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On the eve of 13 November 2015, Paris yet again became the scene of a coordinated terrorist attack, this time simultaneously targeting multiple locations across the French capital. Two suicide bombers shot guests sitting outside cafés in restaurants in the 10th _{arrondissement before triggering their explosive vests. At the}

same time, a group of assailants with semiautomatic weapons entered the Bataclan music hall, shooting at random at the hundreds of people that were attending a concert, many of who would be held hostage for hours before being freed by French special forces. In the northern suburb of St Denis, another suicide bomber tried to enter the Stade de France, where the national football teams of Germany and France were playing a friendly match, attended by French President Francois Hollande. Denied access as a security guard discovered his suicide belt, the man triggered his explosive device outside the stadium but failed to kill anyone but himself. The multi-target attack in Paris has been compared to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which

132 _{Michael Holden, ‘Up to 5,000 European fighters in Syria pose risk: Europol’, Reuters, [online], 13 January 2015.} 133 _{Council of the European Union, ‘Paris Declaration of 11 January 2015’ (Brussels, 16 January 2015): 3.}

134 _{Thomas de Maizière, cited in Bernd Riegert, ‘EU will Anti-Terror-Kampf verstärken’, Deutsche Welle, [online] 29 January 2015.}

135 _{Theresa May, ‘Home Secretary Theresa May on the threat we face from terrorism in the UK ‘, Oral Statement to Parliament (House of Commons,} 14 January 2015).

saw a similar modus operandi as low security, soft targets in public spaces were chosen, with the aim of generating as many civilian casualties as possible.136 _{It also constituted the first suicide bombing on EU}

territory. But what is mostly remembered about the November attacks in Paris is the fact that, despite the launch of massive security operation, Salah Abdeslam, the only perpetrator that survived the attack, was able to escape into hiding to Belgium. He had been stopped at the Belgian border the morning after the attacks in a car sent to pick him up, but was released as the French had no intelligence on him.137 _He

remained at large for months before eventually being tracked down in Molenbeek, a district of Brussels known to be breeding ground for radicalised foreign fighters. It emerged that the Belgian-born Moroccan, along with his brother Ibrahim, had been known to have travelled to Syria to fight for ISIL by Belgian authorities, who had not added him to any European database on radicalised individuals.138 _Abdelhamid

Abaaoud, a Belgian national suspected to have been the mastermind of the attack, was also on the radar of Belgian intelligence services and had been flagged up at the Greek border in January 2015. However, due to the lack of cooperation among the two countries’ authorities, his return to Europe from Syria did not raise any alarms.139 _{Consequently, French and Belgian authorities came under heavy criticism in the months}

following the attacks, leading the head of an investigating commission into the Paris attacks to conclude that their intelligence services had failed, as all assailants of the Bataclan, Charlie Hebdo, as well as the Hyper-Kosher assault, had been known to authorities.140 _{Investigations had further revealed that several of}

the suspects had previous criminal records in their home countries for petty crime such as drug-related offences.141 _{With the increasingly apparent link between organised crime and terrorism, this proved once}

again that the separation of police and intelligence services is proving increasingly problematic to detect suspicious behaviour of potential terrorists. While France had been quick to blame Belgium for failing to uncover the planning and preparation of the Paris attacks, it was argued that the red flags missed by Belgian and France services made the necessity for an automated system for information exchange at European level all the more evident.142

In a speech before parliament on 16 November, President François Hollande describes the Paris attacks as “an aggression against our country, against its values, against its youth, against its lifestyle”. Condemning the coordinated assaults as an act of war against France, yet asserting that “the enemy is not just an enemy of France, but an enemy of Europe”143_{, Hollande triggers Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty}144_,

asking fellow Member States to assist his nation in the fight against Islamic State. His reaction constitutes the first time in the history of the European Union that a head of state demands a European response in

136 _{European Police Office (2016). EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016: 12.}

137 _{Elaine Ganley, ‘Paris attacks findings : gross intel failure, police rivalry’, Associated Press, [online] 5 July 2016.} 138 _{Edoardo Camilli, ‘The Paris attacks. A case of intelligence failure?’, NATO Review (2015).}

139 _{Op cit.} 140 _Ibid.

