CAPÍTULO II: MARCO TEÓRICO
2.2. Base Teórica
2.2.2. Principios Constitucionales en las Relaciones Comerciales
2.2.2.2. Principios Constitucionales de Mercado
Generally speaking, while the ENP is clearly not a ‘security policy’ in the same manner as those conceptualised and implemented by sovereign nation states and, moreover, does not bear close resemblance to either the EU’s ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’ (CSDP) or ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) per se, it does have a strong security element at its core and even encompasses a number of fields related to, and today considered to be, ‘security proper’. Some oft-stated ENP goals for example, such as
mobility and migration management, position issues of ‘border security’ at their core - while key ENP instruments such as political conditionality are clearly geared towards rewarding the security-reform efforts of partners in areas of mutual security interest between themselves and the Union - such as the countering of trans-border terrorism. Indeed, representing the main focus of the present thesis in terms of the proceeding analysis of the ENP in Chapter 4, the primary goals of the policy with respect to the above notions of security governance are typically given by scholars to be; democracy promotion (stabilising the EU’s neighbourhood), mobility and migration management (securing the EU’s borders) and conflict management (pacifying the EU’s neighbourhood and beyond) (Krahmann, 2003; Ehrhart et al, 2014). Indeed, the significance of security within the ENP is further evidenced by the existence of a great deal of contemporary literature and commentary on behalf of EU scholars and observers - each of whom have sought to analyse directly the linkages between the ENP and various issues of security at different times and in different contexts - generally promulgating however that the ENP does in fact represent a key component of the EU’s promotion of security both at home and abroad today (Pace, 2007; Schröder, 2011).
In this sense, according to some prominent EU scholars, the ENP can be best understood as representing case-in-point the EU’s internal management of external security (Lavanex & Wichmann, 2008; Schröder, 2011; Ehrhart, et al 2014) - whereby, primarily, the EU seeks to project its norms and values towards its neighbourhood in the context of its own self-defined security concerns. Such notions have been built upon historic analyses of the EU itself, classing the institution as a prime example of a ‘security community’ - a form of international cooperation, that, within certain contexts, leads directly to cases of integration (Deutsch, 1957). Such early studies have therefore been expanded in recent decades to focus on particular policies such as the ENP, in terms of their potential transformative capabilities in integrating third countries into a distinct ‘European security sphere’, a community based upon the cooperation and mutual interest among various actors that was already self-evident within the EU itself and amongst EU member states more generally (Buzan et al, 1998). These very same notions therefore represent the forerunners of the above ‘governance’ perspectives on the EU, and while a number of studies have in the past concerned themselves with governance aspects of the ENP in
relation to security more generally, it has only been more recently however that such notions of security governance as a concept in its own right have begun to be applied more explicitly to the ENP itself (Ehrhart et al, 2014).
Such recent studies therefore, have largely been able to account for many of aspects of the conventional security governance core characteristics typologies discussed above depending on their respective research focus. First, with respect to the prerequisite categories of conventional security governance, it has been argued that the ENP itself primarily comprises of the mutual interests and shared normative practices between the EU, its MS and ENP target countries - the policy having been designed primarily on the basis of a need for cooperation amongst partners on perceived security issues such as inequality, migration, crime, environmental issues, public health, extremism, terrorism and conflict management; and on shared values such as democracy promotion, human rights and electoral reform (Ehrhart et al, 2014; Dandashly, 2014). Structurally, studies have focused on the multiple actors now involved in the ENP - from complex institutional mappings of the EU’s foreign policy apparatus (Krahmann, 2003) to analyses relating more to the ENP’s cooperation mechanisms between these key actors (Ehrhart et al, 2014). Some have even touched on elements of effectiveness and legitimacy - the final category of conventional security governance - dealing with failures of EU ENP security governance abroad (Bosse et al, 2009) and issues of legality, transparency and accountability (Ehrhart et al, 2014).
Clearly then, both observing and appropriating the ENP as a case of security governance is possible - as has indeed already been carried out in a number of different manners over the last decade or so. Moreover, security governance as a concept can capture, amongst other particular elements of interest; the multiplicity of actors involved in the ENP process and the different levels of interaction they each incur within the context of EU foreign policy; security governance can also help elucidate how cooperative arrangements between the EU and third countries with regards to security issues occur and are maintained; security governance can further appropriate different levels of effectiveness and legitimacy within ENP arrangements; and, last but not least, security governance can offer scholars an alternative avenue and framework for engaging in
studies concerned with certain aspects of EU foreign policy analysis. But are the above core characteristics of conventional security governance infallible? Indeed, what are the limitations of such an approach and what is the significance of these shortcomings vis-à- vis the research aims of the present research project?
2.7 Problematizing Conventional Security Governance: the argument for ‘Critical’