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EU Counterterrorism

Information Exchange

EIS

ECTC

Measurement validity is ensured if indicators truly measure the relevant research concepts123_{. Only}

if we can establish significant indicators that allow us to measure the extent to which information exchange between Member States on an EU level has increased or decreased, we are able to claim our research findings to be valid. We have avoided issues in validity by narrowing down information exchange at Europol to data

inserted by Member States, and only in relation to counter-terrorism. In this regard, messaged sent and received, or cases logged in other crime areas such as fraud or drug trafficking are neglected. Although terrorist suspects may well be involved in other crime areas, including these figures in our analysis could distort the extent of counter-terrorism related information logged by Member States and are therefore disregarded. Furthermore, any information sharing in databases initiated by Europol units itself, third parties or other agencies that do not classify as a Member State unit (e.g. Interpol, Eurojust) were excluded, as including these would not reflect how EU countries have stepped up their information exchange.

Internal validity questions whether the variables in question actually share a causal relationship.124

Information exchange will constitute the dependent variable of our research, while terrorist attacks function as an independent variable. Through the preceding review of literature, we have established causality between these two variables through the lens of focusing events. Expert interviews will further allow us to assess whether the independent variable of shocking events uncovering insufficient intelligence cooperation may have an impact on the dependent variable, causing Member States to share more information with each other. External validity is concerned with the application of the research findings to a more general context125_{. Since we are analysing events that occurred within a short time span and very specific security}

context, and their impact on only one organisation, we cannot make wider generalisations about the full extent of EU intelligence cooperation. Nonetheless, replication of our research is easily manageable as the statistics we have analysed are continuously produced to monitor the level of information exchange. Future research could thus use other focusing events to measure how intelligence sharing changed in their aftermath, allowing monitoring long-term trends in this field.

123 _{Ibid.: 171.}

124 _{Bryman, ‘Chapter 3: Research Designs’: 47.} 125 _Ibid.

3.4

Limits of Research

Focusing events can be exploited by policymakers to promote various kinds of agendas. Constituting a particular sensitive issue, jihadi terrorist attacks, in particular those attributed to Islamic State, routinely attract widespread attention and cause public as well as political debates. While right-wing leaders tend to call for tighter immigration laws or enhanced surveillance powers, left-wing politicians and human rights activists criticise the alleged racial profiling of suspects and privacy right infringements of citizens associated with mass gathering and storage of personal data. In one of the most notorious reactions to terrorist attacks, following the San Bernadino shooting, Republican presidential frontrunner Donald Trump announced he would ban all Muslims from entering the U.S. if voted into office. He further alleged that terrorists would be less likely to cause as many casualties if the victims of the Bataclan hostage taking in Paris had been carrying guns.126 _{While these and many other directions of research could be pursued through the lens of}

focusing events, this thesis will solely concentrate on how far policymakers have used the public and political upheaval following major terrorist attacks to call for more intelligence cooperation on an EU level.

Due to the limited scope of the thesis, the following aspects of information exchange on counter- terrorism will be excluded from our analysis: prevention of financing of terrorism, prevention of radicalisation, de-radicalisation of foreign fighters, tracking of terrorist financing, firearms control, and judicial response. Furthermore, we will exclusively focus on intra-EU cooperation between Member States and thus neglect other forms of multilateral exchange, such as the evolvement of EU-US counterterrorism collaboration since 9/11. Other third countries that can indeed play a vital role in the joint fight against terrorism, such as Turkey or the Maghreb region, are also beyond the scope of our research. Although the increasing policy attention on the subject of terrorism may be controversial, it is further not the intent of this thesis to evaluate the legitimacy of EU counter-terrorism measures and the impact of increased information sharing on citizens or potentially innocent suspects. This is not to say that any of these aspects mentioned above are less relevant, but rather that measuring them would lead this research into too many directions and thus make it ambiguous and lacking in focus. However, as stated in the Discussion chapter, some of the issues may well be of interest to future research on this topic.

Since 2001, hundreds of terrorist attacks have caused devastation and the death of innocent civilians across the globe. The fact that attacks in Western Europe attract far more attention by news reports and expressions of sympathy and solidarity on social media platforms compared to attacks in the Middle East or Asia has incited discussions on double standards.127 _{With this in mind, we remain highly critical of the}

severe under-reporting of targets of religiously inspired terrorism in the non-Western world, which stands in strong contrast to the live feeds, real-time news coverage, social media hashtags and temporary Facebook profile pictures that accompanied the Paris or Brussels attacks. Nonetheless, since we are investigating the rhetorical and policy impact of attacks that occurred within the territory of the European Union, we are limited in the choice of case studies. In this context, bombings or shootings have targeted Russia, Turkey,

126 _{Ed Pilkington, ‘Donald Trump: ban all Muslims entering US’, The Guardian, [online] 8 December 2015.}

or other countries that are geographically located in Europe but are not a member of the EU, could not be taken into consideration.

The findings drawn from the statistical analysis and document consultation will not reflect whether the information is contributed by intelligence or law enforcement agencies of Member States. As intelligence agencies are not formally associated with Europol, the majority of information is fed into systems by police authorities. However, some national counterterrorism units represent a fusion of police and intelligence agencies. As previously explained, this thesis does not claim to be assessing the level of multilateral collaboration between intelligence services, as this is not possible. Instead, we aim to evaluate current levels of counterterrorism related information exchange, which may be sent to Europol by any national unit that constitutes a competent authority in counterterrorism investigations.

4.

Analysis :