Participación de los integrantes en el Consejo Escolar

Approximately one week before the start of the annual Labour party conference, from mid-September, the following actions by members of the cabinet created speculation that an early autumn election was imminent: Ed Miliband, minister for the cabinet office and a loyal Brownite, began drafting the party manifesto. Other practical aspects of approaching an election too were expressed: “Labour had booked advertising hoardings; inquiries were made about the Queen’s movements to ensure she would be in London if Brown needed to seek dissolution of Parliament, and television slots were reserved” (Cracknell and Schofield, 2007).

The half hidden ‘secrecy’ of political actions added weight to growing speculation within the polity that an early election would be held by the end of 2007. Brown neither denied nor confirmed the developing situation, and avoided any direct questions on the election by the media. In so doing, he failed to clarify claims and end speculation. Upon questioning in a live interview by the BBC’s Andrew Marr

Show on the first day of the Labour party conference (23 September 2007), Brown did to some degree quash election speculation but not completely. When asked by Marr whether his advisers were telling him to call an early election, Brown responded

“No. I’m actually getting on with the job” (Brown, 2007b). Brown’s response can be read as a denial; however, media speculation continued and he did not assertively put an end to speculation. Brown’s political inaction in failing to end speculation demonstrated a long period of indecisiveness once the speculation was ended decisively.

Election speculation dominated the five days of Brown’s first party conference as prime minister (23/09/08-27/09/08). On 30 September 2008, The Sun “a mass-market paper” (Mandelson, 2011, p. 489) had switched its support from Labour to Conservative. The significance of the Murdoch press and political outcomes has been demonstrated in chapter 6. Politically, this was significant for Brown and presented itself as a negative institutional condition to performance hereon in. Post-Labour party conference, Brown’s inability to use language and discourse to political effect e.g. clarifying election speculation, continued as the Conservative party conference began. Approximately two weeks had gone by with neither full confirmation nor complete denial of an election; Brown’s indecisiveness was emphasised (and was, paradoxically, highlighted by decisiveness in announcing the withdrawal of troops in Iraq). Against the domestic political background of Day 2 of the Conservative party conference, on 2 October 2007 Brown flew to Iraq, his first visit to Basra as prime minister. He announced the withdrawal of 1,000 troops. Brown was criticised by former prime minister, John Major, for his surprise visit to Iraq which was seen as a political strategy to overshadow the Tory party conference (see Major, 2007). He was also criticised by Shadow Justice Secretary, Nick Herbert, for not announcing the troop withdrawals to the House of Commons but to the media (see

implied that his politics were not that dissimilar from the politics of spin that had characterised the Blair administration. Brown’s arrival back to Britain gave the opposition party greater scope to launch personal criticisms.

On 5 October 2007, Brown held an election summit at Number 10. This action added weight to election speculation. Brown’s public political silence continued amid a “Tory bounce which now put both parties at 38% and cut the Labour lead by 4%” (see Cracknell and Schofield, 2007). The Tory bounce in opinion polls can be attributed in large part to David Cameron’s performance at the Conservative party conference which was positively received by the media; Cameron’s persona was positively refracted through the media as prime minister-in-waiting (The Telegraph, 2008).

Cameron’s speech emphasised defiance and personalisation of Brown; negative characterisations of Brown and hostility towards him were then reiterated by the media which further undermined Brown’s fragile political persona (see BBC poll tracker). During this period, criticism from David Cameron was fierce, accusing Brown of “great weakness and indecision”; (Cameron, 2007a) and soon helped establish an image of the prime minister as weak and indecisive. Cameron’s attacks highlighted Brown’s lack of action.

On Sunday 7 October, three weeks after signs of an early election, Brown ended his silence and invited the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show to 10 Downing Street. In the interview with Marr he revealed his decision, stating:

“I will not be calling an election, and let me say why. Over the summer months we have had to deal with crises – we have had to deal with foot and mouth, terrorism, floods, financial crises. And yes, we could have had an election based on competence, and I hope people would have understood that we acted competently. But what I want to do is show people the vision that we have for the future of this country in housing and health and education, and I want the chance, in the next phase of my premiership, to develop and show people the policies that are going to make a huge difference and show the change in the country itself” (Brown, 2007c).

The three week election speculation was officially over as Brown politicised his

‘voice’. Brown attributed the crisis events over the summer and forthcoming policies as a justification for his three week silence on the issue. What had begun as a strategy to gain a legitimate personal mandate had turned into a major political miscalculation. Brown’s three week political silence had negative consequences for his character from then on. His inability to discursively express his position on the possibility of an early election demonstrated uncertainty, weariness and indecisiveness; a contrast to the image of the new, strong prime minister that Brown had cultivated prior to this event. Brown’s political inaction relating to the election illustrates three points:

• Political inaction: silence, lack of clarity or the inability to add ‘voice’ to a particular situation/event can have negative political consequences for one’s image, status and authority. Political inaction can therefore be as potent, damaging and irreversible as action.

