 1 83 1 in particular, see H. E. Egerton, pp. 281 ff. Marx, on the other hand, argued that the expansion of capitalism was one of the chief causes of the extension of colonialism, see D. McLellan, The Though of Kart Marx, Second Edition, London, 1 980, p. 228.
rudimentary Marxist assessment of the role of colonies, in which colonies were simply an extension of the immanent capitalist exploitation that was already occurring in bourgeois societies in Europe.2
The Absence of a Single Doctrine Supporting British Colonisation
The first step in examining the influence of contemporary ideas about development on the nature of British colonialism in New Zealand is to survey the broader issue of what constituted British colonisation generally in the first half of the nineteenth century. Although there are a myriad of variations of the types of colonisation possible, in most instances colonisation involves the subjugation, either physically andlor psychologically, of a group or culture by a colonising power.3 In the early nineteenth century, the success of British colonialism in many parts of the world was attributable not so much to Britain's military capacities, or its technical prowess, but to its ability to establish hierarchies which either superseded the traditional, indigenous political structures in the colony, or which sometimes used the existing political structures and superimposed layers of British authority on them.4 These new Western hierarchies had the effect of opening up ' . . . the non-West to the modern . . . spirit',5 and of eventually forcing out of power the existing governing structures of the indigenous peoples. When the situation demanded it, the British were capable of attempting to impose an entire regime of order on the indigenous peoples of their colonies, and conscious attempts would be made at making development happen. Inherent in this approach was the 'doctrine of development before settlement',6 in which a specific ideology of development was already formulated and ready to be applied, given the
2
6
D. McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx, p. 228.
P. W . Preston, p. 1 37; A. Escobar, ' Imagining a Post-Development Era', in J. Crush
(ed.), p. 2 1 3 .
J. S. Furnivall, pp. 35-9.
A. Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism,
Delhi, 1 983, p i.
appropriate configuration of circumstances III the colony. The
significance of this doctrine \-vas that it anticipated large-scale. British
settlement in a colony, rather than being a reaction to it. The Preamble to the Treaty of Waitangi perfectly demonstrates this point, referring as it does to the anticipation of ' . . . the rapid extension of Emigration from both Europe and Australia . . . ' into New Zealand.7
H. W. Arndt has suggested that within the British Empire at various times during the nineteenth century, distinct efforts were made at fostering development, citing one official who advised that ' . . . it is more than ever necessary that the economic resources of the Empire should be developed to the utmost' . 8 As an indication of this intent to develop, Arndt looks at Australia, where the absorption of surplus popUlation from Britain was seen by some British officials and in the 1 830s and 1 840s as a prerequisite for the further development of the colony,9 and cites a journal article published in Canada in the 1 840s which argued that the country' s resources ' . . . must be deveioped,. lo This, he suggests, demonstrates the presence of an emerging doctrine of intentional development III anticipation of increases in the European population in those colonies. 1 1
Cowen and Shenton highlight how the emergence of a doctrine of development for Australia required some form of state guidance in order
to be brought to fruition. 12 However, they diverge from Arndt's
suggestion that such a doctrine necessarily preceded large-scale European
immigration into a colony, 13 observing that doctrines of development
emerged in Australia and Canada during periods of high unemployment, 1 4
9 1 0 I I 12 13 14
See Preamble, Treaty of Waitangi, in Appendix Two of this thesis.
Milner, in F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, London,
1 926, p. 489, in H. W. Amdt, 'Economic Development: A Semantic History', in
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 29, No. 3, Chicago, 1 98 1 , p.
460.
H . W. Arndt, p. 46 1 .
Op. cit. Op. cit.
M. P. Cow en and R. W. Shenton, Doctrines of Development, p. 1 74. Op. cit
when the need for further immigration would have been slight. Implicit i n Cowen and Shenton's thesis with respect t o the arrival o f surplus populations of Europeans in the colonies is that the size of the European populations in certain British colonies bore no direct relationship with the materialisation of doctrines of development in those colonies. I S
Another point brought out by Cowen and Shenton, which has a bearing on the Treaty of Waitangi, is the connection between colonial self government and doctrines of colonial development.1 6 In essence, the suggestion is that if a colonial power has the intent to direct the development in one of its colonies, then the political link between the colonial power and its colony would have to be a firm one in order to enable this doctrine of development to be dictated by the colonising
power. 17 This, however, represents a dilemma for a doctrine of
development based on the philosophies of development that influenced Colonial Office policy on New Zealand from the mid- 1 830s. On the one hand, the political link between a colonising power and a colony would have to remain sufficiently strong to enable the former to direct development in the latter. Yet on the other hand, the philosophy of colonial development that had been gaining ground in the Colonial Office during this period favoured the goal of colonial development leading to colonial autarky - not ongoing dependence. 1 8 The British Government failed to address this dilemma when formulating its doctrine of intentional development for New Zealand, and this may account for the particular character of British rule in the colony between 1 840 and 1 842, which will be discussed in Chapter Six.