141 _{Giulia Paravicini, ‘ Paris attacks prompt EU to share secrets’, Politico, [online] 20 January 2016.}

142 _{Jean Quatremer, ‘Terrorisme: face aux accusations de Paris, la Belgique se rebiffe’, Libération, [online] 19 November 2015.} 143 _{François Hollande, Les messages du Président de la République au Parlement, 16 November 2015.}

144 _{Article 42.7: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation} of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.” Council of the European Communities (2008). Consolidated Version

matters of security and defense, underlining the new political dimension of the Paris attacks and setting the stage for European leaders to frame individual reactions to the events.

Just like after Charlie Hebdo, the aftermath of the November attacks was characterised by an outpouring of solidarity among EU Member States, assuring utmost assistance and urging for better cooperation among security authorities. UK Prime Minister David Cameron made a strong bid for EU collaboration and intelligence sharing:

“We face a shared threat. And we must share information and intelligence to better protect ourselves from these brutal terrorists. The UK and France are already doing this but today we have agreed to step up our efforts even further and to work more closely with our European neighbours. In particular, we must do more to tackle the threat of returning foreign fighters. This requires a pan-European effort. We need a stronger external EU border to protect our security more effectively, with screening, systematic security checks and greater sharing of data amongst member states. […] We’ve got to turn words into action.”145

As the likelihood of a Brexit referendum was already looming large at the time, the British PM used the momentum of the Paris attacks to underline the importance for the UK to remain in the European Union in light of the common security issues faced.146 _{German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a similar call for}

pan-European thinking, asserting that “no country in Europe can win the fight against international terrorism by itself […] which is why in difficult times, we must not be tempted to resort to national responses. Isolation is not a reasonable option in the 21st _century”147_{. She emphasized the need for a more}

committed implementation of measures agreed after Charlie Hebdo, such as the information exchange within the Schengen Information System.

Following a meeting of the EU Council and Interior Ministers of Member States on 20 November, they condemned the attacks as an “assault on the European values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”, noting that “this is not the first time that the EU has been confronted with a major terrorist attack and important measures have already been decided”.148 _{The joint statement thus demanded}

the acceleration of measures that had already been decided to be implemented after the terrorist incidents earlier in 2015. In this regard, the Council urged to finalise the EU PNR before the end of 2015, and to allow the directive to include intra-EU flights and a sufficiently long data retention period. As for information exchange, it was announced that the European Counter Terrorist Centre (ECTC) would be launched by January 2016 as a platform where MS can increase information sharing and operational cooperation. It was further decided that MS would ensure that national authorities systematically enter data on suspected foreign terrorist fighters into the SIS II. Most importantly, it was announced that “Member

States will make maximum use of these capabilities to improve the overall level of information exchange between CT authorities

145 _{David Cameron, PM Press Statement following Paris talks, Paris, 23 November 2015.}

146 _{Matt Dathan, ‘Paris attacks makes it more important Britain stays in the EU, says David Cameron as he predicts 2016 will be the year of} fundamental change’, Independent, [online] 18 December 2015.

147 _{Angela Merkel, Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin, 16 December 2015.}

in the EU. Member States will ensure that the relevant national authorities significantly increase their contributions to Focal Point Traveller at Europol to reflect the threat and connect to relevant Europol information exchange systems”. The German

newspaper Tagesspiegel titled an article on the EU Council conclusions “Together against the terror – now for real”149_{, sarcastically pointing out the lack of commitment by Member States to the measures agreed on}

after the Charlie Hebdo attacks.

Sabine Manke notes that since the Paris attacks, Europol has increasingly been mentioned by news media and politicians alike, generating unprecedented attention towards the agency.150 _{She asserts that prior}

to the incidents in Paris, it would have been unimaginable that Germany’s Minister of the Interior de Maizière makes a statement as he did on 20November: “If only five states send information to Europol while no

others do, it is no surprise that the information exchange does not function properly […] We want to exchange information between European states in such a manner that we can take the adequate prosecution measures at national level”151_{. Reflecting}

the change in attitude towards the organisation, a joint statement by Belgium and France emphasized the added value of Europol’s Focal Point ‘Travellers’ on foreign fighters, and committed to feeding more information into its database. The two governments further praised the potential of the newly launched ECTC to contribute to a substantial improvement of EU information sharing.152

