This study probes the claim that the Nigerian press may have played a far more significant role in the formation of the Nigerian nation-state.
Quite early in the political history of Nigeria, newspapers became
“outlets for electoral policies and propaganda” (Omu, 1978, p60). As such, the genesis of organised politics in Nigeria is steeped in the history of the press; the earliest national constitution in 1922 (Clifford) was the result of “newspaper press initiative and campaign for elective franchise” (Omu, 1978, p232).
Media scholars and professionals have understandably paid a great deal of attention to the role of newspaper-press in the struggle for independence from Britain; or in the struggle against military rule, for which many paid with their lives (Oso and Pate, 2011; Olukotun, 2005;
Sobowale, 1985; Omu, 1978). While these struggles are very important, the problem remains: scant attention has been paid to what may have been a more fundamental role played by the press in the internal struggle for hegemonic supremacy by some; and the fight by others for inclusion within the Nigerian political space, their needs, and struggle to belong.
As Aimufua (2007) puts it, “one of the inadequacies of the Nigerian press is that it is divisive and promotes the aspirations of their owners, which in most cases are sectional” (p183). In the immediate post-independent Nigeria (1960-1966 in particular), true professionalism vanished from most newsrooms of press organisations. Of the few that remained steadfast, many were further torn between serving their communities (ethnic groups or regions) and serving the larger imagined nation (Jose, 1988; Nyamnjoh, 2005). They were also torn between intersectional conflicts of allegiance: loyalty to professionalism and ethnic politicians who owned and used the press as stepping-stones to national political relevance and prominence.
The problem became compounded as press, rather than provide a level-playing arena that integrates, became partisan, and more a probable agent of disunity. According to Sobowale (2002), the majority
“promoted inter-ethnic hatred as well as inter-ethnic distrust and acrimony that eventually led to the collapse of the first republic”
(p273). And Dare (1985) concurs, noting that through crude and overzealous partisanship, journalists transformed opponents of ruling parties into dissidents. This study, therefore, seeks to investigate, outside the commonly acknowledged but limiting role of the press in agitating for independence, the problem that the press may have contributed in the more fundamental manner to the forging of a dysfunctional post-colonial identity and character that modern Nigerian state currently has.
1.5.0 MOTIVATION
The world of the Nigerian journalist is marked by constant tensions between the textbook ideals of the profession, and the reality of practice in a peculiar socio-political context: this is a driving ontological motivation. As a young practitioner, I imagined that journalism work should make Nigeria a fairer, more united and egalitarian nation, where everyone would feel a sense of belonging.
However, as I matured in practice and as one from a minority ethnic group, I found my ideas and aspirations challenged and incongruent with the reality of everyday Nigerian journalism practice.
As a student and teacher of media history, I have had recurrent moments of pride in reading or hearing about the role that journalists played in the “struggle for independence”. The often repeated and fascinating narratives of the historic roles that newspapers and journalists played to secure independence from an unwilling and unyielding British Empire, have always been told with enthusiasm and measured drama.
We were regaled with stories of how Herbert Macaulay was acerbic and a terror to the colonial officers through the might of the pen; how Anthony Enahoro practically became a jailbird in his crusade against the British colonial rule; how Azikiwe moved political rallies and newspaper readers with spoken and written bombastic English; how Samuel L. Akintola, a great mobiliser wrote and spoke impeccable Churchillian English; and how assertive and self-assured the duo of Obafemi Awolowo and Ahmadu Bello were – the British could not intimidate them (Osuntokun, 2010). This list of leading nationalists duplicates itself as the list of remarkable journalists (except Ahmadu Bello, first Premier of the Northern Region), before they became prominent politicians. I have also been part of the struggle against military rule, during which I lost a very dear friend and professional mentor.
With all the above in mind, I often wondered why such an erudite and astute group of professionals who became the first generation of political leaders produced such an ethnicised and divided nation, where virtually every group feels disaffected. I have also often wondered if the complete story, of the role that the press and journalists played in the formation of Nigeria, had been told.
1.6.0 JUSTIFICATION
Since colonial days, the essential philosophies and ethos of the Nigerian political systems, as managed by the elite, has remained fundamentally unchanged. Some would argue that Nigeria’s political condition might have been worse, but for the press. What is obvious then is that there is discernable tension between layers of interpretations of the roles that the press has played in post-colonial Nigeria. Many argue that the press played a far more significant role, if not in the designing of it, at least in the propagation and maintenance of the political culture on which modern Nigeria is built. A central justification for this study is the need to clarify if political culture of
representation within democratic process may have been deliberately constructed to fit the Nigerian context, making identity and belonging contentious issues in the business of nation-state formation.
