Políticas públicas de educación superior en Chile

MARCO CONCEPTUAL

CAPÍTULO 2 FORMACIÓN DEL PROFESIONAL DE LA SALUD PARA EL HOY Y EL

2.2. Políticas públicas de educación superior en Chile

This is an experiment about decision-making. You will be paid $5 for participating in this experiment, plus an amount that depends on the decisions you and other people make. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment in the following way: Af- ter we’ve read these instructions, you will receive a player number. DO NOT SHOW ANYONE ELSE THIS NUMBER. When the experiment is done, the experimenter will put each person’s earnings in an envelope marked with the appropriate ID number. These envelopes will be given to someone outside of the room and you will have to give this person your number to receive the envelope containing your money. Any information tying your name to the amount you made in the experiment will not be seen by the experimenter. The procedures will ensure that no one, including the experimenter, will know what decisions you made during the experiment.

In this experiment, you will play a series of games, each with another person in the room. You will always make decisions in the role of Player X. Before each game, you will be randomly matched with another person in the room who will be in the role of Player Y. Since you are randomly rematched every round, there is only a small chance that you will be matched with the same person in multiple rounds.

The games you will play will be like the one pictured below. As player X, you will choose either “A” or “B” by clicking on it. Player Y will not make any choice. Both players will receive payments based on the choice of Player X. The numbers in the table are the payments players receive, given in francs. At the end of the experiment, your francs will be converted to dollars, at a rate of francs per dollar. The numbers below are just an example—you will see different amounts in the games you play.

EXAMPLE 1:

42 Appendix. Experimental Instructions.

NUMBER. When the experiment is done, the experimenter will put each person’s earnings in an envelope marked with the appropriate ID number. These envelopes will be given to someone outside of the room and you will have to give this person your number to receive the envelope containing your money. Any information tying your name to the amount you made in the experiment will not be seen by the experimenter. The procedures will ensure that no one, including the experimenter, will know what decisions you made during the experiment.

In this experiment, you will play a series of games, each with another person in the room. You will always make decisions in the role of Player X. Before each game, you will be

randomly matched with another person in the room who will be in the role of Player Y. Since you are randomly rematched every round, there is only a small chance that you will be matched with the same person in multiple rounds.

The games you will play will be like the one pictured below. As player X, you will choose either “A” or “B” by clicking on it. Player Y will not make any choice. Both players will receive payments based on the choice of Player X. The numbers in the table are the payments players receive, given in francs. At the end of the experiment, your francs will be converted to dollars, at a rate of _____ francs per dollar. The numbers below are just an example—you will see different amounts in the games you play.

EXAMPLE 1: Player X’s A

_{X: 1 Y: 2}

Choices B

_{X: 3 Y: 4}

In this example, if Player X chooses “B,” we look in the bottom square for the earnings. Here, Player X receives 3 francs and Player Y receives 4 francs. Player X’s payments will always be written to the left of Player Y’s payments.

To make sure everyone understands the instructions so far, please answer the following questions:

In this example, if Player X chooses “A” then: Player X receives ____________ Player Y receives ____________ If Player X chooses “B” then:

Player X receives ____________ Player Y receives ____________

To make sure everyone understands the instructions so far, please answer the following questions:

In this example, if Player X chooses “A” then: Player X receives

Player Y receives

If Player X chooses “B” then: Player X receives

Player Y receives

You will not necessarily know which game you are playing—it could be one of two games, called “Game 1” and “Game 2.” You will see a screen that looks like the following example.

EXAMPLE 2:

43 You will not necessarily know which game you are playing—it could be one of two games, called “Game 1” and “Game 2.” You will see a screen that looks like the following example. EXAMPLE 2: Player X’s A _{X: 4 Y: ?} Choices B _{X: 3 Y: ?}

There is a 20% chance that the game is GAME 1.

