Péptidos y proteínas biológicamente activos

[12] The provisions of Articles 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 of the Civil Code use the term ‘civil action’. Some cases22 _{and articles}23 _{use the term ‘civil action’. However, there are also}

(culpa). .. There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.’ See also, Luzon Brokerage Co Inc vs Maritime Building Co Inc (G.R. No. L-25885 August 18, 1972) Reyes JBL J.

16 _{Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co (G.R. No. 12191, October 14, 1918) Fisher J. For a similar quote see} Timoteo B. Aquino, Torts and Damages (2001), 33-4 citing Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co (G.R. No. L-1719. January 23, 1907) Tracey J.

17

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

18

See also Article 2202 of the New Civil Code which states that: ‘In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.’

19 GR No 165732, 14 Dec 2006 20 GR No 108017, 3 April 1995 21 GR No L-24803, May 26, 1977 22

See eg, Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs Chan (GR 157547, 23 Feb 2011) Bersamin J; Heirs of Jose Marcial

Ochoa vs G&S Transport (G.R. No. 170071, 9 March 2011) Del Castillo J.

23

other cases24 _{which use the term dependent and independent ‘civil liability’. For} instance, in Cancio Jr vs Isip25_{, it was stated that:}

‘An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex

delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent

civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,[26] _{intentional torts under Articles} 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action [Article 33, Civil Code].[27] _Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party “cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission” or under both causes.[28]_’

[13] The terms ‘civil action’ and ‘civil liability’ as used in the rules on dependent and independent civil actions, are used to describe a ‘cause of action’ for recovery of civil liability or damages. The same classifications and distinctions are used. First, there is the distinction between a cause of action for recovery of civil liability that arises from crime (delict) and causes of action for recovery of civil liability that arise from other sources of obligation. Second, there is also a distinction between codal provisions that allow the independent recovery (separate from the criminal case) of civil liability based on a particular cause of action, and those provisions that do not allow independent recovery for a particular cause of action. The third distinction super-imposes on the first two distinctions — a distinction between provisions of law that give rise to a new source of obligation (or cause of action) for the recovery of civil liability (‘substantive aspect’ for brevity), as opposed to provisions of law that do not give rise to a new cause of action but merely provide for a procedural remedy for the independent recovery of an already existing source of obligation (‘procedural aspect’ for brevity).

[14] Examples of provisions of law that give rise to sources of obligation (or causes of action) for the recovery of civil liability are Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (civil liability ex delicto, or a cause of action for recovery of civil liability arising from crime), Article 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict), Article 1170 of the Civil Code (breach of

24

See eg, Cancio Jr vs Isip (G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002) Ynares-Santiago J; Lim vs Kou Co

Ping (GR 175256, 23 Aug 2012) Del Castillo J.

25

(G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002) Ynares-Santiago J. The same quote also appears in Lim vs Kou

Co Ping (GR 175256, 23 Aug 2012) Del Castillo J.

26

Bernaldes, Sr. v. Bohol Land Transportation, Inc., 7 SCRA 276, 279 [1963] 27

Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, pp. 25-26 [1993 ed.]. 28

Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, et al., 171 SCRA 429, 436 [1989], citing Barredo v. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607 [1942]; Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113 [1979]; Padilla v. Court of Appeals, et al., 129 SCRA 558 [1984].

contract), Article 22 of the Civil Code (unjust enrichment). The latter three (quasi- delict, breach of contract, unjust enrichment) are causes of action for recovery of civil liability that arise (not from delict but) from other sources of obligation; Article 31 of the New Civil Code refers to these causes of action as ‘based on an obligation not arising

from the act or omission complained of as a felony’. In Bernaldes vs Bohol Land Transportation Inc29 _{the Supreme Court said that Article 31 ‘evidently refers to a civil action based, not on}

the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but to one based on an obligation arising from other sources, such as law or contract’. Thus, Article 31 of the Civil Code does

not give rise to a new source of obligation (or cause of action) for the payment of civil liability, but provides for a procedural remedy for the independent recovery of damages based on sources of obligation (other than delict). This explains the first type of ‘independent civil liability’ (classification 2(a)) in Cancio Jr vs Isip30_.

