3.7 Descripción de la propuesta
3.7.1 Planificación
Initially, the EU and Britain were at a stalemate with ‘crisis progression’ threatening to overwhelm both governance levels. There was an impending political crisis if a limit was placed on free movement, leading to the unravelling of the EU project, and if free movement was not limited respectively. Thus, stability dominated the EU’s response to Britain’s concerns as free movement was “a part of being in Europe” (Interview 8, March 2015). Free movement was ‘locked in’ hence adjustment pressure was transferred away from the EU level. Respectively, with the EU remaining committed to its irrefutably, inflexible standpoint over not changing free movement policy, it was the euro crisis which was “offering an opportunity for re- discussing [free movement] policies” (Interview 4, February 2015).
Britain seized this opportunity, committing to its position that free movement could be adjusted to resolve national concerns. Thus, a significant period of ‘crisis diversity’ emerged with a significant amount of discussion ensuing over ways to limit free movement (Interview 2, December 2014). Euroscepticism was already disproportionately present in Britain (see Chapter 5). However, politically the euro crisis had increased British Euroscepticism (Interview 4, February 2015) which in turn “encouraged politicians to view European migration as a problem that requires them to make a response” (Interview 10, April 2015). Namely, adjusting social policies to appear “as if they are responding to increased migration” (ibid).
Thus, a new form of Euroscepticism was fostered, one “predominantly clothed in anti- immigrant rhetoric” (Interview 11, April 2015). Financially, the euro crisis caused free movement to challenge “the ability of countries to support high levels of EU migrants” (Interview 12, May 2015). Out of this challenge came policy change. Together these concerns created a “snowball effect” (Interview 1, December 2014) within the development of national social welfare policy, despite the ongoing euro crisis. In a dramatic transformation during the crisis period, British anti-immigration rhetoric went from being addressed in immigration policy to within social welfare policy (Interview 11, April 2015).
174 The policy response initially continued within national immigration policy, despite being obsolete in responding to the social impact of EU free movement. In 2012, with both Ireland and Greece seemingly on the brink of exiting the Eurozone, Theresa May, Home Secretary at the time, disclosed details of emergency immigration controls should the euro crisis deepen with the collapse of the European single currency (The Telegraph, May 2012b). Nonetheless, the EU retained its obstinate policy approach, defending free movement by way of strengthening non-EU third country nationals’ free movement rights, in parallel to its defence of EU nationals (EC, 2012). The EC proposed a new EU mechanism to coordinate and “ensure complementarity” (ibid: 6) between the national and EU level approaches to third country nationals’ access to welfare benefits. Opposition was raised by Britain on both political and economic grounds (House of Commons, 2012: Column Number 4-5).
Correspondingly, the EU’s inflexibility over social security co-ordination regulation in relation to Britain’s Right to Reside Test continued as the EC issued a second reasoned opinion due to four areas of national policy still not being brought into line with EU law (EC Press Release, 2012). Similarly, the ‘European Year of Citizens 2013’ further preserved free movement with the EC intent on extending the stipulated three-month period in which unemployment benefits could be exported to EU jobseekers to facilitate their free movement (EC, 2013: 8). Paradoxically, at a time of celebration at the EU level over the success of free movement and EU citizenship, at the national level Cameron announced the Conservatives would hold a referendum on EU membership, should the party be re-elected in 2015. The referendum constituted the potential for “a very dramatic change” (Interview 5, March 2015) from the euro crisis with either ‘Brexit’ or changes to free movement as the threat of an ‘out’ vote afforded both political “sway” over controlling EU free movement and an incentive for national policy innovation (Interview 3, December 2014).
At this time, Britain’s policy response transferred to social welfare policy as Britain’s rigid stance in not paying welfare benefits to inactive EU nationals living in the state was accommodated within national reforms of the welfare system. The Welfare Reform Act introduced a new single benefit payment, Universal Credit (UC), replacing welfare benefits treated differently under EU law respectively (House of Commons Library, 2013: 11). The government categorised UC as social assistance, on the basis it was replacing not agglomerating benefits. Thus, it was “outside the scope” of EU social security regulations and, by implication, “not exportable” (ibid). Others claimed special non-contributory would be a more appropriate classification (Sibley and Widmann, 2013).
175 EU nationals’ access to UC was inextricably connected to employment status, with only those working, self-employed or seeking employment who passed the HRT qualifying (DWP, 2012: 4). Those not seeking work (DWP, 2012: 5), students and the inactive who had a right to reside were ineligible (DWP, 2012: 4). Contrastingly, reflecting the EU’s firmer policy position, a new EU directive was created which went beyond EU law (House of Lords, 2013a: 6) to explicitly “ensure real and effective application of existing legislation” (EC Press Release, 2013b). This was in light of the “lack of awareness and consistency” (EC MEMO, 2013) within the national application of free movement rights. Hence, putting into action the three- pronged approach to guaranteeing free movement rights in practice.
Andor maintained that because of the euro crisis it was “all the more important to make it easier for those that want to work in another EU country to be able to do so” (EC Press Release, 2013b). In parliament, it was deemed the new directive did not impact on Britain in any significant way (European Scrutiny Committee, 2013; House of Lords, 2013a; House of Lords, 2013b). Nonetheless, opposition was voiced by Mark Harper who argued the directive did little in the way of addressing British concerns, maintaining the directive would “not rebalance the rights and responsibilities debate at all” (House of Lords, 2013b: 28). Harper claimed that if public concerns were not addressed, “it becomes very difficult for the public to support, first, our membership of the European Union, and, secondly, free movement rights” (House of Lords, 2013b: 12).
Euroscepticism reached its climax with public concern over Romania and Bulgaria’s forthcoming accession and the economic recovery “fuelling” further inflows (Interview 5, March 2015), affording UKIP Conservative seats in local elections84 (The Guardian, May 2013a). In this context, the EC finally referred the matter of Britain’s Right to Reside Test to the ECJ after “two years of fruitless negotiation” (The Guardian, May 2013c). In addition to disputing the Right to Reside criteria, the EC also maintained that Jobseeker’s Allowance was not a form of social assistance, even the non-contribution element of it (The Guardian, May 2013c). However, British officials expected both British and EU law to be amended to take into account the unprecedented public concern (The Financial Times, May 2013b).
A spokesman from the EC stated the court case was unavoidable as "the difference between us is fundamental” (The Guardian, May 2013b). Stephen Booth from Open Europe at the time commented, “if the commission wants to push the UK out of the EU, it's doing a pretty
176 good job" (ibid). In response, Britain conceived the test as already aligned to EU law and “a vital and fair tool” (DWP, 2013) to safeguard British welfare benefits. The government argued that Britain was committed to the EU’s principle of free movement but could not have a welfare system permitting “‘inactive’ migrants to become a burden on our welfare scheme” (ibid). Hence, the stalemate looked set to continue.