Before we distinguish between quantitative and qualitative synthesis, let us first have a closer look at the activity of apprehension these syntheses form aspects of. Our description of relational synthesis made clear that appre- hension is important. Apprehension is a condition for relational synthesis. Whether relational synthesis makes us regard representations A and B as objectively successive or as objectively simultaneous, in both cases A and
B first need to be given. This requires we apprehend them. Combining representations in inner sense makes them available for relational synthesis. Apprehending representations is necessary more often than we might think. In our house-example, it was clear that the four sides of the house could not all be given to us at one moment in time. It is clear, therefore, that in order for us to be able to generate a representation of a house with four sides, we need to apprehend these sides. Kant, however, seems to think that empirical objects (phenomena and proto-phenomena) also combine rep- resentations for which this is less clear. An empirical object does not only combine representations that cannot be represented at one moment in time. It also combines, Longuenesse points out, representations thatcan be rep- resented at one moment. In the A-Deduction, in which Kant provides an extensive description of the act of figurative synthesis16, he says:
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; foras con- tained in one momentno representation can ever be anything than absolute unity. (A99)
Again, our house-example can shed light on this passage. When, for in- stance, the front of a house is given to me, a “manifold” of representations is given to me. My representation of the front of the house “contains” repre- sentations of windows, of a door, of a part of the roof, of bricks, etcetera. It is in this sense that my intuition of the house “contains a manifold” of rep- resentations. However, if I have an intuition of the front of the houseonly, I do not represent this “manifold” of representations “as such”. I represent windows, a door and the roof of the house as parts of a larger representation of the house’s front, but I do not represent these aspects of the house on
16
Kant does not himself apply the term ‘figurative synthesis’ to the acts of synthesis he describes in the A-Deduction. The idea that the syntheses of the A-and B-Deduction can be equated is specific to Longuenesse’s interpretation. See chapter 1, footnote 5.
their own.17 At least for certain goals, Kant seems to find this insufficient. Longuenesse’s ideas about the function of figurative synthesis make this comprehensible. Figurative synthesis makes sure empirical objects are given to us in such a way that forming judgments about these objects becomes possible. If we see the front of a house at one glance, we will not be able to tell how many windows it contains, which colour the door has or how exactly the roof is shaped. In order for us to be able to form judgments about these matters, we must actively direct our attention to these details. We must
apprehend them. When Kant says that to represent a manifold as mani- fold, we must “distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another”, he seems to mean that to represent the details our representation of the house contains, we must represent them at distinguished moments. We must represent its door at one moment, its window at a second moment and its roof at a third moment. Doing so allows us to represent the details of our complex intuitionas these details. The more time we have to study a certain object, the more details we will be able to form judgments about.18 Being able to represent as manifold the manifold contained in an intu- ition is also necessary for those judgments by means of which we generate concepts. In chapter 1, I mentioned the activity of analysis. Analysis is the act of generating concepts (KCJ: 11). In analysis, we compare vari- ous proto-phenomena and focus on their similarities while we abstract from their differences (115-6).19 This enables us to form empirical schemata (115- 20). Analysis is itself a kind of judgment (121-2).20 I generate the schema belonging to the concept ‘house’ by comparing various proto-phenomena, and by taking those marks they have in common while abstracting from their differences. In order for me to be able to form the schema belonging to the concept ‘house’ on the basis of a few proto-phenomena, it is neces- sary that these proto-phenomena contain certain details. They must contain such details as doors, windows and a roof, otherwise they would not allow me to form a ‘rule’ that makes me represent a rectangular building with a roof, a door and a few windows. To be able to represent proto-phenomena 17This is what I take Longuenesse to be explaining atKCJ: p. 36-8 and 271-4 (at p.
271-4 she also uses the example of a house). Longuenesse does not explicitly distinguish between the situation in which we represent the four sides of a house, and the situation in which we represent the representations contained in one representation of the house.
18
That this is how Longuenesse sees this, she suggests at KCJ: 270-4. Longuenesse does not explicitly explain this connection to judgments, but it follows naturally from her ideas.
19See also section 1.2. 20
For an explanation of the idea that the act of analysis consists in an act judgment, see Longuenesse, 1998b: 139-41.
that contain these details, I must represent these details. The activity of apprehension enables me to do this.21
We now see why the activity of apprehension is important. Figurative synthesis generates proto-phenomena on the basis of which we can form empirical schemata and discursive judgments. Such proto-phenomena are combinations of sensible representations: on the one hand, sensible repre- sentations that cannot be given at one moment in time (like the four sides of a house), and, on the other hand, sensible representations that cannot, at one moment in time, be given “as such” (like the door, the windows and the bricks contained in the front of a house). In relational synthesis, we saw, we combine these representations according to objective forms, and this generates proto-phenomena. The activity of apprehension makes sure these representations become available for combination. It enables us to represent “manifolds” of representations by successively placing them in inner sense.