The interrelation between the “JINSANs” and the government has deep roots. In 1977, the founders chose as their executive director Michael Ledeen, who at the time was a visiting professor of history at the University of Rome. Although he is still a board member, Ledeen’s JINSA affiliations do not appear in any of his official biographies.
After serving as executive director, Ledeen entered government on the coattails of Reagan’s presidential victory. From 1982 to 1986 he served as consultant to the White House, Pentagon, State Department, and the Italian military intelligence service.
Ledeen is most infamously remembered as the central figure in the “arms- for-hostages” scandal (Irangate), which exposed the Reagan administration’s involvement in illegal arm sales to Iran via Israel. In 1984, Ledeen served as go-between for Oliver North and Israeli spy David Kimche to gain the release of U.S. hostages in Beirut through Iranian arms dealer and Mossad agent Manucher Ghorbanifar. In congressional testimony, National Security
31. Mark H. Milstein “Strategic Ties or Tentacles? Institute for National Security Affairs,”
9. Invasion of the Policy Snatchers
175advisor Robert McFarlane stated that Ledeen violated procedure by bypassing the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv to deal directly with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres.32
Ledeen’s successor at JINSA was Stephen Bryen, who epitomizes the ease with which pro-Israeli Jews infiltrate the government. In 1978, a North Dakota businessman, Michael Saba, was in a Washington hotel coffee shop ordering breakfast when he overheard Bryen offer a top-secret document on Saudi air bases to a group of visiting officials from the Israel Ministry of Defense. At the time, Bryen was on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Saba was struck by the inclusive “we” tone of the conversation with these agents of a foreign government and began taking notes. According to his account, the conversation concerned strategies Israel could use to reverse the steep decline in administration and congressional support for Israel caused by Menachem Begin’s religious justifications for holding on to the West Bank:
“We must re-establish credibility,” Bryen told the group in English. “The West Bank can be gained on security grounds. To get [Senator Henry] Jackson and the others back we must push the security issue.” …. An Israeli asked Bryen if certain military information were available. “I have the Pentagon document on the bases, which you are welcome to see,” [said Bryen.]33
Saba, who is also former executive director of the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), took his concerns to the Justice Department. Subsequently, department and FBI investigators turned up sufficient evidence to consider a charge of espionage. In his book They Dare to Speak Out, former Congressman Paul Findley summarizes the case:
After nine months the investigating attorneys recommended that a grand jury be empanelled to consider the evidence against Bryen. According to the Justice Department, other witnesses testified to Bryen’s Israeli contacts. Indeed, a Justice Department memorandum dated January 26, 1979, discussed “unresolved questions thus far, which suggest that Bryen is (a) gathering classified information for the Israelis, (b) acting as their unregistered agent and (c) lying about it….” The Justice Department studied the complaint for two years. Although it found that Bryen had an “unusually close relationship with Israel,” it made no charges and in late 1979 closed the file.34
During the investigation, Bryen was suspended from the committee but was later reinstated. Despite a series of successful NAAA appeals, Bryen was never indicted. As Saba wrote, Deputy U.S. Attorney General Philip
32. Ibid. Ledeen affirms that his meetings had been approved.
33. Richard H. Curtiss, “Book Review: Michael P. Saba, The Armageddon Network” (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1984), WRMEA, Nov. 26, 1984, p.10.
Heymann was a long-time professional associate and close friend of Bryen’s lawyer. Saba’s book The Armageddon Network is a history of the Bryen investigation, his current activities, and the Justice Department’s role. He raises the possibility that the department might have covered up Israeli espionage.35
After his reinstatement, Bryen left the committee to succeed Ledeen at JINSA, where he could work for Israel under the pretext of promoting the “strategic relationship.” He remained as executive director until he resigned in early 1981 in favor of his wife Shoshona. Bryen still kept his membership on the JINSA board of directors when he subsequently took up his new post as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, responsible for regulating military technology transfers to foreign countries.
Thus, at the very onset of the Zionist-dominated Reagan presidency, this member of JINSA and suspected Israeli spy was placed in the highly sensitive position of helping decide which weapons Israel could buy with its annual allotment of military aid, and also which technology Israel could use in its own arms industry. Israel’s abuse of U.S. satellite intelligence to bomb Iraq’s Osirik nuclear reactor also occurred at this time.
