Perfiles de metilación del extremo 5’ de la CGI-1 en el gen CD8A analizados

Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation None. Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation None. Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation None. Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Burkina Faso (1999-2008)

The Evaluation Report does not emphasis the Commission’s added-value in the PSD sector but it does refer to a “success story”:

« La mission a identifié deux secteurs de concentration pour lesquels l'aide européenne possède un réel avantage comparatif à savoir l'appui macro-économique et les infrastructures. Néanmoins, les tous les autres secteurs présentent des résultats intéressants et sont susceptibles de faire l'objet de financements futurs. En effet, dans les autres secteurs, l'aide européenne a néanmoins connu de réelles « success stories » (Culture, Eau, appui PME, Sécurité alimentaire et développement rural) qu'il faut souligner et qui peuvent servir de base à une réelle consolidation des interventions dans ces secteurs. » p.92

Guyana (1997-2007)

The Evaluation Report mentions that: “The interventions focus on specific Commission PSD strategy activities: business development services, training, and financial services.” But does not mention whether this is the case because of an added-value of the Commission in these areas. p.38

Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim

Overall, the BizClim evaluation makes the following observations regarding EC added-value:

« The communication of DGVIII to the European Council of November 1998 encouraged a combination of support at the macro-economic level (improvement of the business environment and investment climate; policy and institutional reforms), meso level (strengthening of the financial and non-financial intermediaries) and micro level (increasing enterprise competitiveness).

To boost the private sector in ACP countries, the EC implemented a number of programmes, which included a second generation of reforms for governments, dialogue between the private sector and ACP governments on how to improve services intermediary structures

and to catalyze a higher level of private capital and the development of EU-ACP business co- operation. Different programmes made a diagnosis of the situation in each country (DIAGNOS), offer credit facilities and technical advice to enterprises (EBAS and INFAC), and promote co-operation agreements among operators (PRO€INVEST).

BizClim was a direct off-spring of DIAGNOS, intended to add value specific to the EC in the ACP area by supporting policy dialogue at the national and regional levels on all matters thathelped improve the business environment. Coherent with the 1998 DGVIII Communication to the European Council, BizClim supported actions at the macro and meso level but did not intervene at the micro level because it did not involve directly with private enterprises.

Co-ordination with other donors, especially with actions carried out by EU member states, was ensured through the OECD, the Donor Committee for Small Enterprise Development and CGAP. Regular consultation and exchange of information was carried out with donors active in the area of PSD. Specifically, the €2 million contribution provided by the PSEEF, the source of funding of BizClim, to the Knowledge for Change Programme (KCP) and to the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) was aimed at ensuring complementarity, coordination and synergies with other efforts by EU Member States. »

Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environmnet Facility

CDE (2011) Overall, the CDE evaluation concludes on CDE value-added (Conclusion 3) in summary that “The CDE had a strong value added for beneficiaries through its capacity to mobilise qualified professional expertise. However, to its funders (mainly EU MS through the EDF), IFIs and other partners, its value added was low.”

It provides hereby the following details:

“The value added of the CDE must be assessed under three categories of stakeholders: the beneficiary enterprises; the funders of the CDE, that is mainly the EU MS through the EDF; but also partners who co-finance its activities or finance it to manage their own programmes. Three sub-conclusions are drawn, corresponding to these different stakeholders.

Value added for beneficiaries (SMEs, IOs and BDS providers)

C7.1 For the beneficiary enterprises the valued added of the CDE has lain in the access to relatively low-cost valuable technical assistance and professional expertise that generally increased their performance. For the intermediary organisations and BDS providers, the value added of the CDE has lain in its capacity to mobilise qualified expertise and strengthen their capacity to provide services to enterprises.

For the beneficiaries the potential value added of the CDE lies in (1°) the timely availability of relevant advice and technical assistance at a subsidised cost, and (2°) the transfer of useful professional expertise.

Regarding the first point, beneficiary enterprises, IOs and BDS providers benefitted from TA and advice that were relevant insofar as they addressed their requests, and at a relatively limited cost since it never exceeded 33% of the total cost, regardless of their contribution capacity. However, in several cases complex and bureaucratic procedures have been a disincentive to drawing on the support of the CDE.

