Broadening Portuguese foreign policy beyond the PALOPs could, realistically, be achieved through a process of putting the African vocation more firmly in the multilateral context. While the EU will be a central vehicle through which to do this, partly because of its pre-existing relationship with Africa under the EU–ACP states framework, but also because of the growth of the EU as a global actor, there are other relevant organisations which could be of considerable importance. Europeanisation, therefore, represents a means of broadening Portugal’s African vocation and linking it with multilateral organisations. In addition to Europeanisation, the globalisation process and the growth of other multilateral organisations will also lead to significant developments in the twenty-first century and the possibility of diversifying Portuguese African policy beyond the PALOPs.
Portugal is active in scores of multilateral international organisations and, equally, there are several international institutions which are involved in fostering integration between African states and between Africa and the wider international community. The European Union, the African Union, the CPLP, the United Nations, the African Development Bank, NATO (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2010a), as well as the Union for the Mediterranean, the Arab League, the Southern African Development Community and the Economic Community of West African States are all organisations which Portugal must interact with in order to pursue an effective policy towards Africa, be that in the multilateral context or with reference to strictly bilateral ties.
Therefore, the scene is set for international multilateral institutions to play a significant part in global affairs in the twenty-first century, and for Portuguese foreign policy to be more orientated towards them in order to maximise its own global influence. Prioritising multilateral relations with international organisations over bilateral ties with specific countries, reflects the multilateralisation of Portuguese foreign policy and stems from a myriad of pressures, including globalisation and Europeanisation.
In order to assess whether framing African relations in the multilateral context opens up more possibilities for Portugal, and will see it expand its interests in the continent, it is necessary to examine two areas in particular. The first being the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon and the emergence of the European External Action Service and Portugal’s roles and responsibilities in European delegations outside of the PALOPs. The second important area of interest, and potential new pillar of Portuguese foreign policy, is the Maghreb. While Europeanisation and European integration will open up possibilities for Portugal in African countries that are not Portuguese-speaking, this needs to be put in its proper context. Where Portugal has strategic interests, and underlying Lusophone motivations, these need to be properly taken into account before drawing any firm conclusions as to whether Europeanisation has the power to transform Portugal’s policy towards Africa.
– EU foreign policy in the post-Lisbon context: a mechanism for broadening Portuguese interests in Africa through Europeanisation? –
When Portugal held the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU in previous years it tried to, firstly, advance the general European interest on an issue, and secondly, to advance the national agenda to “colour” the European level with national priorities, as a
former minister admitted (Interview 13, Lisbon, 2010). There has always been a considerable amount of overlap between the two; however, the move towards a more cohesive and co-ordinated common foreign policy could both restrict and enhance Portuguese national interests with regard to Africa. The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the creation of the role of High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and the end of the rotating Presidency on foreign and security issues, present considerable challenges for smaller Member States such as Portugal, states which previously relished the opportunity to influence the common EU agenda through the rotating Presidency.
The emergence of the European External Action Service means that Portugal has been forced to use the EU’s diplomatic missions, rather than the Council Presidency, as a way of acting as interlocutor between the EU and the individual countries of the CPLP. Portugal managed to secure the role of heading the EU’s mission in Brazil, but was unable to secure a similar role in the PALOPs, with Spanish officials heading the EU delegations to Angola and Guinea-Bissau and an Irish official appointed as head of the EU’s mission in Mozambique. The only EU delegation to a country in Africa to be headed by a Portuguese diplomat is Gabon (Radio Renascença, 2010).
With Portuguese officials heading the EU’s missions to the United States and Brazil, it would have been a lot to ask to get Angola and Mozambique as well. However, the preferment of a Portuguese official to head the EU delegation in Gabon has two distinct advantages for Portuguese diplomacy. Firstly, it shows an interest in a country that is not a PALOP and can be used as a platform from which to diversify Portugal’s African policy. Secondly, Gabon is very close to the PALOP São Tomé and Príncipe and the CPLP observer country Equatorial Guinea, and is not far from the Cabinda region of Angola. Therefore, while the Treaty of Lisbon opened up the possibility to diversify Portuguese foreign policy through deepening European integration, and building a more cohesive common European foreign policy (through Europeanisation), Lusophone interests still persist and guide Portuguese foreign policy.
