Sesiones del Consejo Escolar

The Good Friday Agreement, announced on 10 April 1998, was a momentous event in Irish political history. Up to this point, Northern Irish politics had been characterised for nearly thirty years by political factions, Unionist violence and IRA terrorism, and enormous hostility between the Catholic community and the British Army and Government. Blair’s centre-stage role in the Agreement marked the perceived end to

the violent struggles that had dominated Irish politics; moreover, a positive London-Dublin connection was reinstated.

The analysis of Blair’s performance is his announcement of the peace deal on Good Friday (10/04/1998) as in section 6.5.2a; however, it is also worth stressing Blair’s post-election commitment to the peace process, as well as the energy that he expended on the peace process in the final week of negotiations (03/04/1998-10/04/1998) as chronologically indicated, and the effects of these on his political persona. The following points are considered as a series of inter-related conditions which conditioned Blair’s announcement of the peace deal:

• 16 May 1997: Blair’s first engagement as prime minister outside Westminster was a speech delivered in Belfast at the Royal Agricultural Society. The speech detailed the Anglo-Irish question and the importance a resolution had for him personally, “It is a responsibility that weighs not just upon the mind, but the soul” (Blair, 1997c).

• 14 October 1997: Blair held face-to-face talks with the republican leadership, more specifically, with Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Fein at Stormont, East Belfast. In so doing, Blair became “the first British PM for 70 years to meet a Sinn Fein delegation” (BBC, 1997). The political breakthrough was an achievement for Blair. He urged both Protestant Unionists and Catholic Republicans to unite. In a bid to rally support for the peace deal, he stated

“we can continue with the hatred and the despair and the killing, treating people as if they were not parts of humanity, or we can try and settle our disagreements by negotiation, by discussion, by debate” (Lyall, 1997).

• 12 January 1998: multi-party talks resumed at Stormont after the Christmas break. The British and Irish governments issue a document entitled

‘Propositions of Heads of Agreement’ in an attempt to add impetus to the talks (see Blair, 1997c).

• 18 January 1998: a delegation from Sinn Fein travelled to Downing Street for talks on the ‘Propositions of Heads of Agreement’ document (ibid).

• 29 January 1998: Blair announced ‘The Bloody Sunday Enquiry’, an inquiry into the death of civilian protesters in Londonderry, January 1972. This was a key demand of Nationalists in the run-up to the political deal. They wanted a new fully open public inquiry into the events (BBC, 2006a). Blair’s goodwill gesture was seen as a gesture of inclusion rather than the isolation of nationalist groups.

• 4 March 1998: the British Government issued a discussion paper on the future of policing in Northern Ireland in response to the Poyntzpass killings which took place the previous day in County Armagh (see Blair, 1997c).

• 12 March 1998: Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein met Tony Blair at 10 Downing Street after their temporary expulsion (from 20 February to 9 March) from multi-party talks because of alleged IRA involvement.

• 23 March 1998: Sinn Fein rejoined talks, in part owing to the meeting held with Blair on 12 March.

• 29 March 1998: David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist party, travelled to Chequers for private talks with Blair.

The points made above illustrate Blair’s commitment to achieving peace in Northern Ireland. As incoming prime minister, Blair’s first official visit outside London was to Belfast where he gave a speech in which he outlined the effect of the Anglo-Irish question upon him personally: “it is a responsibility that weighs not just upon the mind, but the soul” (Blair, 1997d). The speech was well received and Blair’s commitment was both personal and formal; talks with the Sinn Fein delegation

followed. Blair’s role in the week of negotiations leading up to the Peace Agreement (03/04/1998 – 10/04/1998) is narrated; thereafter, his announcement of the peace deal is analysed as a discursive performance.