1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 Op. cit. Ibid., p. 1 84. Ibid., pp. 1 84-5.
1. Bentham, Emancipate Your Colonies!; 1. S. Mill. On Liberty' P 227; 1. S. Mill,
Principles of Political Economy, chap. 2; C. C. Eldridge, pp. 26-8; Normanby to W. Hobson, 14 August 1 839, in GBP? 1840, Vol. 33, p. 4; Russell to W. Hobson, 9 December 1 840, in GB?P 1841, Vol. 1 7, p. 26 .
The Lack of a Unified British Policy o n Colonisation
One of the reasons why Britain did not actively plan for New Zealand's independent political development when creating its doctrine of development for the colony was that British imperialism throughout the nineteenth century was not the product of a single, coherent strategy that unequivocally aimed at intentional development in every colony that became part of the British Empire. In fact, the opposite was often more true:
Colonialism was not a rational or planned condition. It was rather the product of a unique set of circumstances before and during the later nineteenth century that resulted unpredictably in the formal partition of much of the world between the great powers. Few of those .. . had a coherent preconceived idea of what they would do with the territories they had claimed or of
the problems they would create. 1 9
In the Pacific in particular, the absence of a prescribed, overall policy resulted in officials being reactive rather than pro active in their approach to managing this area of the Empire:
British ... officials devised remedies for particular evils and policies in particular situations when decisions had to be taken, but they certainly did not think continuously about Pacific Island problems. These were a tiresome nuisance.2o
Intentional development for the colonies was therefore not always a first option for the British, but was an option that could be utilised if necessary. In Borneo, for example, a British citizen, James Brooke, unilaterally declared himself Rajah of Sarawak in 1 84 1 .21 The state eventually became accepted by the Colonial Office as a British protectorate without there ever having been a British policy to annex the territory?2 There were certainly no prescribed British plans for Sarawak, and the state
1 9
20 2 1 22
D. K. Fieldhouse, Colonialism i870 _ i945: An introduction, London, 1 983 , pp. 4 1 -
2 .
W . P . Morrell, Britain in the Pacific islands, Oxford, 1 960, p . vii. G. S. Graham, p. 1 93 .
continued to be administered by British commercial interests for the next four decades.23
In another example, Penang was acquired by the British for motives of naval strategy,24 similarly with no additional policy for the colony having
been devised. Burma was conquered by the British in 1 826 not because
there was any plan to do this, but simply because of ' . . . the sheer force of circumstances . . . ' that was ' . . . ultimately to bring about complete annexation no matter how unwilling they [the British] were to extend their
territorial commitments' .25 Indeed, rather than any doctrine of
development being evident as a basis for Britain' s colonial activity in the first half of the nineteenth century, much of Britain's colonial intervention, especially in parts of South East Asia, were followed by decades of inactivity.26 Thus, British acquisition did not necessarily mean that specific intentions for a colony had been formulated.
The Transition from Intervention in a Colony to a Doctrine of Development
There are two inherent and related contradictions which lie at the heart of British colonialism in the first half of the nineteenth century, both of which are related to the emergence of a doctrine of development for New Zealand by Britain's colonial administration. The first contradiction is between the specific and frequently limited functions empire was intended or believed to fulfil, and the fact of full administration of colonial territories. The second contradiction or paradox is between the character of colonial governments, and those conditions which alone might make alien rule tolerable to the peoples being subjected to colonialism.27
23 24 25 26 27 Op. cit. D. G. E. Hall, p. 530. Ibid., p. 642.
R. Emerson, Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule, New York, 1 93 7, p. 9 1 .
One of the features of British colonialism throughout this period was that it was often not initially accompanied by a comprehensive system of government and administration. The perceived advantages imperialists obtained from colonies were usually unhindered by the absence of a full governmental regime. It was only when commercial or strategic interests became more pressing that a greater official administrative presence emerged:
Security for trade did not automatically involve full territorial controL .. But once Europeans wanted more than freedom to trade with coastal areas, arguments for some degree of internal
political control were likely to arise .... Capital
investment...required greater political security than was provided by indigenous political systems. White settlers expected a more secure title to land than non-European law and custom provided?8
These sorts of considerations obliged the British to expand their involvement and commitments within their colonies - in many cases to a point that exceeded the requirements to safeguard settlers' and merchants' rights - effectively as a reaction to the changes that were taking place in the region that affected British interests. One of the reasons for this extra extent of involvement was that the act of colonising a country actually brought the British into direct contact with indigenous peoples. The British view of their own colonising prowess, and their perception of the general inferiority of indigenous peoples,29 compel led them to devise an approach to actively shape the characteristics of these people so that they could integrate into an ideal which was being articulated by the social philosophers of the period. In New Zealand, for example, the creation of the Office of Protector of Aborigines aimed in part at eventually assimilating Maori into European society. The Protector of Aborigines,
28 1bid., p. 2 1 .
