As visions of a post-Saddam Iraq began to gather steam, the question of whether to establish a centralized or devolved government emerged. The CIA report recommended a federal solution. Pointing to the German experience, the Agency argued “The success of the Federal Republic and the US occupation of Germany was due at least in part to confronting a set of issues that had undermined previous German regimes”, namely “regional particularism, ethnic strife, and a lack of a clear identity”.149 The report argued that U.S. efforts to rebalance a strong federal system of government were key to the success of postwar reconstruction efforts, and suggested, “The German model of strong, US backed federal structure…could provide a useful model for Iraq”.150 State’s FOI Project made similar recommendations. Iraqi working group participants said the United States should commit to Iraq the same way it had committed to West Germany and Japan after World War II, but a briefing notes the “military government idea did not go down well.”151
147 Phillips, Losing Iraq, 38, 49.
148 Department of State, “The Future of Iraq Project, Democratic Principles and Procedures Working Group,” 18. 149 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan,” 6.
150 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan,” 6. 151 Department of State, Briefing, “Future of Iraq Project,” 01 November 2002, Slide 11.
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The Department of State’s position was more restrained. The Democratic Principles group met first in September, and again in October 2002. Contrary to the limitations placed on the group’s deliberations by the earlier July cable, the working group began detailed discussions of “political transition to an Iraq based on democracy and federalism” utilizing principles articulated by Chalabi’s INC.152 The proposal of a federal model appears to have come at the instigation of Iraqi working group participants rather than U.S. policy makers. Phillips explains that Iraqi exiles and Kurds favoured a federal model for a reconstructed Iraq. “Iraq’s problems always arose because of abuses by the central government”, Phillips notes, “therefore, decentralizing authority was the best way to harmonize competing claims between Iraq’s factions.”153
State’s report ultimately accepted federalism as a way forward, but cautioned against redistricting or discussion of federal demarcations during the transitional period, as such discussion would be divisive and suffer from a lack of popular legitimacy. The report notes:
due to the issue of federalism, redistricting Iraq during the interim or transitional period would by its very nature be difficult; in addition, as federalism is—to an extent—a highly debated issue (that is, a politically charged one), attempting to change Iraqi administrative divisions along particular lines (ethnic or administrative) during the transitional period would be destabilizing and would, due to the lack of a popular referendum on the matter, be illegitimate (or at least imposed).154
The challenges encountered in the State Department FOI working group were echoed in think tank reports from the same period. In early 2003, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) argued against an understanding of federalism based on “ethnic enclaves”, instead urging policy planners “to encourage territorial/provincial lines within a unified, federal framework.” Academic scholars put forward similar arguments. Writing in advance of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Professor Charles Tripp articulated the dangers of seeing federalism as an inherent solution to the political challenges facing a post-Saddam Iraq. His analysis is worth quoting at length:
152 Department of State, Briefing, “Future of Iraq Project,” 01 November 2002, Slide 11. 153 Phillips, Losing Iraq, 5.
The vexed question of federalism in a future Iraq…has been proposed as a ‘solution’ to the social fragmentation of Iraq on the one hand and to the tendency to central dictatorship on the other. Yet in the territorial divisions most usually suggested – Kurdish northeast, Sunni Arab northwest and Shia south – crude divisions of the population have been imposed which fail to capture the complexity of what it means to be Sunni, Shia or Arab in Iraq. Only in the Kurdish region does this proposal meet with general approval and correspond to a certain historical and political reality. The demographics and allegiances of the other regions of Iraq are considerably less receptive to such a proposal. For some, it indicates a divisive attempt to reduce still further the terrain of national politics; for others, it suggests that only those associated with a certain kind of exclusivist identity politics, whether defined in sectarian or tribal terms, will be recognised as legitimate political players, creating considerable fear and anxiety among those who are excluded by reason of social origins or ideological choice.155 As Tripp warned, further discussion of federalism within the FOI working group proved divisive. While Iraq’s exiles agreed in principal that Saddam Hussein-era centralization of the Iraqi state was negative, proposals for a remedy were often contradictory. While Kurdish exiles maintained a federal system was the only safeguard for the rights of Iraq’s Kurds, the Assyrian and Turkmen populations favoured some centralization of power, lest they find themselves a minority within a largely independent Kurdish federated zone. Other Iraqi nationalists worried about the economic viability of an Iraqi state if oil-rich regions in the north and the south were allowed to spin off into fiscal independence.156 Mired in mistrust, the working group failed to achieve agreement.