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As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, there is no unified theory of distributive justice that could be considered the theory of distributive justice. Social choice theory provides for an analysis of collective decision-making which attempts to connect the values or opinions of a given group of people to derive a collective verdict. Social choice theory acts as a bridge between philosophical conceptions of distributive justice, and the distributive justice perceptions of a group. Through the aggregation of the preferences of individual members of the group, social choice theory seeks to create social preferences that reflect its general opinion or will (Gaertner, 2009). As the plethora of distributive justice theories demonstrate, perceptions of fairness are not fixed and can take different forms. Real world distribution challenges raise difficult questions, the foremost question being: according to which rules should a distribution be carried out. Each theory of distributive justice relies on a set of axioms which need to be fulfilled for a distribution to be considered just. Social choice theory aids the discovery of preferable axioms within a specific group which can be analysed alongside the theories of justice which support those axioms. (Yaari & Bar-Hillel, 1984) describe a social choice process which seeks to establish a just distribution amongst a group (Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1 Axiomatic approach to distributive justice (Yaari & Bar-Hillel, 1984)

First, a list of properties (axioms) that a distribution mechanism ought to have is drawn up. Theories of distributive justice provide a source of axioms for this purpose. Next, the existence of a

distribution mechanism which satisfies all these axioms is examined. If no such mechanism exists, then a revised list of axioms is drawn. If a mechanism which does satisfy all the axioms exists, then an attempt is made to characterise all the mechanisms which satisfy the axioms. Finally, the issue of tenability is raised. The mechanisms must be examined to determine whether they possess any undesirable properties. If the distribution mechanism is found to have untenable properties, the process begins again until an equilibrium is reached.

The process proposed by Yaari & Bar-Hillel (1984) is a iterative process of self-correction intended to arrive at a fair distributive justice mechanism that satisfies a range of axioms. The act of following a self-correcting process to arrive at an equilibrium in distributive justice was described as seeking a

39 reflective equilibrium by Rawls (1971, pp. 48-51). Both Rawls (1971) and Yaari & Bar-Hillel (1984) argue that a theory of justice, like all theories, should be tested against evidence. Yaari & Bar-Hillel (1984, p. 3) argue that a theory of justice must be tested against “observed ethical judgements or moral intuitions”. The tenability of a distribution mechanism therefore relies on its alignment with

observed ethical judgements. Evidence gathered through the observation of individuals under experimental conditions can be used as a basis to explore the tenability of different distribution mechanisms, and through them, the theoretical frameworks that promote them. Schokkaert (1998) argues that for normative economics to have real influence on decisions made in a political system, it has to consider the opinions and preferences of its citizens as these determine the social context. Policy proposals require public support and empirical research can provide information on the acceptance of concepts of justice by different social groups that live in different cultural and geographical environments (Gaertner, 2009).

In situations where there is a conflict or a trade-off between efficiency and equity in a distributional challenge, social choice theory can define ethically attractive solutions with an axiomatic approach. Luce & Raiffa (1957, p. 123) provide a summary of this social choice approach:

...rather than dream up a multitude of arbitration schemes and determine whether or not each withstands the best investigation? of plausibility in a host of special cases, let us invert the procedure. Let us examine our subjective intuition of fairness and formulate this as a set of precise desiderata that any acceptable arbitration scheme must fulfil. Once these desiderata are formalized as axioms, then the problem is reduced to a mathematical investigation of the existence of and characterization of arbitration schemes which satisfy the axioms.

Gaertner & Schokkaert (2012) argue that the purpose of axiomatic social choice is normative, that is, it can determine which schemes are ethically acceptable, and which are unfair. This perspective was also espoused by Luce & Raiffa (1957, p. 123) which stated:

By means of a (small) finite number of axioms, we are able to “examine” the

infinity of possible schemes, to throw away those which are unfair, and to characterize those which are acceptable. The only alternative - to examine in detail each of the infinity of schemes for each of the infinity of possible conflicts it is supposed to arbitrate - is not practical.

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3.2.1

Empirical Social Choice

Empirical insights are necessary to apply theories of justice in the real world (Gaertner & Schokkaert, 2012). Normative theories of distributive justice, such as that put forward by Rawls (1971), aim to be put into practice. However, the implementation of any theory of justice is reliant on the support of the public. The values and preferences of the public will in turn influence their willingness to support a theory of justice. In order to determine the acceptance of distributive justice theories by different social groups through the exploration of social values, empirical research is required (Alesina &

Angeletos, 2005). Roemer (1993, p. 166), in discussing how to distinguish between ‘effort’ and ‘circumstance’ in a distributive justice context, stated:

Because the choice by society of these parameters cannot but be influenced by the physiological, psychological, and social theories of man that it has, the present proposal would implement different degrees of opportunity egalitarianism in different societies.

Roemer (1993) recognises the culture dependency of distributive justice theories and emphasises the need to explore intercultural differences in developing theories of distributive justice. Sen (2011, p. 44) offers a similar sentiment when he writes about the essential nature of public reasoning in creating objectivity in political and ethical beliefs:

… public reasoning is clearly an essential feature of objectivity in political and

ethical beliefs. . . . In seeking resolution by public reasoning, there is clearly a strong case for not leaving out the perspectives and reasonings presented by anyone whose assessments are relevant, either because their interests are involved, or because their ways of thinking about these issues throw light on particular judgements — a light that might be missed in the absence of giving

those perspectives an opportunity to be aired.”

Sen (2011) like Roemer (1993) believes that the opinions held by society are essential for developing a good theory of justice. Empirical social choice typically relies on the use of questionnaires

(Gaertner & Schokkaert, 2012). The implementation of questionnaire studies for the purpose of understanding social choice is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.

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