[15] Like Article 31 of the Civil Code, the prevailing view is that Article 33 of the Civil Code does not give rise to a new source of obligation for the payment of civil liability, rather it merely provides for a procedural remedy for the independent recovery of damages based on a cause of action ex delicto31 _{in ‘cases of defamation, fraud, and} physical injuries’.32 _{Referring to Article 33 of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court said} in Madeja vs Caro33 _{said ‘The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-}

delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution"’. Thus, under the prevailing view Article 33 of the New Civil

Code is the only recognized instance authorizing an independent recovery of civil liability arising from a cause of action ex delicto. Article 33 explains the second type of ‘independent civil liability’ (classification 2(b)) in Cancio Jr vs Isip34_{. The rest of the} causes of action ex delicto (other than those covered by Article 33) are called ‘dependent civil actions’ (first classification in Cancio Jr vs Isip35_).36 _{There is however the opposite} view of Justice Caguioa where the liability under Article 33 does not arise ex delicto but rather is ‘more of the nature of culpa aquiliana and, therefore, separate and distinct from

29

(G.R. No. L-18193 February 27, 1963) Dizon J 30

(G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002) Ynares-Santiago J. 31

That Article 33 refers to civil liability ex delicto, see eg, Madeja vs Caro (L-51183, December 21, 1983) Abad Santos J; see also Jose C. Vitug, ‘Developments in Civil Law’ (2000) 26 (No 1) IBP L. Journal 1, 20 where ‘‘There are specific instances, however, when the conviction of the offender for a felony would not

be required in order to enable an aggrieved party to sue on the basis of delict. Examples of such cases are those so declared by the Civil Code as defamation, fraud, and physical injuries (Article 33, Civil Code)’

[underscoring supplied]. See further Joaquin vs Aniceto (G.R. No. L-18719 October 31, 1964) Regala J where the discussion on the independent character of the Article 33 civil action was premised on it being sourced from delict.

32

Article 33 New Civil Code. 33

(L-51183, December 21, 1983) Abad Santos J. 34

(G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002) Ynares-Santiago J. 35

(G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002) Ynares-Santiago J. 36

the civil liability arising from the crime’.37 _{Under this view, Article 33 gives rise to a} new source of obligation for the payment of civil liability and logically becomes classified as an ‘independent civil action’ under Article 31 of the Civil Code (classification 2(a)) in Cancio Jr vs Isip38 _{(deleting classification 2(b)). For purposes of} this article, the classification of Article 33 under the prevailing view as based on delict and its classification under 2(b) of Cancio Jr vs Isip39 _{is maintained.}

[16] As to Articles 32 and 3440 _{of the Civil Code, Corpuz vs Paje}41 _{has espoused the view that} the cause of action referred to in these articles is recovery of civil liability ex delicto.42 However, the better view, sustained by succeeding cases, is to consider Articles 32 and 34 as giving rise to new causes of action of intentional torts.43 _{Thus, the intentional} torts created by Articles 32 and 34 are classified as ‘independent civil actions’ under Article 31 of the Civil Code (classification 2(a)) in Cancio Jr vs Isip44_{). That said, Articles} 32 and 34 also reflect certain procedural aspects insofar as they mandate that ‘the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages’45 _{and the ‘civil action … shall be independent of any criminal} proceedings’.46

37 _{Timoteo B. Aquino, Torts and Damages (2001), pp 509-10 citing 1 Caguioa 53 and Barredo vs Garcia}

and Almario (G.R. No. 48006. July 8, 1942) Bocobo J.

38 _{(G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002) Ynares-Santiago J.} 39 _{(G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002) Ynares-Santiago J.}

40 _{Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection} to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

41

(G.R. No. L-26737. July 31, 1969) Capistrano J

42 _{Corpuz vs Paje (G.R. No. L-26737. July 31, 1969) Capistrano J, where — ‘Article 31 of the Civil Code} does not provide for an independent civil action. An independent civil action is an action that is based upon the same criminal act as in the case of Articles 32, 33 and 34. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action being based upon an obligation not arising from the criminal act but from a different source is not an independent civil action within the meaning of Articles 32 33 end 34.’

