Some of the respondents indicated that disaster management Agencies from sister West African countries did not directly move into Liberia and Sierra Leone during the crisis. The situation was mainly due to the very high infections and fatality rate of the Ebola virus. Adwoa indicated that no emergency management agency from West African Country directly moves into Sierra Leone to support during the crisis. However, after the epidemic, some emergency management experts moved in to offer their assistance. She stated, "They didn't come at that time, but after the whole crisis, they were coming from Ghana, Nigeria, and all that." Mpiani indicated that sister West African countries supported the response but from afar. He indicated, "Well, they were supporting us. Because it was possible for them to be infected, so they supported us with materials and other equipment." He clarified that "We have the ECOWAS management team that is responsible for epidemics and disasters. We had a consultation with them, and they supported us. They helped us financially and with other materials.”
Takyiwa, however, indicated emphatically that, to the best of her knowledge, she "did not see another disaster management agency from other West African countries coming to Liberia to support the ministry, during the crisis." Yeboah also indicated ardently that no emergency management agencies from any other country came to Liberia to support during the crisis. He stated emphatically, "as far as I remember, no emergency management agencies came into Liberia to support during
the crisis, probably due to the fear of the possibility of being infected by the virus." From Dwomoh’s perspective, no emergency management agency from West Africa moved to Liberia to support it. However, at the initial stages, Liberia sent emergency management experts to Sierra Leone to support the response in that country. He noted, "Actually, no agency from West Africa came into Liberia. There was a point in time we had to dispatch professionals to Sierra Leone to support their response." Nyantakyi was also emphatic that “Ghana did not send emergency management experts to any of the affected countries. I also think no country in West Africa sent emergency management experts to affected countries."
Birago also buttressed the fact that no emergency management agencies were dispatched to Liberia and Sierra Leone to support in response to the crisis. She emphasized, "ECOWAS response was a far cry from which should be expected because it’s like nobody paid attention to the countries that were facing the Ebola crisis. It was all because of the fear of the unknown. Not so much was known about EBOLA, and everybody was afraid as it was killing, so nobody came out to support the affected countries."
According to Dada, ECOWAS was caught unawares by the crisis in 2014. Several of the countries in ECOWAS During the outbreak in 2014 were unprepared for such an epidemic. He indicated, “The whole West Africa sub-region was caught unawares. The infrastructure and education to create awareness were nonexistence. The capacity of stakeholders in emergency response was low; hence, they didn't have the expertise to respond effectively until the international community came in to assist."
Significantly, some of the respondents indicated that although emergency management agencies from sister West African countries did not directly move in to support, the respective countries provided some other forms of support during the crisis. Kwarteng, for instance, indicated that "ECOWAS supported a lot. Of course, they helped in coordinating international support for expertise in terms of nurses from countries abroad, from countries within Africa to lend their expertise to Sierra Leone. Kwarteng further indicated that the Ghana NADMO provided training support
through the KAIPTC. Kwarteng recalled that “prior to the Ebola crisis, NADMO, through the KAIPTC, has been providing a lot of support, training support to Sierra Leone and especially officials from the and other assigned security agencies.” Dwomoh indicated that ECOWAS did not directly send emergency management experts; however, the regional body supported other countries with an early warning during the crisis.
Summary
This chapter covered the essentials of how the study was conducted. The researcher's discussion setting for the research, the demographics, data collection, and data analysis. The researcher further discussed evidence of and the results of the analyzed data. Five themes each emerged from both research questions. The themes, which emerged from RQ1 included coordination, communication, and inclusion of traditional and religious leaders. Other themes were the whole society approach and control of the movement of people and cultural practices. Themes that emerged from RQ2 were autonomy, leadership in coordination, planning border control, and ECOWAS.
RQ1 sought to find answers to the roles that were played by the non-medical emergency management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone in responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis. The researcher discussed five dominant themes, including coordination, communication, the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders, the whole society approach, and control of the movement of people and cultural practices, to answer RQ1. The inquiry revealed that during the crisis, the roles, which were played by the emergency management agencies in the respective countries, included coordination and communication. The individual agencies also used strategies such as the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders, the whole society approach, and control of cultural practices and movement of people to effectively respond to the crisis
RQ2 sought to address the roles that should have been played by the non- medical emergency management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone and similar agencies in West Africa in responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis. The researcher identified four themes in answering this question. These themes included were autonomy, planning, border control, and ECOWAS. For RQ2, the study discovered that the emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone lacked autonomy and operated under government ministries under the names NDRC, and Department of Disaster Management in the ONS, respectively. It was also evident that before the Ebola crisis, there were no plausible Ebola response plans in place not only in Liberia and Sierra Leone but also at the sub-regional level of ECOWAS. Additionally, the research established that emergency management agencies from
ECOWAS member states did not move to Liberia and Sierra Leone to support their counterparts in the response during the crisis.
In Chapter 5, the researcher interprets the findings from the respective themes under the two main research questions based on the professional experience of the respondents. The researcher subsequently discussed the limitations of the study after he makes recommendations for future studies. Afterward, the researcher discusses the implications for social change as well as implications of the findings and
recommendations for policy-making and professional practice. Finally, the researcher summarizes the entire research in the conclusion of the study.