• The expression of negative traits can define a leader’s premiership thereafter and have a dramatic impact upon status and authority. In the case of Brown, before the election debacle emerged, he had enjoyed steady poll ratings of 39%. An ICM opinion poll conducted immediately after the election fiasco (10 October 2007) placed the Tories at 43% and Labour at 36% (Sparrow, 2007).

• Political errors of judgement can leave leaders vulnerable, and can give opposition parties, rivals and adversaries political momentum. John McDonnell, the Left-wing Labour MP, claimed:

“This has been a complete fiasco from start to finish. It will do us a lot of damage. After weeks of political game-playing by the inexperienced, testosterone-fuelled young men in Brown's team we have presented the Tories with an own goal, making a Labour leader look weak, and re-associating the party with spin”

(McDonnell, 2007).

Errors of judgement can weaken the position of the leader from within the party and can weaken internal support (see Powell, 2010, p. 37, 38 who describes Brown’s public display of indecision and negative impact upon his leadership thereafter and the party). Moreover, during Brown’s first term in office, on 6 November 2007, the day of the Queen’s Speech, David Cameron and acting leader of the Liberal Democrats, Vince Cable, attacked Brown’s persona negatively. David Cameron stated:

“That is what Britain needs: solving long-term problems, not short-term political tricks; a clear vision for the future, instead of a tired and cynical Prime Minister who has forgotten what he is trying to achieve; and consistent, strong leadership, instead of a weak Prime Minister who cannot stick to anything for longer than five minutes.

That is the change that people want, and that is the change that our party will deliver” (Cameron, 2007b)

Vince Cable stated:

“The Queen’s Speech has been long in anticipation. The Prime Minister has been waiting for it for 10 years. He has had a 35-year political career distilling many of the ideas that have come forward today. He postponed the election in order to inject more vision, but the sense of anticlimax is deafening. We have heard little new, no ideas and little vision. Is that really what we were waiting for? I fear that the Prime Minister now cuts a rather sad figure. He was introduced to us a few months ago by his predecessor as the great clunking fist, but the boxing story has gone completely awry. Like a great boxing champion, as he once was, he has somehow made himself unconscious falling over his own bootlaces and is now staggering around the ring, semi-conscious and lost, and hanging on to the ropes. What is certainly absent is any forward movement or new ideas”. (Cable, 2007a)

Both Cameron and Cable continued to critique Brown. Cameron continued characterising Brown as ‘a bottler’ and Cable, on 28 November 2007 at PMQs ridiculed and demeanoured Brown by making reference to him as ‘Mr Bean’ – a hapless satirical comedy figure: “The House has noticed the Prime Minister’s remarkable transformation in the past few weeks from Stalin to Mr. Bean [Laughter]

creating chaos out of order, rather than order out of chaos” (Cable, 2007b).

Throughout Brown’s first term in office, Cameron and Cable’s criticisms involved

major attacks upon the persona. References cited above by Cameron and Cable e.g.

Brown as “a weak Prime Minister”; “the Prime Minister now cuts a rather sad figure”;

and “from Stalin to Mr Bean”, were attacks upon Brown’s political persona. Such criticisms brought to the forefront of British politics the question of political leadership and character traits. Such personal criticisms by rivals and adversaries served as a constant reminder of Brown’s political inaction over election speculation, sought to diminish Brown’s political authority, and provided negative conditions for Brown’s forthcoming political actions.

During Brown’s first year in office, his political popularity decreased (see BBC Poll Tracker), and hostility towards him increased from within the party, from opposition leaders and from the media commentariat. Media hostility towards Brown iterated the

‘pack mentality’ of the media and its ability to act in a concerted fashion (see chapter 5). At this time, David Miliband, then foreign secretary, published an article in The Guardian before the summer recess entitled ‘Against all odds we can still win, on a platform for change’ (Miliband, 2008). The article by Miliband was perceived as a criticism of Brown’s leadership and the beginning of a possible leadership contest, thus further diminishing Brown’s authority and internal support from the party.

In sum, Brown’s inaction relating to the election revised his political persona as a strong and competent prime minister into an indecisive and fearful leader. Against overwhelmingly negative personal attacks upon Brown’s character, his performance in the global financial crisis managed to, albeit temporarily, restore some status and authority.