For all of his charisma and moral rectitude, Reagan would quickly find that he was little more than a bystander in foreign policy, even where U.S. law was concerned. In June 1981, Israel used U.S. F-16’s to bomb Iraq’s uncompleted Osirik nuclear reactor. This act of aggression clearly violated the U.S.-Israel arms procurement agreement, which stipulated that weapons may only be used for defensive purposes. Alexander Haig, Reagan’s Secretary of State, swept the matter under the rug.
For his part, Reagan sent a letter to Begin to protest the bombing. In response, Begin threw the Nazi holocaust at Reagan:
A million and half children were poisoned by the Ziklon [sic] gas during the Holocaust. Now Israel’s children were about to be poisoned by radioactivity. For two years we have lived in the shadow of the danger awaiting Israel from nuclear reactor in Iraq. This would have been a new Holocaust. It was prevented by the heroism of our pilots to whom we owe so much.38
36. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Military–Industrial Complex Speech, November 1960, <www.yale.edu/lawwebavalon/presiden/speeches/eisenhower001.htm>.
37. Michael Mandel, “Lessons of the Reagan Years,” Business Week, Aug. 19, 1996. 38. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall–Israel and the Arab World Since 1948 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), p. 387.
To compound the insult, the first person Begin called after the bombing was Jerry Falwell to ask him to “explain to the Christian public the reasons for the bombing.”39
Three months afterwards, Begin visited Reagan, who never once brought up the question of illegal Jewish “settlements,” or the difference between offensive and defensive weapons. Instead, the two leaders signed an agreement proclaiming U.S. “strategic co-operation” with Israel, although “Israeli co-optation of the U.S.” would be more accurate. During the Reagan era, annual economic aid to Israel rose to $1.2 billion, and military aid rose to $1.8 billion.
As part of the agreement, Israel would have access to the most sophisticated U.S. technology and intelligence gathering systems, including techniques to defeat U.S. weapons and reconnaissance systems. As Alfred Lilienthal pointedly commented: “Henceforth, Israel was not to be the 51st state, as critics had complained, but the first state of the Union.”40
Israel’s abuse of U.S. technology was a key factor in the Osirik bombing. In early 1981, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, wondered how Israel managed to target the Iraq’s reactor with such accuracy, and proceeded to make inquiries about Israel’s requisitioning of U.S. satellite photographs. According to mutual agreement, satellite data was to be shared only for defensive purposes so that Israel could highlight “potential direct threats.”
“When I asked what materials had been drawn under that process for the last six months, I found not only a lot of information on Baghdad had been drawn, but also on other countries substantially removed from Israel… Pakistan, Libya,” said Inman. “And I made the decision as the deputy director of central intelligence, the acting director, to limit the process, to say that in the future they could draw material within 250 miles of the border, but beyond that, they would have to ask.”41
Inman goes on to say that then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was so furious he came to the U.S. to protest to Reagan’s Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, but neither Weinberger nor CIA Director William Casey would cave in. Moreover, Inman enjoyed considerable bipartisan respect.42
39. That same year, Falwell become the first non-Jew to receive the Jabotinsky Award for Zionist Excellence. Two years earlier, Begin gave Falwell a Learjet. Donald Wagner, “Bible and Sword: U.S. Christian Zionists discover Israel,” Daily Star (Lebanon), Oct, 9, 2003. 40. Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 732.
41. Excerpts from transcript of televised news conference by Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, Jan. 18, 1994, cited in “Safire Media Attacks Began When Inman Blocked Israeli Access to U.S. Satellite Intelligence,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Feb./March 1994, p. 29. 42. Adm. Inman won easy Senate confirmation for his nomination, and became the first naval intelligence specialist ever to become a four-star admiral. Oklahoma Democratic Senator David Boren said of him: “It was principally Admiral Inman who first showed that the congressional oversight process could work.” Cited in Biography of Bobby Ray Inman, White House documents, Dec. 16, 1993, <fas.org/irp/news/1993/931216i.htm>.