On the second point the record of the CDE is positive, owing to the quality of the expertise provided and the dedication of the staff in the field; but the support provided was too fragmented and marginal to allow achievement of significant results at sector or meso levels, beyond the direct benefits to the enterprises or organisations assisted.

Value added for the funders of the CDE: EU MS through the EDF

C7.2 For the funders of the CDE, the value added of CDE support has been limited by the lack of CDE strategic approach (see conclusion 11) and its high cost of operations.

For the EU MS, the potential value added of the CDE resides in its capacity to:

 identify the priority needs of the private sector; and

 use efficiently the EDF subsidy to respond to private sector needs in such a way as to complement and support the overall EDF programmes as prepared and managed by the Commission.

The record of the CDE has been mixed: although it has demonstrated that its demand-driven approach has undoubtedly permitted it to address the needs expressed by beneficiaries, a number of issues are of concern:

 from the field visits, there was little evidence that CDE’s knowledge of the situation of the private sector served as an important input in the programming of the Commission’s assistance.

 The CDE being an institution created under Cotonou dealing with private sector development, there was a potential for complementarities with Commission programmes and EIB operations. However, synergies remained underexploited over the evaluation period, implying that the potential of the whole EU family had not been fully achieved.

 Finally, CDE activities have been professional and useful for the beneficiaries but have been provided at an extremely high management cost for the EDF, owing to the heavy permanent structure involved.

Value added for partner institutions (e.g. IFIs, regional organisations, other donors, ACP partner governments)

For the partners, the value added of the CDE contribution has lain more in its complementarities with them and in its capacity to transfer professional know how than in its cost-effectiveness in managing programmes on behalf of third parties.

For the partner institutions the added value of the CDE has lain in:

 the complementarities of the CDE with their own specific characteristics that allows them to better fulfil their mandate by using the CDE to provide services they cannot offer themselves;

 its accumulated knowledge of private sector problems at enterprise level and the experience it has built up in identifying and mobilising adequate professional expertise;

 its capacity to manage their programmes swiftly and efficiently.

The cooperation with the EIB illustrates the first point. There are clear potential complementarities between the CDE and the EIB, the CDE providing non-financial assistance to financial intermediaries benefiting from EIB global loans and to SMEs to help them access this source of finance. While the two institutions have cooperated in the past, there was no concrete collaboration between them during the evaluation period at HQ or in the field, although there have been increased contacts since 2010. They signed two conventions in 2011 (one for the Pacific and the other for the Caribbean) which envisage management by the CDE of the EIB-financed TA to financial intermediaries.

The second and third points are deeply inter-related. Partners who use the CDE to implement their PSDP and other programmes expect the institution both to provide adequate professional expertise and to administer their programmes in a swift and cost-efficient manner. Specifically:

know-how, its high running costs and deficiencies in reporting its performance have made it difficult for the partners to perceive the value added of the CDE prior to its restructuring.

 Hence, although potential complementarities were recognized by the partners, their interaction with the CDE remained minimal during the evaluation period. The 2010 strategic redirection and re-focus by the CDE on the management of programmes for third parties has again raised the possibility of achieving synergies with partners. A number of agreements have been concluded between the CDE and partners (the PSDP DR Congo materialised in 2010 and the WAEMU PSDP was signed in 2011). However, so far it has not been clear how the CDE plans to adapt its processes and organisational modalities to the role of “programme management”.

At the same time the restructuring of the CDE has also led to the reduction of in- house expertise. If the CDE does not take sufficiently into consideration the necessity of maintaining and expanding its in-house (or closely associated) professional expertise there is a risk that its potential value added to the partner institution may become negligible.”

Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages 77-79) Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area None. Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008

The Evaluation mentions the EC’s specific value added on workers‘ rights (p. 4). Whilst the nature of this added value is not clearly specified in the report, there are indication, that it is an area which has not usually been supported by other donors.

JC 9.1 The Commission PSD strategies were geared towards the provision of