GAME 1 GAME 2

A _{X: 4 Y: 3} A _{X: 4 Y: 1}

B _{X: 3 Y: 1} B _{X: 3 Y: 3}

Notice that “GAME 1” and “GAME 2” are the same except that Player Y’s payments are flipped between the two. In both games, Player X gets his highest payment of 4 francs by choosing A. In the game on the left (Game 1), this gives Player Y her highest payment of 3 francs, but in the game on the right (Game 2), it gives Player Y her lowest payment of 1 franc. If Player X chooses B, he gets a lower payment of 3 francs. In Game 1, this gives Player Y her lowest payment of 1 franc, but in Game 2, it gives Player Y her highest payment of 3 francs.

The payments that you see will be different than in this example, but the same rules will apply. Player X’s payments will be the same in both games, and Player Y’s will be flipped between the two games. Player X will always get his highest payment by choosing A. In Game 1, this will give Player Y her highest payment, but in Game 2, it will give Player Y her lowest payment. If Player X chooses B, he will get a lower payment. In Game 1, Player Y will get her lowest payment, and in Game 2, she will get her highest payment.

You will not know which of the games you will be playing, but you will see the chance that you will be playing Game 1. In the example above, there is a 20% chance that the game is Game 1. That means that the computer will randomly select a game with a 1 in 5 chance of picking Game 1. You can choose to find out which game you are actually playing, if you want to do so, by clicking on the “Reveal Game” button before you play. If you click this button, you will see Player Y’s payoffs and will therefore know if you are playing Game 1 or Game 2.

Reveal Game

gives Player Y her lowest payment of 1 franc. If Player X chooses B, he gets a lower payment of 3 francs. In Game 1, this gives Player Y her lowest payment of 1 franc, but in Game 2, it gives Player Y her highest payment of 3 francs.

Although you will always make decisions as Player X, you will also be acting as Player Y for another person. For example, let’s say the person with ID number 5, who we’ll call person 5, is making a decision as Player X, and he is paired with person 8, who will be in the role of Player Y. Person 5 will make choices that affect how much he and person 8 receive. At the same time, person 7 will act as Player X with person 5 in the role of Player Y. Person 7 will make choices that affect how much she and person 5 receive. Note that your decisions as Player X do not affect what you will get as Player Y. Your earnings will be a total of the amount you earn as Player X and the amount you get as Player Y, which is based on other people’s decisions.

After you have made your decision in one round, you will automatically be taken to the next round. You will not see any information on what you earned in that round, and Player Y will not see what decisions you made in that round. You will find out your total payoffs at the end of the experiment.

To make sure everyone understands these instructions, please answer the following questions.

1. Which action gives Player X his or her highest payment? 2. In Example 2, if Player X chooses B, then Player Y receives:

a) 3 francs b) 1 franc

c) either 3 francs or 1 franc

3. In Example 2, what is the chance that the game is: Game 1?

Game 2?

4. In Example 2, if the probability of game 1 were 100% and Player X chose A, what would Player Y receive?

5. In one round, you make a choice that gives Player X a payment of 2 francs and Player Y a payment of 1 franc. At the same time, you are Player Y for another person who makes a choice that gives Player X a payment of 4 francs and Player Y a payment of 3 francs. What is your total payment for this round?

Chapter 3 The Effect of Selective Information

Acquisition on Charitable Giving

3.1 Introduction

Research has shown that people will avoid information in order to justify self-serving economic decisions, though most of us know this to be true from personal experience. In past experimental studies (e.g., the previous chapter; Dana, Weber, and Kuang, forthcoming), subjects faced a simple binary choice of obtaining information or not. Decisions to gain information in everyday situations are seldom so clear-cut. This chapter considers whether the amount of information one chooses to learn about a charity affects the amount one donates. I conduct an experiment that allows subjects to obtain varying amounts of information about a non-profit organization before choosing how much money to keep or donate to the cause. The amount of information obtained is positively correlated with the amount donated, and experimental evidence suggests that reading more leads to higher donations. This chapter also finds signs of guilt or self-deception among subjects who do not make donations. These findings indicate that even agents who appear to act generously by making positive donations to charities might still partake in information avoidance to prevent themselves from donating more.