EU Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner, Dmitris Avramopoulos, has also pointed to Europol as a crucial tool to fight terrorism. Ahead of the meeting of Interior Ministers on 20 November, Avramopoulos stated: “This meeting is of great importance: after Charlie Hebdo I had proposed - and finally it was done - the creation of a counter-terrorism centre at Europol”. He said he counted on Member States to send their experts to the ECTC in advance so it could be operational from day one.153

Avramopoulos went as far as to demand for intelligence services to be transferred to a supranational level: “I believe it is a moment to make one more step forward and put the basis for the creation of a European intelligence agency”154_{. In a statement a few days later, he further emphasized: “The tools are there! […] But we}

also need more trust amongst us, to share intelligence, and prevent the possibility and repetition of horrendous attacks like those in Paris.”155 _{His remarks underline how EU policymakers used the window of opportunity posed by the}

Paris attacks to draw attention to existing structures and platforms, or to call for the implementation of measures that had previously been part of political debate.

149 _{http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/eu-innenminister-gemeinsam-gegen-den-terror-jetzt-aber-wirklich/12620376.html} 150 _{See Annex I.}

151 _{„Wenn nur fünf Staaten Informationen an EUROPOL melden und alle anderen nicht, dann darf man sich nicht wundern, dass der Informationsaustausch nicht} richtig funktioniert. [...] Wir wollen die Informationen zwischen den europäischen Staaten so austauschen, dass wir national dann die entsprechenden

Verfolgungsmaßnahmen ergreifen können“Thomas de Maizière, ‘Jetzt ist die Zeit zu entscheiden‘, News Section on the website of the Ministry of Interior, 20 November 2015.

152 _{Charles Michel, ‘Déclaration conjointe franco-belge du 1er février 2016: Consolider le partenariat franco-belge en matière antiterroriste’,} Communiqué de presse, 1 February 2016.

153 _{Dmitris Avramopolous, Remarks of Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos at the Press Conference on the Preparation of the 20 November Justice and Home} Affairs Council and the Firearms Package, Brussels, 18 November 2015.

154 _{Op cit.}

155 _{Dmitris Avramopoulos, Closing Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the European Parliament Plenary Session: “Recent terrorist attacks in Paris”, 25} November 2015.

As fingers were pointed at Belgium’s intelligence agencies, Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel repeated his call for the creation of an EU intelligence agency in order to overcome the obstacle of national intelligence agencies not sharing classified information within Europol structures. In an interview with the French radio RTL following the Paris attacks, he proclaimed that “if the information exchange between intelligence agencies worked flawlessly, there would not be any more terrorist attacks in the world” and said it was his conviction that a European intelligence agency, modelled on the CIA, should be established as quickly as possible.156

Bures asserts that “it is one thing for Europe’s politicians to make public promises to improve the fight against terrorism via better intelligence sharing across Europe, and quite another thing for them to persuade the relevant national agencies, over which politicians usually exercise less than perfect control, to comply”.157 _{Bearing in mind the calls for better information sharing emanated by policymakers across the}

European Union in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, we will now analyse to what extent the focusing events in question have spurred political will and rhetoric to translate into concrete actions.

4.2.

Changes in Security Measures and Information Exchange

“Osama Bin Laden has done more for security cooperation in the EU than Jean Monnet”

In this section, we will assess the status quo of counter-terrorism measures and levels information exchange in the immediate aftermath of the Paris attacks in January and November 2015. This will be evaluated in terms of three aspects: the adoption of the Passenger Name Records (PNR) Directive, the launching of the ECTC, and the statistical increase in information exchange through existing databases. The PNR Directive constitutes a controversial security policy, promoted as a crucial tool to prevent terrorist travel, was not sufficiently supported at EU level prior to the attacks. In a similar manner, the launching of the ECTC had been discussed but was yet to become a reality. While platforms and systems for information exchange were long in existence at Europol, their use by national counter-terrorism units was comparatively limited.

For the latter, it is important to differentiate between the overall increase in information entered into a certain database, and the entries made only by Member States. These figures exclude the entries made by Interpol, internal Europol staff or Third Parties, in order to accurately reflect the readiness of MS national authorities to share more information.

156 _{Charles Michel, Interviewed on RTL Radio France, 30 November 2015.} 157 _{Bures, ‘Intelligence sharing and the fight against terrorism in the EU’: 58.}