The deadline for reaching a peace deal was set by George Mitchell, Chairman of the multi-party talks: Maundy Thursday, 9 April 1998. Events in the week leading up to the deadline were accelerated, rich and dramatic. On 1 April 2008, Blair welcomed Bertie Ahern, the Irish prime minister, to Downing St for talks on the details of the agreement, and talks lasted into the evening. The meeting was followed by another meeting on 3 April, the third meeting between Blair and Ahern in three days, in which both prime ministers mulled over details of the agreement. Meanwhile, in Ireland, the second enquiry into ‘Bloody Sunday’ was opened (3 April 1998) and was headed by Law Lord Saville, (see Blair, 1997c).

On Saturday 4 April, The Alliance party of Northern Ireland (APNI) held its annual conference in Belfast. John Alderdice, then leader of APNI called on the British and Irish prime minister to take personal control of the final stage of the multi-party talks at Stormont (see Blair, 1997c), an illustration of the perception by the Northern Irish of the importance of Blair’s role in the peace process. On Sunday 5 April, Bertie Ahern’s mother died. He was not present at the multi-party talks, thus leaving Blair at various points to oversee the process. On Monday 6 April, George Mitchell, Chairman of the multi-party talks, presented a somewhat delayed draft settlement of the deal late into the evening. Internal party divisions on the peace process were expressed with 12 resignations from Sinn Fein. To add to this, the following day (Tuesday 7 April), the draft paper was rejected by the Ulster Unionist party, the same day that Blair arrived in Northern Ireland for the final stages of the agreement. Upon arrival in Northern Ireland, Blair uttered a personal and political soundbite: “this is no time for soundbites – but I feel the hand of history on our shoulders. I really do” (Blair,

1998b, p. 57). The perceived character traits that this soundbite projected upon him was of someone determined, a peacemaker, poised, focused and undaunted, and, of course, participating in, making, a moment of history. Later that day, Blair’s dedication to the peace settlement was formally restated in a meeting with Bertie Ahern and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist party who had rejected the draft paper earlier in the day. In Blair’s autobiography, he positively endorses Bertie Ahern’s character and situates both leaders as modernisers as regards the peace process “his presence and mine, his personality and mine, in a way symbolised the new, modern realities which were extinguishing old attitudes. In a sense we personified the opportunity to escape our history, British and Irish, and move on”

(Blair, 2010, p. 168). Blair’s identification of sameness with the Irish prime minister informed his performance as regards the announcement of the peace deal i.e. use of association to positive political effect.

On Wednesday 8 April, Hillsborough Castle, County Down was the scene for a breakfast meeting between Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern. The two prime ministers discussed the settlement amid signs of dissatisfaction from some of the parties involved. Talks continued that day at the Parliament building in Stormont, Belfast. On Thursday 9 April, the day of the midnight deadline, further discontent were expressed, “the Ulster Unionist John Taylor didn’t turn up with his delegation and announced that he ‘wouldn’t touch the agreement with a ten-foot barge pole’. He was later won back by the prime minister’s handwritten pledges to Unionists” (Boulton, 2008, p. 54). Blair’s ‘fatherly’ role in the process and his ability to ‘keep it together’

was emphasised; a demonstration also of his status in Irish politics. Later that day, further disarray was expressed as Jeffrey Donaldson, part of the Ulster Unionist party’s team of negotiators walked out and left the negotiations and did not return.

Late in the evening, after 11pm a march took place outside Stormont, led by Ian

negotiations. Amid the chaos, negotiations continued; the midnight deadline had passed and no announcement was made.

Blair’s intense and unrelenting role in the Northern Ireland peace deal was heavily reported by the media; particularly that Blair had had no sleep, and that he had expressed such commitment to achieving a successful resolution. The media coverage of Blair was significant in terms of projecting his publicly perceived character and the notion that history was being made and that Blair was the central political actor in this decisive moment of the peace process.

Some 36 hours after party leaders were last seen, 18 hours after his deadline, on Good Friday at 17:36pm, the Chairman of the talks, George Mitchell, announced the successful resolution between both sides. Blair’s contribution and centre-stage role in the peace process was particularly evident in the last week of negotiations. His hands-on managerial style and emphasis on process was seen to have led to a historic political breakthrough in Northern Ireland; political success which was attributed to his personal performance and personal efforts.