– The Maghreb: a new avenue for Portuguese foreign policy made possible by European integration? –
The Mediterranean and North Africa have been largely absent from Portuguese foreign policy since the Portuguese king, D. Sebastião, was defeated in humiliating fashion at Alcácer-Quibir in 1578. Although, geographically, Portugal does not have a
Mediterranean coastline, ‘Mediterranean’ is a term which is used interchangeably with the Maghreb. Therefore, for Portuguese foreign policy the ‘Mediterranean’ generally refers to the Maghreb, principally Morocco. This is important as Morocco is nearer to mainland Portugal than the Azores and Madeira (Faria, 1996: 213). Additionally, the distance from Lisbon to Rabat is not much further than the distance between Lisbon and Madrid. The Maghreb and the Mediterranean are, therefore, strategically important for Portugal, although ignored for many years because of the predominance of the Atlantic and the colonies in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy can, therefore, bring with it the Mediterraneanisation of Portuguese foreign policy as the Maghreb and the Mediterranean basin are strategically important for the Union as a whole.
Political instability in the Maghreb raises significant security concerns for Portugal because of its close proximity to North Africa, which makes it more of a priority than the Middle East. Portugal, motivated by economic and social interests in the Maghreb, has, therefore, needed to build stronger political ties with the countries in North Africa. The Maghreb is not a major market for Portugal, but Portugal relies on gas and oil imports from North Africa, which underpin economic relations between Lisbon and North Africa (Faria, 1996: 215–216). Portugal relies upon Algeria for 70–80 per cent of its natural gas supplies (Lesser, 2006: 38). These important strategic interests clearly motivated Sócrates’ governments (2005–2011) to pursue a much more active policy of engagement with the Maghreb and have seen it potentially emerge, as Gorjão (2010e) argues, as the “fourth pillar of Portugal’s foreign policy” (Noivo, 2010: 4; Gorjão, 2010e: 7).
The Portuguese Presidencies of the Council of the European Union have championed relations between Europe and Africa with both the first and the second EU–Africa Summits occurring while Portugal held the rotating Presidency. This shows the recognition of the importance of the two regional co-operation organisations and the framing of the relationship in terms of EU–AU.9 Furthering Portugal’s interests with
9 Of all the Maghreb countries, Portugal’s principal focus is on developing relations with its closest
neighbour – Morocco. However, it should be noted that, Morocco left the African Union’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, in 1984 because of other African states’ formal recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara). It was consequently excluded from the African Union upon its creation (Bamford, 2001). This meant that in order for Portugal to construct a meaningful relationship with Morocco it had to engage with the country both bilaterally and through Mediterranean co-operation mechanisms, such as the Barcelona Process, the 5+5 Dialogue and the Union for the Mediterranean.
sub-Saharan Africa meant engaging with countries in North Africa also, and this gave the Maghreb increased significance alongside Portugal’s other, more traditional, foreign policy objectives in Lusophone Africa. For example, the Portuguese government delegation visited Libya in the run-up to the third EU–Africa Summit hosted in Tripoli in November 2010 (Noivo, 2010: 4). Although Portugal’s primary interest is in Lusophone Africa, the EU–Africa Summits have now twice been hosted in North Africa, which reinforces the sense of pan-Africanism created by the AU, and the need for Portugal to frame its African policy with reference to all countries in the continent, from the Maghreb to the Portuguese communities in South Africa.
As Faria (1999) argues, Portugal’s recent attitude towards the Maghreb reflects the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy. While, she argues that it is not at the expense of ‘traditional’ foreign policy priorities, (i.e. Lusophone Africa, Brazil and the Atlantic), it does represent the “enlargement of Portugal’s foreign and security priorities” (Faria, 1999: 121). The concerns over security in the Maghreb are legitimate concerns for a country, such as Portugal, in close proximity to such instability. However, Faria (1999) argues that because of its obligations under the Schengen Agreement, Portugal is more acutely aware of the need to make sure that this external southern border of the European Union is more tightly controlled. Portuguese policy- makers, therefore, have a sense of duty to the whole of the European Union, not just to their own citizens, to ensure that this border is secure. This partially explains Portugal’s interest in the Maghreb in recent years (Faria, 1999: 121).
There are, however, other key motivations which explain Portuguese policy towards the Maghreb, and these reflect the wider multilateralisation and globalisation of national foreign policy. In terms of multilateralisation, the foundations set by the Barcelona Process, of which Portugal was a keen advocate, have now been built upon by the Union for the Mediterranean (Rosa Lã, 2008: 118). Portugal made sure that its EU Council Presidency of 2007 focused on the security aspects of Mediterranean relations and supported efforts to create the Union for the Mediterranean (Santana Carlos, 2007: 11). This development created an international institutional framework for dialogue between Europe and its southern neighbours, one which is institutionally distinct from the EU. Portugal’s long-standing membership of NATO may also explain the country’s interest in the Maghreb as part of the Atlantic Alliance’s efforts to construct the Mediterranean Dialogue (Rosa Lã, 2008: 118).