In the previous chapter, we saw that, according to Longuenesse, the complex act of figurative synthesis generates ‘proto-phenomena’. Proto-phenomena are empirical objects we can represent without possessing a concept of that object. From proto-phenomena, we can abstractschemataand the empirical concepts that express these schemata. I have explained this idea by means of the example of a house: A person who has never seen a house will not have developed the schema belonging to the concept ‘house’, and will therefore not be able to see a houseas house. Confronted with a house, this person will see something different than we: people who do have acquired the con- cept ‘house’, do. This person, however, will still see some kind of object: a proto-phenomenon. In figurative synthesis, he will combine his various rep- resentations of the house into such a proto-phenomenon. When this person has represented a few proto-phenomena of this kind, these proto-phenomena
allow him to abstract the schema and the concept ‘house’.4
In essence, proto-phenomena are combinations of sensible representa- tions. However: not every combination of representations, we saw, is a proto-phenomenon. To represent a proto-phenomenon we must combine our sensible representations according to so called ‘objective sensible forms’.5 When we combine our representations according to these forms, we regard our representations as standing in the objective temporal relations of suc- cession and simultaneity.6 The sensible representations that form a proto- phenomenon on the basis of which I can form the schema belonging to the concept ‘house’, for instance, I regard as existingsimultaneously.
Within the act of combining sensible representations according to ob- jective sensible relations, Longuenesse thinks, we can distinguish different aspects. First, we can distinguish a relational aspect from a quantitative and qualitative aspect.
In order to be able to combine sensible representations according to ob- jective sensible forms, I need to becomeconscious of these representations. To be able to regard the four sides of a house as existing in time simul- taneously, I need to have had conscious representations of these sides. In chapter 1, we encountered Kant’s notion ofinner sense. I become conscious of a representation when that representation is placed in inner sense. For us, human subjects, inner sense has a certain form: time. Because time is the form of inner sense, the only way in which we can become conscious of representations is by placing them in time.7 Kant says:
Wherever our representations may arise [...] as modifications of the mind they nevertheless belong to inner sense, and as such all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations. (A99)
At one moment in time, Kant says, we can become conscious of one rep- resentation only: “as contained in one moment no representation can ever by anything than absolute unity.” (ibid) This implies that to become conscious of a multiplicity of representations, we must have these represen- tations atsuccessive moments in time. The only way to become conscious
4
See section 1.2.
5
See section 1.5.
6
See also section 1.6.
7
of the four sides of a house, therefore, is to place them in inner sense one by one.8
The activity of successively placing sensible representations in inner sense, Kant callsapprehension. When I place a sensible representation in in- ner sense, Iapprehend that representation. Now Longuenesse’s idea is that the activities of quantitative and qualitative synthesis are two aspects of the activity of apprehension of empirical representations (these two aspects we will distinguish later). The activity of apprehension as a whole makes possible the activity of relational synthesis.9
What role does relational synthesis play? This becomes clear in the Analogies of Experience. Relational synthesis makes me combine those rep- resentations I have successively apprehended according to the objective sen- sible forms. It makes me regard these sensible representations as standing in
objectivetemporal relations. This generates a distinction between two kinds of temporalities. On the one hand: thesubjective succession of representa- tions in inner sense the activity of apprehension generates. On the other hand: the objective temporal relations between objects and states of ob- jects.10 This is necessary to represent empirical objects (proto-phenomena and phenomena). As Kant says:
[B]y means of our perception no appearance would be distin- guished from any other as far as the temporal relation is con- cerned, since the succession in the apprehending is always the same [...] (A194/B239)
Suppose I generate a house as proto-phenomenon.11 To be able to represent this proto-phenomenon as an object that has four sides, I must represent these sides. This, we saw, I can only do by representing them at successive 8Again, Longuenesse does not explain these points in this way. That this is how she
sees this, I derive from her analysis of the different kinds synthesis (see KCJ: chapter 8-11), her discussion of quantitative synthesis (seeibid: chapter 9, in particular p. 271-4 (here Longuenesse also discusses the example of a house)) and her analysis of the ‘threefold synthesis’ in the A-Deduction (seeibid: chapter 2).
9
These points I derive from Longuenesse’s analyses of quantitative and qualitative synthesis. See, in particular,KCJ: p. 271-4, 290 and 302-3.
10See, for example,KCJ: p. 302-3, 324. See alsoibid: 240-1. 11
As we saw in chapter 1, Kant himself uses the example of a house to explain the importance of the categories of Relation: “[T]he apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house that stands before me is successive. Now the question is whether the manifold of this house itself is also successive, which certainly no one will concede.” (A190/B236)
moments in time. By apprehending the four sides of a house, I thus gen- erate subjective temporal relations among my representations. I represent the sides of the house as succeeding each other, even though they do not objectively succeed each other. If I would only apprehend these represen- tations, I would not be able to represent the house as object. Subjecting my successively apprehended representations of the house to a relational
synthesis makes me regard these representations as simultaneously existing aspects of an object.12 This enables me to represent the house as object. Relational synthesis also enables us to represent an object thatchanges. If I see a changing object, this means relational synthesis makes me regard my representations as objectively successive. If I see, for instance, a sailing ship13, this means relational synthesis makes me regard my representations of the ship as successive states of that ship.14
Within relational synthesis, we can distinguish the roles of the three cat- egories of Relation. When I regard two representations assimultaneous, this means I have synthesized them according to the category ofcommunity. If I regard them as ‘objectively’ succeeding each other, I have synthesized them according to the category of cause. In both cases, I will have synthesized my representations according to the category ofsubstance as well: I regard the representations as, respectively, succeeding or simultaneous statesof an object: of a substance.15
The role relational synthesis plays within the complex act of figurative synthesis should now be clear. If we would synthesize our representations ‘quantitatively’ and ‘qualitatively’ only, we would onlyapprehend these rep- resentations. All that would be given to us, would be a subjective succession of sensible representations. We would not regard any of these representa- tions asobjectively succeeding or asobjectively simultaneous, and we would not regard them as states of objects. We would, therefore, not be able to represent empirical objects.
12See againKCJ, chapter 11, especially p. 387-8. 13
Kant also uses the ship-example. See A192/B237.
14See, in particularKCJ: p. 361-3 and 387-8. As I explained in the previous chap-
ter, the figurative synthesis of representations can also lead todeceptive experiences (see 1.6). Theoretically, relational synthesis could make us represent the sides of the house as successive.
15These points I derive, in particular, fromKCJ, p. 388, p. 361-3 and p. 334-7. As I
understand it, regarding my representations as related to an object is what generates the ‘necessity’ in a combination of representations necessary to represent proto-phenomena (see section 1.5).