RESULTADOS Y DISCUSIÓN 4.1. INTERPRETACIÓN DE RESULTADOS
4.1.2. PRESENTACIÓN, ANÁLISIS E INTERPRETACIÓN DE RESULTADOS
One of the things that always saddened me in the past was the way in which the responsibilities of what was then the Department of National Heritage were written off by many commentators as an add-on to the main economic business of government. That perception is now changing rapidly, and not before time. These areas of industry, which rely on individual talent and the creation of value through imaginative skill, are not just part of the enjoyment agenda; they are vital for employment and our economy, too. (Smith, 1998: 147)
The previous chapter conceptualized the neo-liberal restructuring under the Thatcher Government as a response to the world-wide shift toward post-organized capitalism. The Third-Way restructuring of cultural policy under the New Labour government can be then understood as a response to both the post-organization and the neo-liberal restructuring. With the rise of New Labour to power, the state of affairs in the UK cultural policy arena significantly changed. As quoted, ‘Mr. Smith’ drew ‘a map’ (Frith, 1999) for this shift as the first Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. This chapter aims to provide a detailed outline of the changes that were instituted.
New labour policymakers often framed the post-organization as the rise of the ‘knowledge economy’ or the ‘new economy’. From the early days it was the policymakers’ key project to reconceptualize Britain and its competitiveness in accordance with the rules of ‘the new global economy’ (cf. Fairclough, 2000). For instance, as Robin Cook declared, the promotion of ‘Cool Britannia’ sought to ‘replace a myth of an old Britain’ that had continuously declined from its glorious past, with the new image of a youthful and fashionable country full of cutting-edge talent and activities (Awan, 2008). When it comes to cultural policy, the key word for this ambitious initiative was ‘creative industries’. In order to engage in the emerging trends and sectors under the new economy, the policymakers devised the new concept and promoted it along with related policies.
There are of course contending views on this government-driven discourse that predicates the centrality of the creative industries from the perspective of the emerging new economy. To illustrate, while contrasting ‘modernist’ categories including the public sphere and governmentality with a newly emerging paradigm such as ‘the DIY citizen’, John Hartley (2004b) argues that along with creativity, the ‘new economy’ as the latest version of the ‘knowledge economy’ is producing significant
30 changes in the conventional methods of cultural production and consumption. Stuart Cunningham (2004) also asserts that the ‘cultural industries and policy’ heyday around the 1980s and 1990s gave way to the ‘service industries model’ of industry development and regulation, which is now giving way to new developments around the ‘knowledge- based economy’. Accordingly, he welcomes the fact that governments around world have recognized that most classic strategies are insufficient for fostering the new economy, and are now accepting a ‘renewed interventionist role for the state in setting 21st-century industry policies’. In this regard, these pro-new economy researchers
appear to not only approve of but also to advocate the British discourse of creativity and creative industries (see also Flew, 2004; Higgs et al., 2008).
On the other hand, other commentators are suspicious of the new economy and thus of creative industries policy. For Toby Miller (2004), it seems not proper even to confer the status of a ‘research topic’ on inaccurate concepts such as the ‘new economy’ and ‘creativity’. Instead, he argues that as part of technological futurism, the new economy discourse has been a ‘smokescreen’ for the prevailing neo-liberal Washington Consensus, which have resulted in slower worldwide growth and greater worldwide inequality. Andy Pratt (2004) points out that the articulation of the ‘new economy’ with ‘creativity’ in strategic policy making has a long history of over a century, and does not represent a ‘rupture’ at all. He also insists that most accounts drawing on the term appear ‘locked into a fairly crude form of technological determinism’. Against the over-inflated expectations of the new economy, these sceptical researchers have worked hard to reveal the shortcomings and negative impacts of the British CI policy shift (see also Garnham, 2005; Oakley, 2004; 2009).
Nonetheless, both parties almost readily agree that interest in the new economy has driven a great shift in British cultural policy, and has given prominence to ‘creative industries’ as a ‘pioneer sector of the economy’ (The Work Foundation, 2007: 16). Besides, it should be noted on another level that the newly emerging CI policy consists of ‘a body of thought’ (Schlesinger, 2007) or a conceptual ‘constellation’ (Benjamin, 2003), which therefore cannot be easily totalized or reduced to a simple position or two. Hence, taking a step back from the sharp division around the new economy, this chapter seeks to describe the production and products of the British policy shift, rather than to judge their value too hastily. In doing so, I shall first explore the terminological shift toward ‘creative industries’, focusing on its politico-economic background. This chapter then attempts to overview the body of work that arose during the shift to comprise the CI policy framework. Finally, I will critically examine assessments of the policy shift. My
31 ultimate aim in clarifying the shift in British policy here is to provide a useful reference point for examining the parallel Korean experience. Therefore, this chapter may be viewed as a reading of the British experience through the Korean perspective.