El papel del Estado y la regulación del sector financiero

How do these connections between the two moral powers and self-respect explain the priority of liberty qua social basis of self-respect? Liberty qua resource/framework and recognitional/framework basis of self-respect must be kept equal—even though we can perhaps allow inequalities in other goods constitutive of the resource/framework and recognitional/framework bases of self-respect—because a conceptual and a practical pre-requisite for the exercise of the moral powers contributing to self-respect is a choice over the courses of action that one will adopt. The conceptual and practical connections between liberty, the capacity for a conception of the good, and self-respect, will be addressed in the next chapter. Here I want to reflect only on these connections with respect to liberty and the capacity for a sense of justice. The conceptual connection between liberty and the natural duty of mutual respect—qua crucial component of the capacity for a sense of justice—generates an argument for the equality and priority of liberty on the grounds of how liberty constitutes a recognitional/framework bases of self- respect. The practical connection between liberty and the natural duty of mutual respect generates an argument for the equality and priority of liberty on the grounds of how liberty constitutes a resource/framework bases of self-respect.

The conceptual argument starts with the claim that one cannot think of oneself as genuinely accepting the natural duty of mutual respect unless one can conceive of oneself as not having accepted it. If genuine acceptance of this duty is part of what it means to realise the ideal of citizenship, and

realising this ideal supports self-respect, then basic liberties—allowing for rejection or acceptance of this duty—support self-respect. A further conceptual point concerns what it is that one accepts when one accepts the natural duty of mutual respect, over and above the fact of acceptance.

A person who accepts the natural duty of mutual respect believes, not only that she must respect others in virtue of the fact that they are persons, but also that others must respect her in virtue of her personhood. Without this qualification the duty of mutual respect would be merely ‘I must respect others’ rather than ‘We should all respect one another’. Constructing principles that will work best if everyone accepts the natural duty of mutual

respect means that these principles will work best if each person, not only considers others to be worthy of respect, but also considers herself to be worthy of respect. The beliefs involved in acceptance of the duty of mutual respect imply a self-conception fit to support self-respect, or at least not damaging to self-respect; principles which encourage these beliefs will encourage, or at least not undermine, self-respect.

How do these two points support the priority of liberty? If, as I have argued, the state of affairs ideal from the point of view of self-respect is that the assumptions constitutive of ideal theory informing the choice of principles of justice turn out to be accurate, then we can mount the following argument for the priority of liberty. Disallowing restrictions on liberty apart from those that are made for the sake of liberty encourages every person to think of themselves as deserving of the respect of others, and so encourages

a state of affairs in which principles designed to promote the conditions of self-respect can do their job most effectively. Maintaining an equal distribution of a fully adequate scheme of liberties—or allowing inequality of liberty or less-than-full adequacy so long as these restrictions protect existing liberties, or enable movement towards more ideal conditions— does two things. First, it makes possible genuine acceptance of the natural duty of mutual respect, where such acceptance is necessary for a person to realise the ideal of citizenship and receive the self-respect supporting respect of others in virtue of this realisation. Second, in making this acceptance possible it encourages those who aspire to the ideal of which such acceptance is partly constitutive to think, not only of others, but also of themselves, as worthy of respect. The development of such self-conceptions is supportive of self-respect.

To turn now to the more straightforward practical argument, conditions ideal for self-respect depend not only on individuals accepting the duty of mutual respect—and thereby viewing themselves as deserving of respect— but also on individuals acting in accordance with this duty. Acting in accordance with this duty supports self-respect not only by enabling principles to do their self-respect supporting work, but also by prompting the respect of others who recognise action—over and above talk—which meets the ideal of citizenship. Such action will only prompt the respect of others if it is done freely. Putative acts of good citizenship lose their praiseworthy characteristics once we discover they are done out of fear or greed or indoctrination. Enabling people to be good citizens in a way that supports

their self-respect means allowing them to fail without fear of punishment. The best way to secure for people the freedom they need for their citizenly actions to be self-respect supporting is by giving priority to a principle of equal liberty.

In this chapter I have reconstructed Rawlsian arguments for the priority of a principle of equal liberty by making clear the connections between self- respect and the exercise of the two moral powers, especially the capacity for a sense of justice. By requiring that the institutions of the basic structure meet the demands of a principle of equal liberty taking priority over other principles we build opportunities for self-respect into the framework of society. Taking these self-respect related justifications for according priority to a principle ensuring an equal distribution of a fully adequate set of liberties as a point of reference, we can now move on to look at problems which arise with respect to this principle once the way in which membership of a group can support self-respect has been acknowledged.