In the main experiment described in this chapter, subjects play multiple rounds of a dictator game with a different charity as the recipient in each period. In one stage

of the experiment, subjects can choose to read a short description about the charity in order to learn about it before deciding how much to donate or keep. Without reading anything, subjects would not know which charity had been chosen. Half of the charities that are selected for a subject are ones she claims to dislike and the other half are ones she claims to like. A subject could therefore justify a decision to donate nothing by ignoring the description and telling herself that the selected charity is probably one she does not like. Subjects may also choose to read just enough to know whether the charity is liked or not, but avoid learning more about it.

Previous studies have found that subjects make substantial contributions to charities in laboratory dictator games (Eckel and Grossman, 1996 and 2000; Benz and Meier, 2006). This chapter does not focus on the size of donations to particular charities or contrast the findings to a standard dictator game. Non-profit organizations are used as recipients primarily because they can be described within a paragraph, but also because one can readily imagine the everyday equivalent of seeking out information about a charity. Reading an entire description of a charity in this experiment can be likened to taking the time to talk to volunteers about the fund they are raising money for. Reading only part of a description is akin to changing channels halfway through a Christian Children’s Fund commercial.

This chapter is most closely related to studies on the justification of self-serving decisions, and particularly to studies of information avoidance. Giving subjects in a dictator game the opportunity to avoid knowing whether their payoffs were aligned with their recipients’ has been found to increase self-serving allocations (Dana, Weber, and Kuang, forthcoming). Subjects avoid information more often in these games when they can reassure themselves that the recipients’ payoffs are most likely aligned with their own (see Chapter 2).

Agents may also justify decisions by seeking information sources that can provide support for their beliefs or preferences. They might read about preferred political candidates (Chaffee and Miyo, 1983) or check their stocks only when a market in- dex has risen (Karlsson, Lowenstein, and Seppi, 2005). This confirmatory bias can be so strong that subjects will pay for non-instrumental information in laboratory

experiments (Eliaz and Schotter, 2006; Chapter 4 of this thesis).

Other forms of justification have been studied experimentally. When outcomes for a recipient are ambiguous or conflicts of interest are revealed, experimental subjects give less honest advice because they can justify taking the action that benefits them (Schweitzer and Hsee, 2002; Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore, 2005). Ambiguity about recipients’ payoffs in a dictator game leads to less equitable allocations and can even make dictators perceive their actions to be fair (Haisley and Weber, 2005).

Guilt may be a driving factor for generosity in dictator games. In Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006) and Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2006), subjects are allowed to opt out of a dictator game and receive an amount of money similar to what they could have allocated in the game itself. Opting out prevents a potential recipient from knowing the game could have been played, but the recipient earns nothing. Even when opting out provides them with less money than keeping everything in the dictator game, many subjects take this option. These subjects presumably would feel guilty about directly failing to allocate money to a recipient, but they somehow avoid guilt by exiting out of the game.

The current chapter considers a physiological expression of guilt, namely, looking away quickly from charities that one does not donate to. Guilt has been discussed theoretically by economists. For example, Kandel and Lazear (1992) provide an orga- nizational application of guilt, and Becker (1996) discusses the avoidance of beggars on the street as being caused by guilt about not donating. However, direct measure- ments that relate to guilt are lacking in the literature. (See Elster, 1998, for a survey of the rare appearances of guilt and other emotions within economic research.)

This chapter aims to provide greater insight on forces that might drive information avoidance, such as guilt and the effect of learning about the potential recipient of a donation. The next section presents the primary experiment used to address the questions of this chapter, followed by hypotheses and results. Section 3.5 contains the details of other treatments designed to determine whether people who choose to donate to a charity seek out more information about it, or whether gaining information causes one to donate more. Section 3.6 ties together the findings of the experiments

discussed in this chapter.

In document Aprendizaje multiprofesional basado en problemas en la formación de profesionales de la salud: Un estudio de caso (página 32-36)