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Organización del servicio posventa Actividad propuesta 9

In document CAC. Solucionario (página 65-70)

Actividades de enseñanza y aprendizaje Actividades de comprobación

Capítulo 9 Organización del servicio posventa Actividad propuesta 9

Shleifer and Vishny (2003) developed a model of M&As based on the assumption that

managers are rational and the market is less than fully rational. The model explains ‘who

acquires whom, the choice of the medium of payment, the valuation consequences of mergers and merger waves’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003: 295). Their study focuses on the limitations of

the neo-classical theory of M&As, which focuses on industry-specific shocks, and the effect of

the method of payment on M&As, which is not clearly interpreted. In addition, reasons why

cash-financed M&As generate long-term positive earnings while stock-financed M&As

generate long-term negative earnings have not been well explained. So as to explore these

reasons, their study presents a simple valuation model of M&As to explain the short- and long-

term gains of the bidder. The model implies that the bidder can produce a positive synergy in

the short term yet few synergies in the long term. Important implications drawn from this model

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Suppose the target firm is 0 and the bidder firm is 1. Stock volumes for firms 0 and 1 are K and

K1, and price per unit is Q and Q1, and Q1 being greater than Q. The price per unit for the

combined equity is S, q is the long-term price. Bidders would pay a price for the target, denoted

P. If synergies exist, P lies between Q and S (i.e. Q<P<S).

1. The combined market value is S (K+K1)-K1Q1-KQ, which is the value of the new combined

firms minus the value of each individual firms involved in an M&A deal.

2. The target value in the short term is (P-Q) K, suggesting that the offer price is over market

value.

3. The bidder value is made up of two parts, one part is the gains the bidders earned as long as

their pay is less than S, the other is the loss of value dilution of the bidder firm’s capital, from

Q1 to S or (S-P) K+(S-Q1) K.

4. Given that there is no long-term profit for the combined firm when acquisitions are funded

with cash since the gains to the target firm is the loss on the bidder firm, the effect on the value

of the target is K (P-q), whereas the value of the bidder is K (q-P).

5. For stock-financed acquisitions, suppose x is the ratio of deal value over combined firm

value or x = PK/S (K+K1). In the long term, this share is xq (K+K1) = q (P/S) K;

6. The net long-term gains to target shareholders in stock-financed acquisitions are q (P/S) K-

qK = qK (P/S-1), where qK is the stand-alone value of target in the long term, whereas for the

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Shleifer and Vishny’s misvaluation model (2003) indicates that bidders are those with a

considerable valuation whereas targets are those with a low valuation. Further, the long-term

effect of cash-financed acquisitions suggests that the target is undervalued whereas the net

long-term effect of a stock deal generates a short-term loss and long-term gains, explaining

why an overvalued bidder tends to use stocks as ‘cheap currency’ to pay for targets. Moreover,

there is a reverse effect between the bidder firm and the target firm, i.e. what the bidder loses

is the target gains. Finally, the model reveals that both the target and the bidder firms could

gain in the short term if there is synergy from the mergers.

Shleifer and Vishny (2003) also reason that M&As are a trade-off game between the bidder

and the target, since they involve a high valuation bidder and a low valuation target based on

the rationale that a low valuation firm may find it hard to create synergy through the acquisition

of a high valuation firm. Their study suggests that a bidder buys a target to create long-term

value whereas the target focuses on short-term gains; hence, targets voluntarily accept

overvalued stocks for a cash-out purpose. All of these imply that bidder managers attempt to

maximise the interest of shareholders through exploring the market’s mispricing in an

inefficient market (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003: 296).

Therefore, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) assume that bidder managers are rational whereas target

managers are irrational as since they accept overvalued stocks. However, this view has been

challenged by Rhodes-Kropf and Vismanthan. (2004) who contend that rational managers

accept overvalued stocks by mistake. According to this study, target managers are misled when

the market valuation is high, and accept overvalued stocks as they overestimate synergies.

Further, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) identified three types of specific valuation errors that drive

Chapter 2. Literature Review: M&A Motives

35

firm-specific deviations from short-run industry pricing (firm-level misvaluation), sector-

factor, short-run deviations from a firm’s long-run mispricing (sector-level misvaluation), and

long-run pricing to book (long-run growth opportunities), the authors found that high MTBV

firms buy low MTBV firms, which is attributed to firm- and sector-level valuation errors. Firms

of low long-run growth opportunities tend to buy firms with high long-run growth opportunities.