8. Housebreaking the U.S.
155Of all the Middle East issues that bothered Reagan, Israel’s June 6, 1982, invasion of Lebanon was the most painful. Begin claimed that the invasion was meant to stop Palestinian attacks from southern Lebanon, but Israel quickly betrayed its true purpose when it laid siege to Beirut to push the PLO out of Lebanon.
On June 14, Israel began a punishing two-month bombardment of Beirut’s civilian neighborhoods. More than 4,000 people were killed and untold numbers injured and buried alive under rubble. In one 14-hour assault, 180,000 shells were fired, and American-made bombers flew 200 sorties.
For Reagan, the pictures of babies with burnt-off limbs, children dying of starvation and thirst, and weeping mothers was too much.43 He threatened to review U.S.-Israel relations because of the carpet-bombing of Beirut, but Begin again hid behind the Nazi holocaust to put Reagan in his place.
Now may I tell you, dear Mr. President, how I feel these days when I turn to the creator of my soul in deep gratitude. I feel as a Prime Minister empowered to instruct a valiant army facing Berlin where amongst innocent civilians, Hitler and his henchmen hide in a bunker deep beneath the surface. My generation, dear Ron, swore on the altar of God that whoever proclaims his intent to destroy the Jewish state or the Jewish people, or both, seals his fate, so that which happened once on instruction from Berlin—with or without inverted commas—will never happen again.44
On Sept. 1, 1982, Reagan delivered a nationwide address in which he defined U.S. policy for Palestinian-Israeli peace. It was a moderate speech, replete with the requisite paeans to Israel and its history, but its significance lies in Reagan’s compassion for the suffering of the Palestinians. The following two paragraphs contain the key points:
First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs. Due consideration must be given to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties
43. “Horror for Lebanon,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Aug. 23, 1982, p. 2. “Today in Beirut, Arab children have their legs and arms amputated by candlelight in the basements of hospitals destroyed by bombs, without anesthetics, without sterilization. It is eleven days since proud veteran Israeli troops cut the electricity and water, and food and fuel supplies. We’re in August, a hot August. Rats already outnumber children in the city of Beirut, upon which the best pilots in the world, the aviators of the Israeli Air Force, are exercising their marvelous capacity for precision. From their planes they watch how the buildings of Beirut crumble. People in Beirut also observe those who leap from their windows, choosing a different death from those who were caught in buildings that were reduced to dust….In the second month of the war more children were killed in Beirut than during 30 years of terrorism in Israel.” Jacobo Timmerman, The Longest War—Israel in Lebanon (New York: Vintage, 1982), p. 162. Begin deliriously confuses Beirut with Berlin.
involved. The purpose of the five-year period of transition, which would begin after free elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority, is to prove to the Palestinians that they can run their own affairs and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel’s security.
The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transitional period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.45
Within four days of the speech, Israel announced the allocation of $18.5 million to build the first three of 10 new “settlements.” Approval was given on the same day that Begin wrote a letter of protest to Reagan for his comments about Palestinian statehood. On Nov. 3, five more settlements were approved. Harsh condemnation led to Israel announcing 15 more settlements. The World Zionist Organization even called for 1.4 million Jews to be living in the West Bank by 2010.46
Even though the Lobby bullied previous administrations, its pressure had been external—from Jewish groups, senators, congressmen and the media. As Rabbi Alexander Schindler, the leader of Jewish political lobbying, said in April 1978: “The strength of Israel depends on the strength of the American Jewish community and its unity in support of Israel.”47
With Reagan in the White House, the Lobby was given the keys to government. Although Reagan did not appoint any Jews to his cabinet, many Zionists, including Israeli citizens, received key appointments to advisory and sub-cabinet policymaking positions.
Thus, it came to pass that Ronald Reagan, the movie actor-turned- political actor, was cast in a reality movie written, directed and produced by the Heritage Foundation and supply-side economic mystics. The Reagan
Revolution, as this production came to be called, was a critical and financial
failure, but it became a cult hit among Americans eager to imbibe simplistic slogans and jingoistic patter.