George Clarke, intended that Maori should one day be subj ect to British laws, and dispense with their traditional community rules.3o
There is a distinct seam of utilitarianism running through the extension of British government of its colonies at this time. If community happiness in the colonies was augmented by such expansion, even if merely through reducing some of the worse excesses of lawlessness in a colony, then this would be the measure of a government being ' . . . comfortable to the
principle of utility' ? I However, this utilitarian ideal was strictly
parochial, in that community happiness was measured in European terms.
More significantly, though, initiatives such as the Protector of Aborigines strongly reflected the element of trusteeship in the colony. Maori were not to be directly ruled as a means of controlling or subj ecting them. Rather, under the trusteeship principle, Maori would be guided by the colonial administrators so that the greatest good (however defined by the British) could be spread among the greatest number of people in the colony - both settlers and indigenous. This guidance was vital. Relying on immanent development was tantamount to an abrogation of the responsibility of the colonising power in its capacity as trustee over the indigenous people in the colony. Moreover, it also had the potential to threaten British interests in a colony. Thus did intentional development acquire strategic as well as benevolent dimensions.
As for the second contradiction of British colonies, it is possible that most of the primary objectives of the British Government could have been satisfied in the colonies without seriously disturbing indigenous political and social institutions, and leaving the native peoples generally
30
3 1
G. Clarke, in P. Adams, Fatal Necessity: British intervention in New Zealand 1 830
-1847, Auckland, 1 977, p. 220.
unaffected. However, notwithstanding a few exceptions,32 this was almost never done: ' ... practically all colonial governments inexorably destroyed or overlaid indigenous social and political forms' .33 From a contemporary development perspective, however, good government required that the government would constantly aim to represent the interests of all those in the society,34 even if a distinct group in the society had never given its consent to be ruled by this government. Thus, the need existed for indigenous peoples to be guided towards a developed state in order that they could be included in the society whose interests, it was hoped, would be represented by ' good' government. The fact that, in New Zealand' s case, Maori were frequently denigrated as ' uncivilised,3 5 and 'barbarians' ,36 served only to provide additional impetus for the colony ' s Government to advance along the path o f ameliorating these ' adverse' characteristics in the Maori portion of the popUlation. The reasons for this initial process of extending colonial rule to cover the indigenous peoples are complex, but some principles and motives can be i dentified which account for the British expansion into full and comprehensive colonial administration.
The first of the reasons for the comparative ease of British expansion in the first half of the nineteenth century - more so than with any other colonial power at the time - was that Britain expected many of its colonies to be self-funding. 37 The costs of running a colonial administration were expected to only be short-term, until the economy of the colony was able to provide for its own government. Taxation was the most obvious solution, and in order to enforce a system of taxation, colonial government
32 33 34 35 36 37
In parts of Africa, the British experimented with 'grafting' British rule onto existing indigenous political systems as a seemingly expedient means of acquiring and maintaining control over the colony.
D. K. Fieldhouse, p. 22.
J. S. Mill, Democracy and Government, pp. 1 79-80.
G. Gipps, in Report of the Select Committee ofthe House of Commons on New
Zealand, 29 July 1 844, in GB?? 1 844, Vo!. 13, p. 5.
Evidence of D. Coates before the House of Commons Select Committee on New Zealand, 14 May 1 838, in W. D. McIntyre and W. J. Gardiner (eds.), p. 5. Russell to W. Hobson, 9 December 1 840 in GB?? 1 841 , Vo!. 1 7, p. 26.
evolved from fulfilling a supervisory function, to one of effective rule.38
The Benthamites,39 among others, succeeded in directing British colonial
policy in the 1 830s to minimise, as far as possible, the costs of administering colonies.4o Because of their general philosophical objection
to colonies, the Benthamites argued that if colonies were to be maintained
at all, then efforts should be made to ensure that they would eventually become self-funding.41
Once settlers and merchants became involved in a colony, they invariably expected that their commercial interests and physical assets would be