43

See eg Vinzons-Chato vs Fortune Tobacco (G.R. No. 141309, 19 June 2007) Ynares-Santiago J, where the Supreme Court said in re Art 32 NCC that ‘The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.’ See also the following cases where Articles 32 and 34 are classified as intentional torts: Cancio Jr vs Isip (G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002) Ynares-Santiago J; Safeguard Security

Agency Inc vs Tangco (GR 165732, 14 Dec 2006) Austria-Martinez J; Santos vs Pizardo (G.R. No.

151452. July 29, 2005) Tinga J. 44

(G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002) Ynares-Santiago J. 45

Article 32 Civil Code. 46

[17] Article 20 of the Civil Code states that “Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.” Article 20 has been used to justify the award of civil liability ex delicto. For instance, it has been said that ‘[t]he legal basis for the award of damages in such a situation is then not really Article 100 of the penal code but the general provision of Article 20 of the Civil Code’.47 _{One may not look beyond the Revised Penal Code for provisions} justifying civil liability in case of felonies48_{, since Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code} in defining ‘[w]hat is included in civil liability’49 _{includes ‘[r]eparation of the damage} caused’50_{, which necessarily presumes the damage caused by the felonious act.} However, in cases of special crimes (not punishable by the Revised Penal Code), the award of civil liability ex delicto as sourced from Article 20 of the Civil Code makes sense — thus, in Banal vs Tadeo51_{, the Supreme Court used Article 20 as a justification} for an award of damages in a BP 22 case, when it said that:

‘Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of

Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action

for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265)’

[18] However, it does not mean that if the justification for an award of damages ex delicto is Article 20 of the New Civil Code that the cause of action should be classified under Article 31 of the New Civil Code. Recovery of civil liability is still dependent upon the crime. Furthermore, the long recognition of Article 20 as a justification for an award of damages ex delicto coupled with the long held distinction between civil liability ex

delicto and civil liability arising from other sources of law militates against classifying

civil liability ex delicto under Article 31.

47

Alfredo F. Tadiar, ‘Civil Liablity for Criminal Conduct: Concept and Enforcement’ (1983) 58 (2nd Qtr) Phil. L. Journal 63, 66.

48

Alfredo F. Tadiar, ‘Civil Liablity for Criminal Conduct: Concept and Enforcement’ (1983) 58 (2nd Qtr) Phil. L. Journal 63, 65 where ‘Under Philippine jurisprudence, however, felony is used to denote all crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code irrespective of gravity. It thus includes misdemeanors or light felonies.’

49

Article 110 Revised Penal Code. 50

Article 110 Revised Penal Code. 51

[19] For purposes of this paper, there are three categories of civil actions: a) dependent civil action which corresponds to category 1 in Cancio Jr vs Isip52_{, b) Article 31}53 _covered actions which corresponds to category 2(a) in Cancio Jr vs Isip54_{, and c) Article 33}55 covered actions which corresponds to category 2(b) in Cancio Jr vs Isip.56 _{As to how} truly ‘dependent’ or ‘independent’ these causes of action are from the criminal action is discussed in other parts of this Article in light of the doctrine of res judicata.

III. COMMON ELEMENTS AND STANDARD OF PROOF

[20] There are two levels at which one can look at common elements that duplicate themselves in dependent and independent civil actions. The first is common elements between causes of action for the recovery of civil liability.57 _{The second commonality} occurs between elements of the crime for purposes of imposing criminal liability, on one hand, and elements of causes of action for the recovery of civil liability, on the other. These two levels will be relevant later on, for purposes of res judicata (conclusiveness of judgment), the standard of proof in proving civil liability, and the effects of an acquittal merely based on a reasonable doubt, as opposed to an acquittal where there is a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability may arise does not exist.