Moreover, the backers of The Reagan Revolution were prepared to do anything to ensure an indefinite run. As a result of these machinations, Zionist influence on government proliferated, and the U.S. began to resemble an Israeli satrapy.
45. President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the
Middle East, Sept. 1, 1982, <www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1982/90182d.htm>.
46. “West Bank: Settlements Galore,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Nov. 15, 1982, p. 3.
8. Housebreaking the U.S.
157BU R N I N G BU S H
After the Berlin Wall fell on Nov. 9, 1989, the geopolitical social order changed radically: the Cold War was over, the Soviet Union disappeared, and the U.S. found itself without a clear external enemy. This was the world Reagan’s Vice-President and successor George Bush Sr. inherited.
Bush was a reluctant Reaganaut. He was neither senile nor passively dependent on advisors. Thanks to his elite connections, Bush had spent much of his life in politics, including posts as UN ambassador and director of the CIA under Nixon.
On foreign policy, Bush was an internationalist and pragmatist, and in the Middle East, he favored regional stability over Israel’s self- aggrandizement. Using the pretext of rolling back Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and protecting Saudi Arabia from an attack, he put together an international armed coalition to protect the U.S. Persian Gulf oil supply. Bush’s limited aims put him at odds with the radical Pentagon Zionists, whom he derisively called “the crazies.”
The crazies wanted to use the Gulf War to oust Saddam Hussein, but then-Gen. Colin Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and field commander Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf opposed the idea on legal, political and military grounds. The United States had a UN mandate only to liberate Kuwait, not to topple Hussein—which would have torn apart the coalition.
Regional allies like Turkey and Saudi Arabia feared that taking out Hussein would fragment Iraq into warring ethnic and religious factions. In one scenario, the Kurds in the north could spread rebellion to Turkey’s own Kurdish population, and Iraq’s majority Shi’ites could find themselves under Iranian influence. To his credit, Bush stared down the crazies, but he would not enjoy his victory for long.
In 1991, Bush tried to breathe new life into Carter’s idea of a comprehensive Middle East peace. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev co-sponsored an Oct. 30–31 ministerial conference in Madrid to devise an end to the first Palestinian Intifada or uprising (literally, “shaking off”). A letter of invitation went out to the governments of Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan (including Palestine), the European Community, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (observer). At the time, the U.S. had still not recognized the PLO.
Former terrorist and assassin Yitzhak Shamir, the Likud Prime Minister at the time, refused to participate. To compel his participation, Bush threatened to withhold $10 billion in loan guarantees. The threat worked, but the Lobby was furious, to say nothing of Shamir. The cause of their anger is obvious in these excerpts from Bush’s address.
Our objective must be clear and straightforward. It is not simply to end the state of war in the Middle East and replace it with a state of non- belligerency. This is not enough; this would not last. Rather, we seek
peace, real peace. And by real peace I mean treaties. Security. Diplomatic relations. Economic relations. Trade. Investment. Cultural exchange. Even tourism.
What we seek is a Middle East where vast resources are no longer devoted to armaments. A Middle East where young people no longer have to dedicate and, all too often, give their lives to combat. A Middle East no longer victimized by fear and terror. A Middle East where normal men and women lead normal lives….
What we envision is a process of direct negotiations proceeding along two tracks, one between Israel and the Arab states; the other between Israel and the Palestinians. Negotiations are to be conducted on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338….
Real peace—lasting peace—must be based upon security for all states and peoples, including Israel. For too long the Israeli people have lived in fear, surrounded by an unaccepting Arab world. Now is the ideal moment for the Arab world to demonstrate that attitudes have changed, that the Arab world is willing to live in peace with Israel and make allowances for Israel’s reasonable security needs.