The man responsible for Bryen’s appointment was under Assistant Secretary-designate Richard Perle, the most powerful Israeli agent in the government. Perle also had a history in politics as a staff member for hawkish pro-Israel Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson. He also had more than casual contact with Israeli officials. In 1970, an FBI wiretap summary recorded Perle discussing classified information with the Israeli embassy, and in 1983, while in the government, he received payments to represent the interests of an Israeli weapons company.36
Perle was the mentor of Wolfowitz, architect of the Gulf War while George W. Bush’s Assistant Secretary of Defense, a research fellow at the AEI, former member of the Defense Policy Board, and current member of the JINSA advisory board. Other key board members past and present include: Dick Cheney, Douglas Feith (the third-highest executive at the Pentagon), Jeane Kirkpatrick (Reagan’s UN ambassador), John Bolton, Sen. Connie Mack, Congressmen Jack Kemp and Stephen Solarz, Lt.-Gen. Jay Garner (George W. Bush’s first viceroy in post-invasion Iraq), and Ahmad Chalabi (head of the Iraqi National Congress).
CE N T E R F O R SE C U R I T Y PO L I C Y ( C S P )
Formed in 1988, the Center for Security Policy was nominally different from JINSA, but it might as well be considered JINSA’s defense and foreign policy arm, since its leadership features many of the same people—Perle, Ledeen, Kirkpatrick, etc.
35. Ibid.
9. Invasion of the Policy Snatchers
177The center is run by Frank Gaffney, and these highlights from his CSP bio show how fast the Zionists spread throughout the Reagan administration.
• late 1970s—with Perle on the staff of Sen. Jackson, specializing in defense and foreign policy.
• February 1981 to August 1983— staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee.
• August 1983 until November 1987—Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy under Perle. • April to November 1987—Succeeded Perle as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and chaired the prestigious High Level Group, NATO’s senior politico-military committee.
Whereas JINSA declares its Israeli bias up front, the CSP hides behind an innocuous, generic name. The center is little more than a reflection of Gaffney’s own simplistic, militant prejudices, and as such cannot seriously be considered a research institution. If there’s an anti-Arab, anti-UN, pro-Israeli, pro-military or obsequiously pro-George W. Bush position, the CSP will adopt it.
The CSP is less of an independent organization than it is a recycler of writings from other Zionist sources like The National Review, American
Spectator, Fox News, New York Post, frontpagemagazine.com and townhall.com.
To give an example of the incestuous nature of the Zionist fronts,
frontpagemagazine.com managing editor Jamie Glazov offered up a fawning
interview with Ledeen in which he affected Ledeen’s “terrorist” vocabulary and asked him leading questions to elicit the proper anti-Arab responses. At no time did Glazov identify Ledeen as a member of JINSA, yet the interview was dutifully reposted on the CSP website as if it were from an outside source.
In all, the CSP supplied 22 members to the incoming Bush administration, including Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Secretary of the Air Force James Roche. Of late, though, the CSP may have become a victim of its own venom. As Jason Vest wrote in The Nation:
“Gaffney has worn out his welcome by being an overbearing gadfly rather than a serious contributor to policy,” says a senior Pentagon political official. Since earlier this year, White House political adviser Karl Rove has been casting about for someone to start a new, more mainstream defense group that would counter the influence of CSP…. “A lot of us have taken [Gaffney] at face value over the years,” one influential conservative says. “Yet we now know he’s pushed for some of the most flawed missile defense and conventional systems…And since 9/11, he’s been less concerned with the threat to America than to Israel.”37
WA S H I N G T O N IN S T I T U T E F O R NE A R EA S T
PO L I C Y ( W I N E P )
Of all these Zionist fronts, the respectable-sounding Washington Institute for Near East Policy most clearly epitomizes the surreptitious hijacking of U.S. policy.
WINEP began as an offshoot of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the most influential Israeli lobby group in Washington D.C. In February 1985, Martin Indyk, a three-year employee of AIPAC, co- founded WINEP with Barbi Weinstein, former president of the Jewish Federation in Los Angeles and wife of AIPAC chairman emeritus Lawrence Weinberg.
Indyk sought to model WINEP after the Brookings Institution, and promote it as a “balanced and realistic” voice on the Middle East, but WINEP’s transparent pro-Israel bias and links to AIPAC say otherwise. Of the more than 100 members on the institute’s board of trustees, 14 also sat on AIPAC’s board. In turn, six members of WINEP’s 11 executive committee members served on AIPAC’s executive committee or national council, including Weinberg and two of WINEP’s three vice-presidents. AIPAC also provided office space and services to WINEP during its first year.38