Their study suggests a positive correlation between stock-financed acquisitions and market-

wide valuation.

In this connection, Dong et al. (2006) affirm that the misvaluation hypothesis is in favour of

high valuation periods. Analysing a sample of U.S. M&As from 1978 to 2000, the authors

claim that evidence for the misvaluation hypothesis is more relevant for M&As after 1990 than

before, whereas the evidence for the Q hypothesis is more relevant before 1990 than after.

Their findings suggest that the misvaluation hypothesis reconciles the case that the market-

wide valuation is high whereas the Q hypothesis is employed to explain how well-run bidders

explore synergies from poorly-performed targets. In addition, the authors find that more

overvalued bidders prefer to pay for targets with stocks rather than cash, choose mergers rather

than tender offers, and pay higher offer premiums. Their results are consistent with those

predicted by Shleifer and Vishny (2003).

Dong et al. (2006) investigated the effectiveness of the Q hypothesis and the misvaluation

hypothesis in different sample periods but fail to address the concern as to whether bidders

paying with overvalued stocks are being rational. According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003),

bidders who use overvalued stocks as a means of payment for M&As receive negative market

reaction in the short run, leading shareholders to believe that the firm does not generate

Chapter 2. Literature Review: M&A Motives

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value for the firm, since holding stocks in an overvalued market incur risks for the firm (Jensen,

2005). In this respect, Ang and Cheng (2006) assessed the long-term performance of the bidder

who pays for acquisitions with stocks. Studying a sample of completed stock-financed

acquisitions, the authors find that bidders undertaking M&As with overvalued stocks perform

better than those engaging in M&As but not using overvalued stocks. Their study indicates that

not all M&As are driven by misvaluation, since their data show a small fraction of the stock-

financed acquisitions involve an undervalued bidder, which contrasts with Savour and Lu’s

view (2009) in their assumption that all stock-financed acquisitions are misvaluation-driven.

The misvaluation hypothesis has been challenged by many studies. Firstly, in line with Ang

and Cheng (2006), Fu et al. (2013) suggest that ‘The existence of relative overvaluation

between the bidder and the target is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the acquisition to benefit acquirer shareholders’, as their M&A sample shows that two-thirds of

stock-financed acquisitions are motivated by a bidder firm’s overvaluation. They suggest that

bidder shareholders only benefit from overvalued stocks if low premiums are paid to the target

shareholders. Using a sample of 1,319 stock-financed acquisitions between 1985 and 2006, the

authors found that overvalued bidders do not outperform those firms in the control sample,

reflected in significantly worse operating performance and worse stock returns five years

following the M&As. By including corporate governance related proxies, their study reveals

severe agency problems in an overvalued firm, indicating that acquisitions driven by

misevaluation destroy a firm’s value when the firm experiences agency problems.

Further, Eckbo et al. (2016) suggest that ‘overvaluation reduces the all-stock payment

propensity’, which contradicts the idea of the misvaluation hypothesis. Using aggregate mutual

Chapter 2. Literature Review: M&A Motives

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caused by mutual fund flows pushes up the market valuation but it does not increase the volume

of stock-financed acquisitions. Their study challenges the view that managers use overvalued

stocks to time the market. The authors find that bidders who pay with overvalued stocks for

financing acquisitions tend to be small firms and non-dividend paying firms with low leverage,

indicating that firms that are financially constrained avoid using cash as a means of payment

for financing M&As.

This section has reviewed three broad types of M&A motives. According to these studies

reviewed, there is no single theory that can fully address the M&A motive, since it varies

significantly in any particular sample at any particular time, which calls for up-to-date evidence.

Jensen and Ruback (1983), by reviewing a quantity of M&A research up to the 1980s,

suggesting that the primary M&A motive is synergies, and the small role the human factors

played on M&As weakened prior to 1990. This is also supported by a number of M&A research

works (Bradley et al., 1983; Bradley et al., 1988; Jensen, 1988; Lang et al., 1989; Servaes,

1991), whilst Jensen (1986) indicates the agency problem of free cash flow where managers of

cash-rich firms invest unwisely, and Roll (1986) suggests hubris-infected managers engage in

value-destroying M&A deals. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that M&As are driven by the

relative valuation of the two firms involved, indicating the role of managers’ timing the market.

Dong et al. (2006), who studied the misvaluation hypothesis and the Q hypothesis in the context

of M&As, noted that synergy-driven acquisitions are more likely to be found prior to 1990

Chapter 2. Literature Review: M&A Process

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In document CAC. Solucionario (página 65-70)