We know that peace must also be based on fairness. In the absence of fairness, there will be no legitimacy - no stability. This applies above all to the Palestinian people, many of whom have known turmoil and frustration above all else. Israel now has an opportunity to demonstrate that it is willing to enter into a new relationship with its Palestinian neighbors; one predicated upon mutual respect and cooperation.48
The very act of showing compassion for Palestinians and arguing for stability in the Middle East was logical and rational, but it posed a direct threat to the crazies and the colonialist ambitions of Israel’s ruling Likud party. Since 1968, Labor and Likud governments alike have supported progressive Jewish colonization in the Occupied Territories. On paper at least, Labor governments have been willing to trade land for peace, because they recognize that the occupation is the greatest threat to Israel’s security. On this point, the party has the backing of the vast majority of Israelis, who are tired of the violence. On the ground, Labor merely pursues expansionist results with greater discretion than Likud.
Likud governments derive much of their electoral support from thuggish “settler” groups, who overtly terrorize and provoke Palestinians. As such, Likud does not want a political solution to the violence, because such a solution would compromise their power base and their messianic “Nile to Euphrates” expansionism.
In short, Labor governments pay lip service to international law and profess to want a political solution, albeit one grossly unfair to the Palestinians. Likud governments care nothing for international law or
48. President George Bush, Madrid Conference Opening Speeches, Oct. 30-31, 1991, <www. mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0bvp0>.
8. Housebreaking the U.S.
159morality. They are deliberately provocative and bent on conducting a Nazi- style Lebensraum conquest and dispossession.
In spirit if nothing else, Bush supported the Labor position, and for this reason he had to go. On Feb. 26, 1992, a domestic pressure group of crazies calling itself the “The Committee on U.S. Interests in the Middle East” took out a full-page ad in the New York Times to excoriate Bush for “pressuring” Israel to enter into negotiations based on “land for peace.”
The attack was gratuitous, since Bush had peremptorily capitulated to Israel, as shown by the letters of assurance Secretary of State James Baker III sent to the two major parties. To the Palestinians he wrote: “‘The U.S. will accept any outcome agreed by the parties,’’ ignoring the fact that UNSC Res. 242 compels Israel to leave the Occupied Territories unconditionally, and renders the basis of any other agreement null and void. To the Israelis, Baker wrote: “Israel holds its own interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 alongside other interpretations.”49
Nevertheless, the ad signaled the impending end of Bush’s presidency and the Lobby’s intention to return to the Democrats.
In a 2002 article Should Israel Retaliate? Avi Davis, a Likudnik writer for the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, typified the Israel Lobby’s anger with Bush. Ostensibly a discussion of whether Israel would again agree not to retaliate against attack as it did during the Gulf War, the piece was a character assassination of the Bush administration and a swipe at the Labor Party:
• The last Bush administration was the most unfriendly to Israel since the country’s founding.
• James Baker famously admonished the Israelis: call us when you are serious about peace, and repeated the identification of settlements as the major obstacle to achieving it. He turned US-Israeli relations into a bitter slogging match between lobbyists.
• The first Bush Administration, flush with confidence in its new diplomatic muscle, railroaded an unwilling Shamir into a peace conference in Madrid. The conference… succeeded in revealing the depth of hatred for Israel (and, if we are to be truthful, for the U.S. itself) in the Arab world.
• The United States has no better military, political or ideological ally in the Middle East [than Israel].
• [The U.S.] might finally acknowledge that the future of the Middle East lies in a quarantine of the region by a quadrilateral military alliance, linking those democratic countries such as Turkey, India, Israel and the United States, who feel most threatened by the export of militant Islam.50
49. Elaine C. Hagopian, “The Pope’s emphasis on Palestinian rights,” Boston Globe, May 16, 2001, p. 15.
50. Avi Davis, Should Israel Retaliate? Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, November 2002, <www.freeman.org/m_online/nov02/davis1.htm>.
With the last point we see the beginnings of the latest shift in Zionist strategy. Just as Israel and the Lobby pushed the “special relationship” as the foundation of U.S.-Israeli relations under Reagan, it now needed to adapt to a post-Cold War vacuum marked by the lack of an arch-enemy for the U.S. The new role for Israel would be as bulwark against the bogeyman of