El papel de la socialización con iguales en la ISE

Aid organisations should maintain security guidelines and security plans specific to each operation, besides offering some training in recognising threats and so reducing risk. Training should be far more comprehensive than the notes in this section. It should be designed to give people the confidence to cope with any eventuality as safely as possible.

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The threat from munitions other than mines and booby-traps should not be underestimated. In some areas, half of all civilian casualties are caused by other explosive remnants of war, whether unexploded ordnance, or ordnance that has been fused and fired but has not exploded, or munitions that have not been used. The latter may not have been fused, but if they are close to fused munitions they can still present a severe threat. In general, 15–20 per cent of all munitions fired do not explode as intended. This means that battle areas are often strewn with UXO. Many are inactive, but others may be sensitive to any movement. Unfortunately, UXO fascinates children and young people. They must be discouraged from collecting them or playing with them.

If there are people living in the area who were present during the conflict, they may be the most reliable source of information about the threats in the area. It is often appropriate to approach their leaders and ask for advice on whom to consult. It is always useful to promote good relations with local people, and this is often achieved by working through the recognised local leaders and hiring local labour to help to identify and mark hazardous areas.

It is always wise to avoid areas that local populations avoid. These may be obviously abandoned and overgrown. While identifying dangerous areas, always follow well-used paths. If the path takes a detour, do not be tempted to take a short cut – even if it is a matter of only a few paces.

Whether or not there are local sources of information, all other sources should be investigated. Threats can be better identified and evaluated if you understand the history of the conflict in the region, the troop movements, and the battles. It may be useful to consider, like a soldier, what natural features might be used to conceal approach during attack: if mines were used in the area, the predictable concealed approaches will almost certainly have been mined.

During conflict, dangerous areas are usually unmarked, although occasionally they are clearly fenced. More often, they are sporadically marked by local people to warn each other of a known danger. Improvised marking systems are rarely durable. Common examples are crossed sticks, piles of stones, and unexpected barriers of brush or twisted grass. The local leaders may indicate any such signs that have been used.

When a transitional settlement must be sited in an area that includes minefields and areas with munitions and UXO, the suspect areas must be well marked. This may be hard to achieve if the materials used for marking have a resale value. When possible, the local and displaced populations should be involved in the marking or in preparing the marking materials, to increase awareness of the dangers. Every member of both populations should be sensitised to the threat and the consequences of handling or stepping on explosive devices.

When there is a risk of continued conflict, glass in buildings should be covered with sticky tape on the inside, or on both sides, to prevent injuries from flying glass caused by explosions. Bags filled with sand or earth are often used outside buildings to deflect blast and prevent fragmentation. They provide some protection to the occupants, and to key machinery or goods, but they should not be considered as offering complete protection. Depending on the risk assessment, underground bomb shelters may be appropriate, if they provide safety from bullets and fragmentation.

Both during and after armed conflict, it is wise to be suspicious of unoccupied and damaged buildings, and abandoned military positions and military hardware. They may contain unexploded munitions, and/or they may have been mined defensively or booby- trapped to prevent others using them.

When attempting to identify likely mined areas, whether in a transitional settlement or along a transit route, it may be useful to understand the reasons why minefields are used. Most anti- personnel mines placed around buildings and on sites and routes were put there to defend something, although it may have been a line of confrontation that has long since disappeared. Typically, defensive minefields are used to defend settlements, military posts, power-lines, dams, roads, bridges, and any item of essential infrastructure. Larger anti-vehicle mines may be laid in long belts to restrict the movement of armoured attackers. These large mines may be surrounded by small anti-personnel mines, to prevent attempts at clearance. When a conflict targets a civilian group, mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) may be used to deny people access to their homes and property, or to essential utilities such as a water source.

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settlements Industrial areas pose a particular risk of hazardous pollution, so care must be taken before siting transitional settlements on an abandoned industrial site, or near an active one. During armed con- flict, storage tanks are often ruptured, toxic substances are aban- doned, and monitoring and clean-up cannot take place. Topography and climate may trap pollution, such as smog, vehicle emissions, generator emissions, or dust. Previous development or disaster- response work might create a toxic hazard.

buildings Some materials, such as some types of asbestos, some paints, and formaldehyde, should be avoided because they are toxic. Asbestos poses the greatest risk to health when it is friable, fragmenting into small pieces due to wear or degradation.