This problem is not unique to Nigeria; it is a Pan-African problem.
After over 50 years of independence for most African nations, issues of ethnicity, “citizenship and belonging have failed to disappear in favour of a single political and legal citizenship” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p19).
Rather than disappear, there has been a “resurgence of identity politics and overt tensions over belonging”, as various ethno-cultural groups seek equity, better representation, and greater access to national resources and opportunities (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p19).
There were early signs, in the case of Nigeria, to indicate that the structures and designs of political associations/parties pointed in the direction of where the nation has now eventually found itself. Seeds planted in the 1940s, nurtured in the 1950s bore fruits in the mid-1960s leading to a bloody civil war. The nation has never recovered from the impact of established early patterns, which incidentally seemed to have been nurtured through the press. Today, after over 75 years since the days of nationalist agitations, not much has changed – we have well established but twisted political culture of conflict and protest.
In 2010, Muhamadu Buhari, who served as a Military Head of State about 30 years ago and was democratically elected the nation’s president in 2015, called the story of Nigeria, “a depressing story of a democracy without democrats, and of elections without the electorate having much say in the process” (Buhari, 2010, p3). Thus, Nigeria today presents a good case study as a nation in a paradoxical existence.
Some experts (Ogundiya, 2005; Osaghae, 2015) see signs of looming implosion; they predict a great and gifted nation that may be about to fail – all of which are the result of a long history of ethnic distrust and divisions, regional loyalties, corruption, and inept leadership. Under
the above conditions, finding a justification for the need for the study is not difficult: the study is seeking an explanation for how Nigeria became a democracy without democrats, and what role the press played to get Nigeria into the company of pseudo-democratic nations.
If indeed, as Dare (2000) states, most pre-independence journalists were “firebrand nationalists who wanted to use journalism to change society” and build a nation (p15), what went wrong and at what point did the nation go wrong? And how did nationalist-journalists so quickly transform to so deeply polarised front-line politicians? Why was it that the parties themselves seldom spoke with consensus on major national issues of the day?
As noted earlier, media scholarship in Nigeria has focused on a partial narrative of the role of the early Nigerian press. They have tended to be celebrative about the press’ role in a self-congratulatory manner. While the applause may not be out of place entirely, it is only one of the many possible strands of narratives, as there is an undeniable role played by the press in the struggle for independence. The other strands are still waiting to be investigated.
Often, arguments have been advanced to the effect that the media cannot absolve itself of their contribution to the formation of today’s Nigerian nation (Omu, 1996; Dare, 2000). However, few clear direct studies on the role of the press per se are available that I’m aware of – the likes of Omu (1978), Agbaje (1992), Adebanwi (2002: 2016). While Omu, Agbaje and Adebanwi have done excellent work in these regards along with likes of Aimufua, (2007) and Oso (2014), their generations have been comparatively scanty, with the spaces between them, large and far apart. While other disciplines use the press’ narrative as authentic data sources to annotate, illustrate, or understand certain historic phenomena, there have been limited studies on media themselves and the role they played in the formation of nations like Nigeria.
One established assumption in scores of studies on media effects is that the press has the capacity to shape society (Nyamnjoh, 2005; Herman and Chomsky, 1994; Freedman, 2014); aside from this, alongside its role as the record keeper, it is the society’s mirror – reflecting the society to itself (Obasanjo and Mabogunje, 1991). Even in weak democracies “the media have a complex relationship with sources of power and the political system” (McQuail, 2010, p523). The newspaper-press provides knowledge and education in order for people to use the information at their disposal to participate meaningfully, and have strong influence on public discourse.
Understanding the affiliation between the political power elite and the press, particularly during election periods, should provide deeper comprehension on the press, belonging, and democratisation (Nyamnjoh, 2005). According to Dare (2000), the press “operated primarily to strengthen the grip of (political) leaders over their followers, and thereby the fragmentation of the country” (p15). And Omu (1978) wrote that the newspaper-press provided “a remarkable example of over-zealousness and irresponsible partisanship” (p248).
Could it then be that the press lost power to cause change when it became as polarised and as divided along the same political and ethnic fault lines that divided the politicians and the nation? Could it be that the coalition of convenience between press and political elite in the pursuit of non-integrative ethno-cultural interests produced a detrimental political culture? Could it be that the failure of the press to decouple itself from the political class meant that the press became a
“vehicle for uncritical assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes, ideologies, and orthodoxies… that blunt critical awareness and make participatory democratisation difficult?” (Nyamnjoh, 2005, p2). Providing answers to these questions is central to the main quest of this study.