Observación participante

A novel process was developed to identify respondents. Horticultural land was identified with a GIS mapping tool provided by Land Information New Zealand (LINZ). Google maps satellite images were then used to locate households or processing facilities on the land. Having identified a house or

building and a possible street address using Google, New Zealand Post’s address locater tool was

used to confirm postal addresses. Having established the location of a house or building on horticultural land, and obtaining a postal address, land ownership records for the identified properties were obtained from LINZ so that the surveys could be personalised to the landowners. While this process for identifying potential participants was found to be effective, approximately 23 percent of the addressees were found to be invalid, and those surveys were returned by the postal service.

A total of 464 surveys potentially reached their intended recipients. Ninety-three responses were received which provided a response rate of 20 percent. The sample obtained aligned closely with typical demographics for the horticultural industry as presented in census data from 2012 (Statistics New Zealand, 2012) and a farm survey conducted in 2007 (Fairweather & Mulet‐Marquis, 2009). The

respondents also reflected the Ministry for Primary Industry’s horticultural monitoring programme’s5 _{representations of typical horticultural operations.}

The majority of respondents (88 percent) had some form of environmental certification. Of these respondents, 42 percent considered their environmental certification to be a voluntary undertaking. The initial questions in the survey were related to the costs of on-farm environmental

improvements. Participants were asked to apportion costs between a landowner and the general public. The most common allocation (43.2 percent) was a 50/50 sharing arrangement of costs between the landowner and the general public. Respondents were evenly split between those who indicated that wider society should bear more of the costs for on farm environmental improvements

146 (28.4 percent) and those who indicated that landowners should bear more of the costs for on farm environmental improvements (28.4 percent).

The participants were then asked to select the fairest burden sharing mechanism for allocating

environmental mitigation costs. Three options were presented; ‘Polluter Pays’ – whereby the people

who cause environmental damage pay the most; ‘Ability to Pay’ – whereby the people with the most money pay the most; and ‘Existing Use Rights’ – whereby new growers/producers pay relatively more, while existing growers/producers pay relatively less. The polluter pays mechanism was considered the fairest by 86 percent of respondents, with 14 percent of respondents selecting existing use rights, and no respondent selecting ability to pay.

The first vignette considered fair burden sharing arrangements in the absence of contextual information. The vignette described a fictitious scenario in which the respondent was asked to distribute sustainability targets between two growers. The intention of this vignette was to develop

a baseline understanding of the respondents’ conceptions of fairness. Thirty nine percent of

respondents selected a Rawlsian allocation as being the fairest. The Rawlsian allocation involved an unequal distribution of targets between the two fictitious growers, but resulted in equal outcomes. The next most common selection was a utilitarian allocation at 32 percent. The utilitarian allocation involved an even more unequal allocation of targets between the fictitious growers, and resulted in unequal outcomes. The least preferred allocation was the egalitarian allocation at 29 percent. The egalitarian allocation provided for an equal allocation of targets between the fictitious growers, and resulted in equal outcomes, however, it was also the most inefficient in terms of its impact on

production efficiency. A relationship was found between participants’ choice of a fair cost sharing

arrangement and their perceptions of a fair share of burdens under the first vignette. Participants that preferred the utilitarian allocation were more likely to allocate less that 50 percent of on-farm environmental improvement costs to the landowner. Additionally, participants in higher income brackets were more likely to favour a utilitarian allocation.

The second set of vignettes considered the effect of different types of contextual information about the fictitious growers on perceived fairness. The first contextual vignette considered the effect of information on the higher financial needs of one of the fictitious growers. Fifty five percent of respondents considered the Rawlsian allocation to be the fairest after being presented with contextual information on needs. This represented an increase of 16 percent from the control vignette. Thirty-two percent of respondents considered the egalitarian allocation to be the fairest,

147 and 13 percent of respondents considered the utilitarian allocation to be the most fair, a 19 percent decrease from the control vignette.

The second contextual vignette presented contextual information on exogenous responsibility. One of the fictitious growers was described as facing adverse environmental conditions that made it more difficult for him to meet his water use targets. Under this vignette, the egalitarian allocation received the most support at 43 percent. This represented a 14 percent increase from the control vignette. The Rawlsian and egalitarian allocation received the same level of support at 28.5 percent each. Both of these allocations decreased in popularity from the control vignette.

The third contextual vignette presented contextual information on endogenous responsibility. One of the fictitious growers was described as having put a low level of effort into improving his water use. Under this scenario, the utilitarian allocation was preferred by 63 percent of respondents. This result represents a 31 percent increase over the base vignette. Both the egalitarian and Rawlsian allocations fell in popularity, the Rawlsian allocation falling to only 10 percent support, a 23 percent reduction from the control vignette.